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CHAPTER ONE 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND MIGRATION RIGHTS: A 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
Regional integration can be said to be a strategy endorsed by many countries, particularly in 
Africa, with a view to accelerate economic growth and development. Considering that in most 
cases, regional integration takes the form of economic integration, the two terms tend to be 
used synonymously. Regional integration was initially perceived of in mainly trade-related 
terms of tariff-elimination and trade expansion, but as Asante explains, in Africa, it is an 
economic development issue, partly aimed at improving the bargaining power of African 
countries in international trade and relations1.  
Besides, it may be the case that African States have embraced regional integration, not only as 
a panacea for underdevelopment and poverty in Africa, but also as a means of establishing 
closer links among the peoples and nations of Africa. It has actually been contended that 
regional integration in Africa is seen as paving way for African unity, both economic and 
political2. Elsewhere it is argued that regional integration in Africa is motivated by political 
considerations3. Moreover since regional integration is primarily driven by economic 
objectives, to use the words of McCarthy, ‘a regional integration arrangement can be seen as a 
political construct held in place by economic cement’4. This seems to be particularly the case 
with the East African Community (EAC). 
The EAC is one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa established not only 
for the purposes of attaining economic integration among its member states, but to ultimately 
form a political federation. The seeds of the political federation should therefore be sown and 
nurtured in the earlier phases of the integration. Asides from the seeds of good governance, 
                                                          
 
1 S.K.B Asante The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (1986) 12-13. 
2 Ibid at 26-27. 
3 Colin McCarthy ‘Is Africa economic integration in need of a paradigm change? Thinking out of the box on 
African integration’ in Anton Bösl, Willie Breytenbach, Trudi Hartzenberg, Colin McCarthy & Klaus Schade 
(eds) Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2007) vol.7, 11-12. 
4 Ibid. 
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democracy and rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, for reasons to 
be explained below, should be integral to the integration process.  
It is common knowledge that most African countries, including those in East Africa have 
flawed democratic, good governance and human rights credentials, which raises questions of 
their commitment to their human rights undertakings in the various treaties5. However, States 
tend to exhibit better levels of commitment to trade and economic related treaties and 
agreements such as regional economic integration treaties6. Therefore even where regional 
integration treaties do not expressly incorporate human rights provisions or principles, there is 
yet another dimension through which human rights principles or a human rights approach can 
be insinuated into the economic integration process. That is the migration rights dimension. As 
shall be explained further on, migration rights (that is, free movement of persons including 
workers, the right of establishment and the right of residence) may be said to bridge the gap 
between the economic justification and the human rights justification for these rights. 
This thesis attempts to identify the rationale for migration rights within the EAC in relation to 
the Community’s political objectives. The thesis analyses the dual conceptuality of migration 
rights and examines how migration rights in the EAC are being rationalised, interpreted and 
applied. The main argument propounded in this thesis is that migration rights, though they have 
developed from a purely economic rationale and perspective, have since morphed into an 
entirely novel regime which emphasises the human or fundamental rights of citizens of the 
Community. Thus, considering the nascence of the EAC and its migration rights regime, it 
would serve the ultimate purposes and objectives of the EAC if its approach to migration rights 
was more explicitly human rights oriented as opposed to an economic orientation.  
This thesis and the arguments raised herein are premised on three key concepts of regional 
integration, human rights and migration rights. This chapter therefore seeks to explain these 
concepts and the interplay amongst them. It provides an expository prelude to the subsequent 
chapters. Furthermore, the chapter explains the significance of this research, outlining its 
objectives, research questions, hypothesis and research methods applied in the collection of the 
information and data applied herein. Worth mentioning is that this is basically a legal research, 
                                                          
 
5 On theories of human rights treaties commitment and compliance, see generally Beth Simmons Mobilizing for 
Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009).  
6 Ibid at 124. 
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and though it may use information from other disciplines, it is biasedly legalistic. Furthermore, 
much as the research recognises the economic underpinnings of regional integration schemes, 
as the section below illustrates, this thesis does not aim to examine regional integration from 
the perspective of international economic law or world trade law. Rather it is more of an 
exploration of the less considered, and at times outrightly dismissed, viewpoint of giving a 
human rights interpretation to migration rights guaranteed for purposes of economic 
integration7. Hence this thesis makes out the case for a regional economic community 
advancing its objectives by becoming more human rights oriented in its approach.   
1.1  Regional integration: theories and benefits  
There seems to be no universally agreed upon definition of ‘regional integration’. The 
definition may vary according to the discipline or the context. In terms of discipline, for 
instance, economists may not necessarily define ‘regional integration’ in the same way as 
political scientists. For example, Mattli, an economist, defines regional integration as ‘the 
voluntary linking in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the 
extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the 
supranational level’8.  On the other hand, a political scientist may define regional integration 
as ‘the voluntary creation of larger political units involving the self-conscious eschewal of force 
in relations between participating institutions’9.  International relations scholars may yet define 
regional integration as the ‘process by which States go beyond the removal of obstacles to 
interaction between their countries and create a regional space subject to some distinct common 
rules’10. What seems to be the point of divergence among these schools of thought is the driver 
for integration. Whereas for economists, it is mainly economic objectives that motivate the 
integration, for political scientists, the motives and goal will be primarily political. Economic 
                                                          
 
7 See for instance Philip Alston ‘Resisting the merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law: a reply to 
Petersmann’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law at 826. This was one of the issues in the 
extended debate between Alston and Petersmann, more details of which are available at www.ejil.org.  
8 Walter Mattli The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (1999) 41. 
9 Ernst Haas ‘The study of regional integration?’ (1971) 4 cited in Ben Rosamond Theories of European 
Integration (2000) 12. Elsewhere Haas provides a more elaborate definition of regional integration as ‘the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct national settlings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community 
superimposed over the existing ones’- cited in Rosamond, ibid. 
10 Edwards Best & Thomas Christiansen ‘Regionalism in international affairs’ in John Baylis, Steve Smith & 
Patricia Owens (eds) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (2011) 
430. 
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objectives are viewed by political scientists as a transitional phase that aids or catalyses the 
attainment of the ultimate goal.  
In terms of ‘regional integration’ varying according to the context, the Mattli definition seems 
to be rather apt for a regional integration scheme such as the European Union (EU). The EU is 
so far the most advanced in the sense that member states have created a supranational authority 
– the European Commission to handle EU affairs, as well as a host of other EU institutions 
including the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that ensure 
member’s states adherence to the EU law and spirit. In contrast, RECs in Africa do not yet have 
powerful supranational institutions, much less institutions with such significant powers as those 
of the EU. Member States of African RECs still retain sovereignty in most areas. In such 
circumstances, the definition of regional integration as a “preferential (usually reciprocal) 
agreement among countries that reduces barriers to economic and non-economic transaction”11 
seems more appropriate.   
What appears to be the point of convergence among the various disciplines and contexts is that, 
regional integration involves two or more countries or States linked either geographically or 
ideologically or both, which agree to merge certain functions, usually starting with trade and 
economics. This will thus be the working definition for regional integration in this research.  
1.1.1 Regional integration: theories and approaches  
There have been a number of theories expounded on regional integration12, only a few major 
ones will be highlighted in this section.  
Mitrany 13, in what has come to be termed the ‘functional approach’, advocates for a union of 
states, be it along territorial or ideological lines, for the sake of maintaining peace. He argues 
that certain functions of the state should be pooled together among agreeable states and 
administered by a central authority or agency. Not only would this foster peace among the 
nations, but that once this is attained, attention would be turned to what he refers to as the ‘real 
                                                          
 
11 UNECA Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II (2004) 9. 
12See generally Mattli op cit note 8; Rosamond, op cit note 9; Leon N. Lindberg & Stuart Scheingold (eds) 
Regional Integration: Theory and Research (1971); W Andrew Axline ‘Introduction’ in Andrew W Axline (ed) 
The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation: Comparative Case Studies (1994). 
13 David Mitrany A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International 
Organization (1943). 
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tasks’, that is, ‘the conquest of poverty, and of disease and of ignorance’14. According to him, 
economic issues would only be some of the functions that are pooled together for central and 
common administration. Peace was necessary for States to concentrate on meeting common 
needs of the populace. This was thus the driving force for cooperation behind Mitrany’s 
functional theory. His thinking has been said to have been influenced by the dominance of 
economics and as such he tended to neglect other factors15. 
The neo-functionalist approach which agrees with the basic prepositions of Mitrany’s 
functionalism provides rather different motivations for states integrating. Haas argues that ‘the 
process of community formation is dominated by nationally constituted groups with specific 
interests and aims; willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means 
when this course appears profitable’16. While according to Mitrany, promotion of the common 
good drives States to unify or integrate; according to Haas, it is for self-interests of the key 
players that States choose to integrate. Despite being a political scientist, Haas acknowledged 
economic groups as being at the forefront of such specific-interest groups that would push for 
integration. Therefore, both functionalists and neo-functionalists view economic activities as 
providing the impetus for the desired integration goal. Neo-functionalism theory has been used 
to explain European integration which is traced back to the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 among previously rival nations (France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg). The main objective of its establishment was the control of 
the production of steel and coal that were deemed, as Goormahgtigh refers to them, ‘the 
backbone of any armaments production’17. In this way none of the member states could 
mobilise armaments or its forces without the others knowing, and in that manner wars between 
the member states could be prevented. Thus economic interests were the basis for promoting 
peace and further integration in Europe. The ECSC became one of the precursor organisations 
of the present EU. 
Besides the functionalist theories, the federalist theory focuses on the attainment of a political 
union among separate States18. According to federalists, economic integration may occur after 
                                                          
 
14 Ibid at 54. 
15 Reginald Harrison Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration (1974) 28-29. 
16 Ernst B. Haas The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (1958) xiv. 
17 John Goormahgtigh ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ (1953) 30 International Conciliation at 346. 
18 Harrison op cit note 15 at 43. 
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political federation. However, the branch of federalists known as evolutionary federalists view 
economic incrementalism as a leading towards the ultimate goal of federalism19. 
Most regional integration schemes have, however, been aligned to the functionalist and neo-
functionalist approaches than the federalist approaches. This is because most of the RECs are 
geared more towards economic than political integration. As such, they tend to be modelled 
upon an economic integration model developed by Jacob Viner. 
Viner came up with what has been known as a Customs Union model of economic 
integration20. According to this model, the economic integration process follows these stages: 
first, ‘the complete elimination of tariffs as between the member territories’21 (the creation of 
a free trade area); and second, ‘the establishment of a uniform tariff on imports from outside 
the union’22 (creation of a customs union). With the removal of intra-region trade barriers and 
tariffs, Viner figured that trade-creation would occur leading to increased economic benefits 
among the integrated countries; while a trade diversion effect would occur against third 
countries. Whereas Viner’s model has been adopted by most RECs, with the EU being the most 
classic example, it has been argued that this model may not necessarily work in African 
countries. Gathii argues that the Vinerian model was most suited for the industrial context in 
which it was developed as opposed to the agrarian context of most countries; and that adopting 
it in Africa has not always resulted into trade creation or expansion upon lifting of trade barriers 
as envisaged by Viner mainly because ‘majority of African economies have largely similar 
products without necessarily having comparative cost advantages between them sufficient to 
overcome this similarity’.23 
Beyond the customs union, integration may yet proceed to more advances phases. Upon 
establishment of a customs union, member states or the union may decide to proceed to form 
a common market, whereby there shall be free movement of factors of production within the 
member states. This may further lead to a further stage which includes the removal of fiscal 
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20 Jacob Viner The Customs Union Issue (1950) 5. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 James T Gathii African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (2011) 8. See also Victor Adetula ‘The 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the challenges of integration in West Africa’ in 
Joy Ogwu & Warisu Alli (eds) ECOWAS: Milestones in Regional Integration (2009) 19; and Asante op cit note 
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and monetary barriers thus paving the way for a fiscal and monetary union or an economic 
union.24 Some authors25, and indeed some RECs, have added yet another final phase of 
integration, that is, where the economic union may lead to formation of a political union or 
federation.  
Most regional integration schemes worldwide have adopted Viner’s model of integration and 
doubtless, they are all driven primarily by economic objectives. Hence regional integration 
usually tends to be synonymous with economic integration. In fact most of the regional 
integration agreements, considered as regional trade agreements, fall under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), and thus rightly come within the regime of international 
economic law. In as far as member states of a REC are parties to the WTO, they are bound by 
their obligations under the WTO, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), Article 
XXIV and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article V26 and others, as the 
case may be. Considering the great influence of economic law on regional integration, the term 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) will be applied to regional integration schemes in as 
far as economic motives are the predominant drivers for integration.  
Advancing through the various stages of integration should be a voluntary and conscious 
decision of the States involved, as each stage involves ceding more sovereignty to the central 
authority established for purposes of overseeing the integration. The extent to which States are 
ready and willing to cede some of their sovereignty will determine not only the end result of 
the integration, but also the success or failure of the entire venture. Moreover it has been argued 
that trade and economic related agreements tend to attract more commitment and compliance 
from States than, say, human rights treaties. This is so because the former contain more tangible 
incentives, which raise the expectations of higher benefits for States that are parties to such 
treaties27. Regional integration agreements are such that States, particularly in Africa, expect 
that the benefits of being party thereof will far outweigh the costs of being outside any 
integration scheme. Consequently African States have embraced regional integration. 
                                                          
 
24  On stages of economic integration, see McCarthy op cit note 3 at 7; Sipho Buthelezi Regional Integration in 
Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the 21st Century (2006); UNECA (2004) op cit note 11 at 10. 
25 UNECA, ibid; Wolfe-Christian Peters The Quest for an African Economic Community: Regional Integration 
and its Role in Achieving African Unity (2010) 58.  
26 According to Article II.2 of the Agreement establishing the WTO Agreement (WTO Agreement), all members 
are bound by the agreements and associated legal instruments included as annexes thereto. These include the 
GATT (Annex 1A) and the GATS (Annex 1B). 
27 Simmons op cit note 5 at 118-124. 
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Although integration in Africa is not exactly aligned to any of the above theories, aspects of 
some or each of those theories may be relevant for the various integration schemes in Africa.  
1.1.2 Regional integration in Africa28 
The African continent has, since most of its countries gained independence in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, been grappling with the issue of development, not to disregard that of 
establishing peace and security in the different countries that constitute the continent. With 
most of the continent’s countries making it on the list of least developed countries29, there is a 
crucial justification for exploring and exploiting various ways and means of improving the 
standard of living of majority of the continent’s poor. Underdevelopment in Africa is further 
fuelled by its disadvantaged position in international trade and the global economy. Given that 
most African countries are poor and struggling economies, they do not have a fair share of the 
world market economy, one in which countries are increasingly participating as part of regional 
blocs30.  In the attempt to overcome the numerous economic, social and political problems, 
African countries have embraced regional economic integration, which, it is hoped, should also 
enable them have an improved advantage and better negotiating position in world trade, 
economics and politics. The African Union is actually convinced that regional integration is 
necessary “in order to promote the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more 
effectively the challenges posed by globalization”31.   
Consequently, a number of RECs have been formed in Africa bringing the total to about 
fourteen in 200432. Although these RECs are characterised by multiple and frequently 
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existing in various parts of Africa. Some authors refer to them as sub-regions, but the official and popular term 
used even by the African Union is regional integration or regional economic communities. Therefore this thesis 
shall use the term ‘regional’ and not ‘sub-regional’ in reference to integration schemes in Africa. 
29 Of the 48 least developed countries identified by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 33 are African countries making it about 61% of the continent’s 54 countries. For list of least 
developed countries, see http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-Least-
Developed-Countries.aspx accessed on 18 December 2013. 
30 Ademola Oyejide ‘Trade policy and regional integration in the development context: emerging patterns issues 
and lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa’ (1998) 7 (Suppl 1) Journal of African Economies 138-140. 
31 Preamble to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Constitutive Act was adopted in Lomé, Togo on 7 
November 2000 and entered into force on 26 May 2001. 
32 These are: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA); the Mano River Union (MRU); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community (CEMAC); the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African 
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overlapping country memberships, which result into duplicity and a strain on a country’s scarce 
resources leading to a call for rationalisation33, Gathii explains this as flexibility on the part of 
African countries, which enables them to ‘retain their sovereignty and accrue benefits from 
multiple regimes otherwise not available through sole memberships’34.  
It therefore seems to be the case that African countries are enthusiastically embracing regional 
integration as a means of attaining accelerated economic growth and development35. This is 
expected to be achieved through some of the expected benefits of regional integration which 
include: larger markets for local products of small states; trade creation effects; increased 
competition among producers to the advantage of the consumer; increased investment, both 
local and foreign; and increased bargaining power, particularly in international trade 
negotiations.  
Actually most writers36 seem to agree that regionalism is the best alternative African States 
have got to weather the twin threats of globalisation and marginalisation in world trade. 
Additionally, some donors may prefer assisting comprehensive regional initiatives rather than 
deal with similar national projects on a piece-meal basis37. 
Some non-economic benefits have also been tagged to integration and these include: improved 
co-operation among neighbouring states leading to improved peace and regional security. 
Peters argues that ‘regional integration has the potential to increase democratic convergence’38 
as common democratic standards may need to be applied to all partner states as is the case now 
with the EU39. 
                                                          
 
Community (EAC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Arab Maghreb Union 
(UMA)- see UNECA (2004) op cit note 11 at 45. 
33 Ibid at 45-68. 
34 Gathii op cit note 23 at 72. 
35 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty), Art 4.1 para (a). The AEC Treaty was 
adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 3 June 1991 and entered into force on 12 May 1994. 
36 UNECA (2004) op cit note 11 at 22-23; Peters op cit note 25 at 37; Mothae Maruping ‘Challenges of regional 
integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: macroeconomic convergence and monetary coordination’ in Jan Joost 
Teunissen & Age Akkerman (eds) Africa in the World Economy: The National, Regional and International 
Challenges (2005) 130. See also Philip O Nying’uro ‘The EAC’s prospects on the global stage’ in Rok Ajulu 
(ed) The Making of a Region: The Revival of the East African Community (2005) 34. 
37 Peters op cit note 25 at 36. 
38 Ibid at 40. 
39 Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) requires that States applying to join the EU respect values 
such as respect for human dignity and human rights, democracy etc as laid out in Article 2 of the TEU. 
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Much as regional integration in Africa and elsewhere seems to be driven by economics and 
trade, it often, as a matter of course, leads to integration in other aspects such as infrastructure, 
environment, social, and political. This is consonant with the neo-functionalist concept of 
‘spill-over’ which has been explained as ‘the process whereby a given action, related to a 
specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further 
actions, which in turn create a further condition and need for more action and so forth’40. It is 
therefore necessary not to look at integration from the narrow lens of economics but look at it 
in a more holistic manner. It is clear from most of the regional integration treaties that states 
are conscious of this fact and as such the scope of integration envisaged by most RECs goes 
beyond mere economic objectives41.  
One of the areas in which regional integration can be seen to extend beyond economic 
objectives is that of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Peters contends that ‘only in 
regional communities where human and democratic rights are fully acknowledged and 
observed, will citizens of the member states also support the idea of regional integration’42. 
The discussion that follows not only makes the case for the inclusion of human rights within 
the economic integration trajectory, but also demonstrates how various RECs have taken 
cognisance of the significance of human rights and thereby incorporated them by varying 
degrees within the integration agenda. 
1.2  Human rights within the regional economic integration discourse  
The regional integration discourse is to a great extent dominated by the economic viewpoint so 
much so that regional integration is synonymous with economic integration even where the 
objectives of integration comprise more than the economic aspects. As mentioned above, 
economic integration falls under the international economic law regime, which tends to be 
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Mills, Anna Morner & Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds), Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative 
International Perspectives (2001) 164. See also chapter by Christopher Clapham ‘The changing world of 
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Regional Economic Communities in Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2009) 67-73. 
42 Peters op cit note 25 at 40. See also Maurice Schiff & Alan Winters Regional Integration and Development 
(2003) 188. 
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utilitarian or consequentialist in its approach to development43. Trade law, in particular, which 
is at the core of economic law, is based on the efficiency model which aims at improving ‘the 
economic wellbeing of human beings through the facilitation of efficient exchanges’44. Hence 
economic law tends to be more goal-oriented and perhaps less concerned with issues pertaining 
to human dignity. Accordingly, and by way of example, human beings are taken as objects 
under international economic law or instruments for the attainment of a desired end. This 
explains the reference to human beings as factors of production along with other, perhaps more 
befitting, objects such as goods, capital and services.  This outlook of international economic 
law along with its normative underpinnings sets is at odds or in conflict, in terms of both 
normative approaches and practical implementation, with international human rights law, a 
regime of international law that is more concerned with the dignity of the human person45. 
The concept of human rights and fundamental freedoms embodied in international human 
rights law may be regarded as presenting a parallel development in international law over 
which there is worldwide and significant coalescence among States. Unlike economic law, 
human rights law places the human being right at the centre of all activity. The human being is 
a holder of rights that should be respected and protected by all, most especially by the State, 
which in turn should ensure their promotion, respect and protection. The main, if not only goal, 
is the respect of the human dignity and worth of all persons without discrimination. Hence 
human rights law emphasises how a person should or should not be treated, regardless of 
consequences46. 
Human rights are regarded as ‘one of the most powerful normative concepts’47 and may be said 
to be an effective instrument of mobilisation which various publics world over have time and 
again used against political leadership to behave respectfully towards their citizenry or subjects, 
as the case may be. Human rights have been universally accepted and recognised as ‘a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’48 and almost all states have pledged to 
achieve the ‘promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
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Brooklyn Journal of International Law 67-68. 
44 Ibid at 64. 
45 Ibid at 73-76. 
46 Ibid at 71-72. 
47 Simmons, op cit note 5 at 112. 
48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) 
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fundamental freedoms’49. In some cases, States’ commitments have gone beyond a mere pledge 
to comprise a binding legal obligation in instances where states have ratified human rights 
instruments, be it international or regional. As such human rights should permeate all aspects 
of a state’s undertakings including laws, policies and actions that necessarily extend to 
international agreements and relations. Owing to the deontological underpinnings and 
transcendental nature of human rights, their universal acceptance and highly expressed level of 
commitment by States, and the fact that both economic law and human rights law strive for the 
wellbeing of the human being, albeit by through different approaches, it is highly imperative 
that the human rights claims take priority over any other claims50.  
It therefore follows that regional integration arrangements and agreements, much as they are 
predominantly on trade and economics, should show commitment to the promotion and 
protection of human rights of individuals and peoples. 
Regional integration schemes, however, have tended to develop outside of or in parallel to the 
human rights regime. This is best exemplified by the development of the European Community 
which may be taken as the prototype of RECs. It is clear from the history of European 
integration that human rights did not feature in its earlier treaties, that is, the Treaty establishing 
the ECSC and the Treaties of Rome,51 despite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) having been adopted by virtually all states in 1948. This lends credence to the 
assertion that ‘RECs have not been set up primarily to foster human rights but to facilitate a 
process of economic convergence through closer economic and financial co-operation and 
harmonisation of policies and programmes’52.  
Over the last century, however, the universality of human rights has gained tremendous 
acceptance as well as ever-growing significance and awareness. Hence, human rights cannot 
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51 See Armin Von Bogdandy ‘The European Union as a human rights organization? Human rights and the core 
of the European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307. There were two Treaties of Rome, one 
establishing the European Economic Community, and other establishing the European Atomic Energy 
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52 Frans Viljoen International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007) 495. A similar view can be discerned in the 
following statement of a judge of the European Court of Justice on the role of the court: “The Court will remain 
the Court of the internal market… it is not going to be a fundamental rights court…. It would be a terrible 
disaster if we translate all cases we get here in terms of fundamental rights. It would be a nonsense”. Quoted in 
Sonia Morano-Foadi ‘Migration and human rights: The European approach’ in Sonia Morano-Foadi & Lucy 
Vickers (eds) Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts (2015) 124.  
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be entirely divorced from the regional integration process. As discussed earlier, the aim of 
regional integration is acceleration of economic growth and development, ultimately meant to 
improve the standard of living and meet the common needs of all persons within the region. 
Human rights standards oblige states to promote the dignity and welfare of individuals, and 
more specifically, ‘to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’53. 
It can therefore be argued that both concepts (i.e. regional integration and human rights) aim 
at the same goal54, the main difference lying in the conceptual approach: what regional 
integration seeks to attain at a rather macro-level, human rights seek to attain at a basic level. 
Another way of looking at it is by considering the commitments entailed in regional integration 
treaties as a means of realising what would otherwise seem like idealistic human rights 
commitments. There is thus an undeniable intricate connection between economic integration 
and human rights. 
Of late there has been a growing recognition of the link between human rights and development 
expressed in two major ways, which are relevant to the regional integration process. These can 
even be taken as defusing any tension, real or apparent, that may exist between economic law 
and human rights law as earlier discussed.  
First is the right to development which obliges states to facilitate the enjoyment of all human 
rights in all their development initiatives55.  Regional integration is one of the approaches states 
adopt, in co-operation with each other, to promote economic development and growth and as 
such it is imperative that the development process is itself viewed as promoting the right to 
development.  The right to development is one of the rights articulated in the African Charter 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community (AEC Treaty) can be seen as more or less expounding on the commitment of the 
right as contained in the ACHPR56. As Quashigah postulates in reference mainly to the AEC 
and ECOWAS treaties, the ‘economic integration treaties have amplified this right… thus 
making it more precise and easily tractable’57. Nwogu, using the example of ECOWAS 
                                                          
 
53 UDHR preamble. 
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55 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 - 25 June 
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illustrates how regional integration can in fact be instrumental in the achievement of human 
rights, particularly the right to development58. She argues that the inclusion of human and 
peoples’ rights as provided in the ACHPR as a fundamental principle of the ECOWAS renders 
the latter ‘a mechanism for the achievement of the West African peoples’ right to development 
largely fashioned in response to the realities of globalization’59. Second, human rights and 
development have been linked through advocacy for the adoption of a human rights approach 
to development. This approach emphasises that human rights should imbue the entire 
integration process. Since most States are legally bound by various international human rights 
instruments to respect human rights, they should be guided by those commitments in all their 
undertakings, including development schemes undertaken either unilaterally or in jointly with 
other States. Hence economic integration should adopt the human rights approach. This 
imperative is partly rooted in Article 28 of the UDHR 60 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), states parties to which are obliged to work 
individually or in co-operation with others to progressively realise the rights guaranteed 
therein61. This could perhaps be the human rights justification for regional integration. 
The significance attached to human rights in the development process has been manifested by 
the inclusion of human rights in regional integration treaties. At the very least or as a starting 
point, whichever way one looks at it, they are considered as principles governing the 
achievement of the REC’s objectives. This is the case with most of the RECs in Africa. For 
instance, human rights are one of the principles on which the African Economic Community 
(AEC)62 operates, the Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC) mentions human 
rights as both fundamental and operational principles63, so do the Treaties establishing the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC)64, the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD)65, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)66, 
                                                          
 
58 Nneoma Nwogu ‘Regional integration as an instrument of human rights: reconceptualizing ECOWAS’ (2007) 
6 Journal of Human Rights 345-360. 
59 Ibid at 348. 
60 Article 28 provides: ‘Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’.  
61 ICESCR Article 2 (1). 
62 AEC Treaty Article 3 para (g). 
63 Treaty Establishing the East African Community (EAC Treaty) Article 6 para (d) and Article 7.2. 
64 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community Article 4 para (c).  
65 Agreement on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Article 6A para (f). 
66 Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Article 6 para (e). 
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and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)67.  In some instances, 
however, some RECs provide for specific or thematic human rights issues such as gender and 
equality, refugees and internally displaced persons, among others. The EU, however, has gone 
a step further than most African RECs and actually adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which is legally binding on all member states.  
The difference between the two positions, that is including human rights as principles and 
adopting a human rights charter, is that in the latter case, human rights are directly actionable 
and the regional Court has express jurisdiction to adjudicate on them. In cases where human 
rights are only considered as principles of integration, they are usually not actionable per se, 
but can only be raised if they are directly linked to aspects of the economic integration process. 
What this usually translates into is that the Community courts will most probably not have 
direct jurisdiction over human rights issues.  In such instances, it will take some ingenuity on 
the part of the court to deal with matters that raise human rights issues68, which is the case with 
the EAC as shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters.  
The human rights-development approach notwithstanding, migration rights as provided within 
the regional economic integration model provide yet a palpable nexus and intricate link 
between economic integration and human rights. Not only do migration rights exhibit the 
interplay between economic integration and human rights (or economic law and human rights 
law), but they could also be seen as the avenue through which human rights may gain deeper 
and wider cognisance within the dynamics of regional integration. This thesis argues that a 
human rights approach to migration rights within regional integration not only transcends the 
narrow and restrictive economic rationalisation of these rights, but also might probably be more 
accommodative of the broad objectives of the integrating community. 
1.3 Migration rights: definition and historical development 
The common market stage of economic integration is marked by the free movement of factors 
of production which include labour, goods, services and capital within and among the 
                                                          
 
67 Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States Article 4 para (g). 
68 Exceptionally, the ECOWAS Court has a dual mandate to serve both as a regional integration court and as a 
human rights court - Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 Amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 
of Protocol (A/P.1/7/91) Relating to the Community Court of Justice, Jan. 19, 2005, 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf_files/supplementary_protocol.pdf. 
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integrating States. These are at times referred to as the ‘four freedoms’ of the common market. 
Attendant to these freedoms are the rights of residence and establishment, all of which are 
necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the common or internal market. Consequently, 
migration primarily for economic reasons becomes a crucial focal issue if not integral to the 
regional integration process and discourse69.  
Migration is used herein in the broad sense of persons moving from one country to live or work 
in another. However, within the context of State sovereignty, whereby each State determines 
its own rules of entry and exit within its borders, migration is not guaranteed. Non-citizens may 
only enter a State’s territory upon being granted permission to do so, otherwise their presence 
shall be unlawful. By guaranteeing free movement of persons, if only as factors of production, 
States essentially agree to open up their borders to citizens of other Member States of a regional 
economic community, thus negating the need to obtain prior permission before entering or 
exiting another Member State’s territory. Arguably regional integration treaties may be said to 
entail a ‘right to migrate’70. Moreover this opening up is also extended to other non-human 
factors of production such as goods and capital, but whose movement may necessarily entail 
human movement. Nwauche clearly explains that ‘the abolition of national restrictions on the 
movement of people, goods, services and capital in whatever stage of integration, is about the 
rights of the people. If people of a region have a regional right of residence instead of a national 
right of residence, their freedom of movement, assembly and association are enhanced’71.  
This quotation manifests at least three things: one, the significance of free movement of persons 
in economic integration; two, the cross-border or borderless nature of the rights and freedoms 
emanating from economic integration treaties; and three, the human-rights outlook of the rights 
that may on their face be regarded as exclusively economic or market freedoms. It is therefore 
rather apparent that migration in the integration process is much more than just the economic 
dynamics, as human rights components are intrinsic to it.   
                                                          
 
69 For instance, labour mobility has been referred to as being ‘key to regional integration’- Malebakeng Forere 
‘The relationship between the right of access to education and work, and sub-regional economic integration in 
Africa’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 600; also UNECA (2004) op cit note 11 at 59. 
70 A term borrowed from Elspeth Guild The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and 
Migration Law (2004) 83. 
71 Enyinna S Nwauche ‘Regional economic communities and human rights in West Africa and the African Arab 
Countries’ in Anton Bösl & Joseph Diescho (eds), Human Rights in Africa–Legal Perspectives on their 
Protection and Promotion (2009) 319.  
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Regional integration treaties, particularly where a common market is envisaged, will entail 
guarantees of free movement of persons, including or specifically workers; free movement of 
goods, services and capital; and the right of residence and the right of establishment. The 
interest of this thesis, however, is on the free movement of persons, including workers, the 
rights of residence and establishment; which are collectively referred to herein as ‘migration 
rights’. This is because these rights accrue directly to persons as opposed to other non-human 
factors of production72. The use of the term ‘migration rights’ is influenced by the dual 
conceptual nature of the rights, i.e. both the economic and human rights justification, and the 
fact that within the regional economic context, migration is supposedly pre-empted or 
facilitated by the prior availability or guarantee of these rights.  
The term migration or migration rights, particularly in the context of European integration, is 
generally understood as referring to third country nationals migrating into the EU. When 
referring to movement of citizens of the EU within the EU, ‘free movement’ is the term usually 
used. This specific usage of the terms ‘migration’ and ‘free movement’ within the EU context 
has been explained thus: ‘…migrant nationals of the Member States have acquired a right to 
migrate so substantial as to no longer merit the use of the term ‘migration’ but instead to 
become known as free movement of persons’73. While this statement may hold true for the EU, 
it may not necessarily be the same for other RECs as shall be demonstrated in this thesis. For 
this reason, the term ‘migration rights’ is considered more appropriate herein. Consequently, 
in this thesis, the term migration shall be used to refer to the intra-regional movement of 
nationals of member States of a regional economic community within its territory in pursuance 
of the objectives of the integration scheme. In other words, the movement of community 
citizens among the member States that comprise the REC. 
1.3.1 Synopsis on historical development of migration rights 
Migration, of itself is as old as the history of humankind. Although labour migration provisions 
may be included in some bilateral agreements among countries, the origins of migration rights, 
are difficult to trace outside the history of the development of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Most of the literature available on migration rights considers them from 
                                                          
 
72 Relatedly, where the term ‘non-discrimination’ is used in this thesis, it shall be referring to persons and not to 
other factors of production, such as goods, as is usually understood in international trade and economics. 
73 Guild op cit note 70 at 83. 
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the perspective of European integration. Additionally, the European integration model is more 
or less a prototype for other integration schemes including those in Africa, and so, the genesis 
of migration rights within the European context shall serve as a benchmark for the development 
and evolution of these rights as expressed in regional integration treaties. 
Maas traces the origin of the rights of free movement of Europe to the negotiations leading up 
to the adoption of the ECSC Treaty74. According to him, the push for the inclusion of free 
movement provisions came from the Italian delegation who were concerned about the export 
of surplus labour within the new Community that was being established. They argued that ‘free 
movement rights for workers constituted a fundamental principle of the Community’ and its 
inclusion was a precondition for Italian participation in the Community75. Their efforts were 
successful leading to the inclusion of Article 69 in the ECSC Treaty, which provided for the 
removal of restrictions based on nationality in the coal and steel industries upon the 
employment of workers who are nationals of Member States.  
Article 69 was clearly restricted to workers in the coal and steel industries, moreover it was not 
adequately elaborate. Since its implementation required unanimous agreement and ratification 
by all six Member States of the ECSC, this only happened in 1957 when the agreement finally 
took effect. In the meantime, negotiations for a European Economic Community were 
underway. Maas explains that the free movement provisions in the ECSC Treaty, coupled with 
an already existing de facto common market in labour existing among the Benelux countries 
since the end of the Second World War laid the foundations for the inclusion of broader free 
movement of labour provisions in the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty that was 
concluded in 195776. 
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty provided for the rights of workers who are nationals of a Member 
State to accept offers of employment actually made in another member State, to move freely 
and stay in the territory of Member States for the purpose of employment, and to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after employment has ceased. 
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75 Ibid at 1012. 
76 Ibid at 1019. 
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European scholars77 seem agreed on the assertion that the rights of citizens of the EU, of which 
migration rights are central, have their roots in the provisions of the free movement of workers 
provisions contained in the earlier Treaties (both the ECSC and EEC Treaties) establishing the 
European Community. It is these provisions that were later expanded and extended to all 
persons or citizens of the EU so as to become rights of EU citizens. This evolution has been 
mainly accredited to the significant role of the European Court of Justice in its expansive 
interpretation and application of the Treaty provisions78.  
From this historical perspective, it is clear that rights of free movement of persons have really 
evolved from the free movement of workers as a factor of production in the economic process. 
The right of residence was necessary for both migrant workers and service providers; while the 
right of establishment needed to be guaranteed for self-employed persons and professionals 
wishing to set up business or practice in another Member State. Hence the guarantee of 
migration rights was and is still deemed instrumental to economic integration.  
In Africa, most RECs have been modelled on the European Community, hence where migration 
rights are included, it is mainly to facilitate the free movement of factors of production and the 
attainment of a common market. This is definitely the case with the AEC Treaty79, the 
ECOWAS Treaty, and the EAC Treaty to an extent, as shall be discussed further on in the 
thesis.  
Although in the case of the EAC, during the early years of establishment and operation of the 
first EAC (1967-1977) there was free movement of labour among the EAC countries of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, migration rights were never articulated in the founding Treaty. This 
probably suggests that labour migration in Africa, and in East Africa in particular, has not 
always been approached from a rights perspective. Hence it may not be appropriate to talk of 
migration rights during that era and that any study of migration rights in Africa should 
commence from the point when they have been articulated in hard or soft law, which is what 
this thesis intends to do. Accordingly, the concept of migration rights as applied in this thesis 
                                                          
 
77 Ibid. See also Emiliana Baldoni ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union: a legal-historical 
perspective’ 2003 Pioneur Working Paper No. 3; Siofra O’Leary The Evolving Concept of Community 
Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (1996) 17; Guild op cit note 70 at 51; 
Elizabeth Meehan Citizenship and the European Community (1993) 17. 
78 August Reinisch Essential Questions in EU Law (2012) 68. 
79 AEC Treaty Article 43. 
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is transplanted, basing on the historical development provided, rather than a home-grown 
concept. The concept of migration rights shall be discussed in greater detail in chapter two. 
At this juncture, it is important distinguish between migration rights that are the subject of this 
thesis, and the rights of migrant workers as provided under the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW). The 
latter instrument provides a comprehensive catalogue of rights that States parties guarantee to 
all migrant workers and members of their families, extending such protection to irregular or 
non-documented migrants as well. Article 1 para 2 of the CMW is clear that it applies during 
the entire migration process including the preparatory, departure and transit stages for persons 
who are to be engaged or are engaged or have been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State 
other than the one of which they are nationals80. While the CMW is of much significance to 
persons who exercise their migration rights within a REC, that is, if the member states of the 
REC have ratified the CMW, migration rights in themselves are not the subject of the CMW. 
As argued earlier, migration rights provide the impetus to migrate within the context of regional 
integration. Migration rights would probably constitute the right to enter another country, albeit 
for specified reasons, assuming that such a right were recognised under human rights law. 
Unfortunately, that is not the case. Hence, migration rights, which are an aspect of regional 
integration are a precursor to rights covered under the CMW. This is so because the existence 
of the former sets in motion the conditions that would render one a migrant worker if they 
exercised their migration rights within a REC. Due to this underlying difference between the 
two sets of rights, this thesis specifically focuses on migration rights as herein defined, and not 
the rights of migrant workers as covered under the CMW. 
1.4 Scope of the research 
The focal REC for this research shall be the EAC established in 2000 by the Treaty Establishing 
the East African Community Treaty (EAC Treaty) that was signed by the Heads of States of 
the EAC countries in 1999. At the time of establishment of the EAC, there were three Partner 
States; Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These have since 2007, been joined by Burundi and 
Rwanda.  
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The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has referred to the EAC as 
‘one of the most dynamic regions in terms of integration’ having ‘achieved a great deal since 
its reconstitution in 1999’.81 Gathii, too, agrees that the EAC is the ‘most advanced regional 
trade agreement in the continent since no other… has moved from a customs union to a 
common market’82. The fact that the EAC is the only REC in Africa that has officially 
established a common market, the economic integration stage in which migration rights are 
central,  and appears to be set on advancing its integration objectives, makes it the most 
appropriate case study for this research.  Further details of the EAC, its background, 
establishment, structures and objectives will be discussed in chapter three. 
In this thesis, references and discussions of other RECs such as the EU, the ECOWAS, and the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) are only mainly for purposes of comparison and contrast, 
or drawing lessons for the EAC. Moreover with regard to the EU, the development and 
evolution of its migration rights regime has great influence upon, and in some ways defines the 
migration rights framework as applied in various RECs including the EAC, as shall be 
explained in chapter two. Given the prototypical role of the EU, the thesis thus tends to 
substantially draw references from it, in as far as they are applicable and relevant to the EAC.  
The research looks at the migration rights regime within the EAC as articulated under 
Community law, particularly the EAC Treaty and the Protocol establishing the EAC Common 
Market (hereinafter ‘Common Market Protocol’ or ‘CMP’), and its regulations. For purposes 
of assessing the implementation of the Community law with regard to migration rights, it shall 
be necessary to examine laws and practices within the various EAC Partner States. This 
assessment shall be discussed in chapter six. However, although there are five Partner State, 
the research only looks at implementation in four Partner States: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda. Burundi was left out mainly due to language barriers. Burundi is still mainly 
Francophone, which occasioned an impediment for the researcher. 
The research focuses on citizens of the EAC member states or community citizens who wish 
to voluntarily migrate from one member state to another within the EAC migration rights 
framework. The research, therefore excludes refugees and asylum-seekers, victims of human 
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trafficking and other forced or involuntary migration. Although illegal migrants are not 
specifically targeted, the research may include some situations where a member state declares 
a community citizen illegal. The concept of community citizenship or community citizens, who 
are indeed the beneficiaries of migration rights, shall be explored further in chapter two.  
1.5 Significance of the research 
A substantial amount of literature exists about regional integration, even regional integration 
in Africa, but most of the work is from an economic and trade viewpoint or economic law 
perspective83. This explains the different theories of economic integration, the various models, 
the benefits, prospects, challenges, achievements and shortcomings of RECs, from an 
economic perspective.  From a purely trade-related angle, there is literature on trade 
liberalisation in Africa (GATT Article XXIV)84, particularly liberalisation of trade in services 
(GATS Article V and Mode 4)85, but it hardly touches upon the rights dimension of the 
integration process.  
There is also substantial literature on regional integration from a political science and 
international relations perspective. Much as these explain the various dimensions of regional 
integration or provide valuable insight in to the progress of specific integration schemes in 
Africa86, there seems to be a scholarly gap regarding migration rights within the specific 
integration schemes, in Africa specifically. Generally speaking, the available literature from 
the political science or international relations schools barely delves into the relationship 
between regional integration and human rights nor the significance of migration rights thereto.  
As discussed above, human rights have increasingly become incorporated into the regional 
integration process and trajectory, although it is still a work in progress, particularly in Africa. 
This trend is also notable in the discourse on regional integration which is moving from an 
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economic-centric one to a more holistic one with attempts to place human rights, if not at the 
centre, then in the vanguard. While this effort seems to have considerably advanced in the EU, 
taking into account the highly remarkable role played by the European Court of Justice, in 
Africa it is slowly and steadily developing. 
In recent times, there seems to be a steady increase in scholarly literature emphasising the 
regional integration-human rights nexus, with specific focus on Africa87. Viljoen looks at 
human rights promotion and protection at regional and sub-regional levels in Africa, giving an 
appraisal of inclusion of human rights and level of protection accorded within the different 
RECs recognised by the AU.88 His work is a well-researched and informative analysis of 
human rights law in Africa, but it does not provide an in-depth study of human rights within 
any particular REC, nor is its focus on migration rights. Ruppel89 also makes a strong case for 
the significance of incorporating human rights in regional integration and goes on to show how 
this has been done in East and Southern Africa. Nwauche, too, adopts a similar approach to 
Ruppel’s to assess application of human rights in the RECs in West Africa and the African 
Arab countries90.Whereas they look at the enforcement mechanisms in place in the various 
RECs and how they function, they do not engage in examining and analysing the jurisprudence. 
Swart, however, does examine some of the human rights jurisprudence of select regional courts 
while looking at the role sub-regional courts play in the protection of human rights91.  Ebobrah 
looks at the regional integration-human rights nexus rather deeply as he justifies RECs 
involvement in the field of human rights as being both legitimate and feasible92. His thesis 
however looks general at the regional integration-human rights discourse. In light of the 
foregoing, it seems rather evident that there is a conspicuous scholarly gap in the area of 
migration rights or free movement of persons within any of the African regional integration 
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schemes, either at the Community level or at the point of Partner State implementation93. By 
extension there is hardly any literature that intensively or extensively examines the human 
rights dimension of the economic freedoms guaranteed under the regional integration treaties. 
Nonetheless there are some works that have come quite close to looking into migration rights 
of EAC citizens. Forere looks at the rights to work and education within several RECs, 
including the EAC. She argues that these are ‘the integral rights to sub-regional economic 
integration if RECs are to achieve the goal to raise the standard of living of their community’94. 
While she acknowledges the importance of labour mobility, her focus is not specifically on 
migration rights within the RECs that she examines. Reading her article, one of the questions 
that comes to mind is: how would community citizens enjoy the rights to work and education 
without an effective migration rights regime? The latter is needed before the former can be 
effectively enjoyed. Admittedly though, work and education often are the reasons that prompt 
migration, and as shall be argued in this thesis, harmonisation and modification of national 
laws, policies and practices, including those to do with work and education, so as to bring them 
in compliance with Community law, adds substance to community citizens’ migration rights. 
Musonda has reviewed migration legislation, policies and practices in East Africa95 and 
assessed them in accordance with international labour standards. Some of her findings were 
that the immigration laws of all the three states restricted rather than encouraged labour 
mobility; in some instances, the laws and policies of these states failed to take into account 
their international human rights obligations; and that all three countries faced a number of 
migration challenges.96 Her research, however, was not done from the perspective of regional 
integration and nor from the migration rights framework. Her focus was on assessing 
compliance with international labour standards. Musonda’s work is quite significantly relevant 
and offers a springboard for the present research when it comes to assessing national legislation 
and practices with regards to EAC migrant citizens. This thesis will, in part look at migration 
laws and practices within the EAC countries and assess them in accordance with the provisions 
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of the EAC Treaty and the Common Market Protocol. In some aspects, this thesis partly builds 
upon Musonda’s work. 
As regards the protection and enforcement of migration rights- a function usually of the courts 
and administrative or other quasi-judicial tribunals- there is a dearth of literature. Gathii has 
written comprehensively about the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and some of its 
outstanding jurisprudence97, but not the aspect of migration rights. Actually there is barely any 
publication that examines how both the regional court and national courts have applied and 
enforced EAC citizens’ migration rights despite the existence of some decided cases in the 
various jurisdictions.  
Helfer examines the adjudication of the hybrid right of free movement in various regional courts 
in Africa 98 (emphasis added). His article is of great significance in two major aspects: firstly, 
it looks in part at how the EACJ has adjudicated upon the free movement of persons, examining 
its relevant jurisprudence. His work substantially relates to the discussion of the EACJ’s 
approach towards migration rights that shall be discussed in chapter five of this thesis. 
Secondly, he articulates the ‘hybridity’ or what has been referred to herein as the dual 
conceptual nature of migration rights. Although he refers to it only with respect to the free 
movement of persons, it is a term that applies equally to all migration rights as shall be 
demonstrated in chapter two. Implicitly though, Helfer, in fact touches upon the rationalisation 
of migration rights in Africa. 
Be that as it may, from a theoretical perspective, there seems to be no study that has looked 
into the rationale for migration rights in Africa. This is partly what this thesis attempts to do 
for the EAC in particular.  
In terms of significance of this research therefore, it attempts to fill in the theoretical gap of 
discerning the rationale of migration rights within the EAC, especially given their hybridity. It 
attempts to do so through an examination of the Community law as well as the EACJ’s 
jurisprudence in order to discern its interpretation and approach to migration rights. Finally the 
thesis looks at the implementation of the EAC migration rights framework within the various 
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Partner States. The purposes of this shall be to ascertain whether migration rights within the 
various Partner States are unravelling in a manner envisaged under the EAC law; and whether 
national laws and practices are in consonance with Community law. It is hoped that what 
pertains within the Partner States will provide indications for the rationale of migration rights 
within the Partner States and whether it is in accordance with the perceived rationale at the 
Community level. The findings should then support the hypothesis for this research as 
explained hereunder.  
Despite the proliferation of regional integration schemes in Africa and various studies 
undertaken on them, migration rights in Africa seems to be one of the understudied subjects in 
all relevant academic disciplines. This thesis shall, hopefully, lay the groundwork for further 
studies, research and publications in this area of study. 
1.6 Hypothesis and main arguments of the research 
Economic objectives could be said to be the primary drivers for EAC integration, but the fact 
that the EAC aims to ultimately establish a political federation casts into a different light the 
migration rights provisions contained in the EAC Treaty. Hence, and arguably, it is no more 
mere free movement of factors of production in a purely economic sense, but rather an entirely 
novel regime of migration rights of citizens of the Community. That being the case, the 
approach to migration rights within the EAC should promote and holistically advance the 
objectives of the EAC in their entirety. 
The thesis posits that community citizenship is largely premised on migration rights. Hence, 
migration rights are considerably decisive in providing the impetus for the nurturing and 
consolidation of a robust community citizenship within the envisaged EAC political federation. 
The discussion so far has touched upon the hybridity or dual conceptual basis of migration 
rights. While it may be for purely economic objectives that migration rights accrue; and that 
they are applied in that respect, the human rights rationale for these rights is likewise 
indisputable. While acknowledging the economic justification for migration rights, it shall be 
argued that in order for migration rights to be effectively meaningful for all EAC citizens as 
the region advances towards a political federation, a human-rights oriented approach should be 
adopted in the interpretation, application and implementation of these rights. It would thus 
require a paradigm-shift from an economic orientation to a human rights orientation; a 
paradigm-shift that should be driven by the regional court, the East African Court of Justice 
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(EACJ), vested with the power to interpret and apply Community law. Drawing from the 
example of the ECJ, this research therefore assumes that the EACJ, which has got a mandate 
similar to the ECJ, is in position to define and shape the law and practice regarding migration 
rights within the EAC.  
The EAC common market has officially been in existence since 2009, although some aspects 
of migration rights, specifically the free movement of persons, were already being 
implemented. It is therefore expected that considerable progress is being made in respect to 
conforming relevant national laws, policies and practices to EAC law in order to effect full 
realisation of migration rights. The research shall establish that conformity with the dictates of 
the EAC migration rights regime is more visible in formal and bureaucratic aspects than in the 
substantive aspects of the rights. This shall form one of the bases for the recommendation for 
a paradigm-shift in the rationalisation, interpretation and application of migration rights for 
EAC citizens, both in the economic and political phases of the integration process. 
It has also been claimed that States tend to commit to and comply more with treaties upon 
which the benefits far outweigh the costs, which is usually the case with trade and economic 
related treaties as opposed to human rights treaties99. Owing to the hybridity of migration 
rights, this thesis posits that they provide the intersection between regional integration and 
human rights. As such, if States fulfil their obligations with regard to migration rights in the 
context of economic integration, it might possibly produce a spin-off in relation to States’ 
human rights obligations, even if it might only initially be with regard to that State’s migration 
rights obligations. To borrow from the neo-functionalist expression, human rights compliance 
within the context of migration rights might result into a ‘spill-over’ of human rights 
compliance in other aspects as well. Hence the argument for a more human-rights oriented 
approach to migration. 
1.7 Research objectives and questions 
The main objectives of the present research are: first, to analyse the concept of migration rights 
and thereafter examine their rationalisation within the EAC. Is it in a purely economic sense or 
                                                          
 
99 Simmons op cit notes 5 & 25. 
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has a human rights approach been adopted in the interpretation and application of these rights 
in the EAC? 
Second, is to broadly assess the implementation and enforcement of migration rights within the 
EAC Partner States and thus ascertain whether the rationalisation and interpretation of 
migration rights at the national level is oriented towards human rights. 
The thesis aimed at answering the following questions: 
i. What are migration rights as applied in the context of regional integration? What is their 
rationale or justification and conceptual basis? Can migration rights be said to be human 
rights? And related to the concept of migration rights, who are the beneficiaries of these 
rights?   
ii. How are migration rights rationalised, interpreted and applied within the EAC, that is, 
both at the Community level and at the national level? Does the present approach to 
migration rights promote the objectives of the EAC? 
1.8 Methodology and research methods 
The research used mainly qualitative methods. It was primarily a legal doctrinal research, 
although information and data from other disciplines was of great import- gathered mainly 
through a desk review of available and relevant literature. The legal doctrinal research adopted 
hermeneutic, explanatory and evaluative approaches in the examination of legal documents 
including international and regional treaties, protocols, regulations and declarations; national 
policies and laws, and the jurisprudence emanating from both regional and national bodies. 
The research also relied on comparative legal analysis in defining and explaining key concepts 
such as migration rights and community citizenship. For this purpose, Comparison is made 
with RECs which provide for migration rights, namely the EU and ECOWAS. Besides, 
jurisprudence from the ECJ and Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is used in comparing and 
contrasting approaches of the regional courts to migration rights, and the differences in impact 
of the court decisions arising from their preferred interpretative approaches. The research seeks 
to draw some lessons from the EU regime for the promotion and protection of migration rights 
29 
 
of EU citizens and how this may be of relevance to the EAC100. The EU is so far the most 
advanced regional community (including in developing a rich jurisprudence on migration rights 
of community citizens) and although the historical and cultural issues propelling European 
integration are in their specificities not necessarily the same as for East Africa, intelligent 
lessons can be derived from that experience as a guide. 
It was anticipated that interviews might have to be conducted in some circumstances, although 
they were not the primary method of data collection. Accordingly ethics clearance was obtained 
to conduct interviews in the selected four EAC countries, should the need arise. It was only 
possible to carry out interviews with a couple of government officials in Uganda. These were 
conducted mainly for purposes of ascertaining the current policies and practices being 
implemented to promote migration rights in conformity with EAC law. Interviews proved 
advantageous in as far as it was possible to obtain some information on what may be pertaining 
in other EAC countries. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, costs and disparate convoluted 
bureaucratic research clearance procedures, it was not possible to conduct interviews in the 
other EAC countries. Consequently most of the information on the laws, policies and practices 
in other EAC countries was derived from information obtainable from relevant government 
websites.  
1.8.1 Limitations of the methodology and the research 
There were quite a number of limitations with the research, some of which have already been 
pointed out. These include: assessing implementation in four out of the five EAC Partner 
States. Any information on Burundi contained in this thesis was included because it was 
available in English, and from a reliable source.  
Access to information proved to be a big challenge. Information on public documents is not 
easily available to the public. Even in the concerned government department, important 
information such as ministerial orders, policies etc. are not readily available. Although there is 
important information that can be obtained from government websites, which was done in this 
case, such information may not be up-to-date. Furthermore, the volume of information varies 
                                                          
 
100 The East African Court of Justice also acknowledges that the ECJ is the prototype upon which it (the EACJ) 
is modelled- see Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda & another v Omar Awadh & others, EACJ Appeal 
No. 2 of 2012 para 53. It therefore frequently refers to the ECJ’s jurisprudence as persuasive or supporting 
authority. 
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from country to country and from department to department. In some instances, there is just 
bare information, yet in others, one can find some substantial information and data.  
EAC integration is one of the areas where many developments are happening and one needs to 
always keep track. However, it was found that although practices are being implemented to 
comply with Community laws, the enabling laws or regulations are not readily available or 
accessible. Although interviews might perhaps have been one way of obtaining up-to-date 
information, which was done for Uganda, it was not always possible to carry them out as 
planned for reasons explained above. Even where they were possible, information was availed 
orally and it was not possible to get updated documentation such as amending regulations even 
from the concerned ministry itself. 
The thesis thus relies on the laws, regulations and policies available as the updated versions on 
the relevant government websites as on the date of access. Where the law does appear to be at 
variance with the practice, mention has been made of it. The challenge on lack of updated 
information, however, mainly affected the information contained in chapter six and as such one 
of the recommendations is for EAC Partner States to amend their laws and make such 
information readily and easily available to and accessible by the public.  
The thesis does not really go in depth in assessing the implementation of migration rights in 
the various EAC States. A comprehensive study would require an empirical assessment of laws, 
policies and practices pertaining to each of the migration rights in each of the EAC Partner 
States. What this thesis does is to more or less lay the ground for further research in this area. 
Although it attempts to do an empirical assessment of the laws in place, it does not look at the 
entirety of all the relevant laws, especially when it comes to the right of establishment. A more 
comprehensive and extensive research would thus be necessary in order to reliably determine 
the degree of implementation and enjoyment of each of the migration rights in each of the 
Partner States. Hence this thesis attempts to serve as a seminal exposition on the rationale, 
interpretation and application of the concept of migration rights within the context of regional 
integration in Africa, specifically within the EAC. Hopefully, the findings of this research in 
relation to migration rights within the Partner States, are significant in ascertaining the 
prevailing rationale for migration rights, thus providing the necessary evidence for the key 
arguments and recommendations of this thesis.  
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1.9 Chapter lay-out 
Chapter two examines the concept of migration rights. It analyses the dual conceptual basis or 
hybridity of migration rights, providing both the economic and human rights rationales. It 
further explains the concept of ‘community citizen’ the beneficiaries of migration rights, 
drawing out the differences between community citizenship and nation-state citizenship. 
Considering that community citizenship has its basis in migration rights, it tends to be much 
more circumscribed in scope. This however raises the question whether community citizenship 
as presently understood or defined would suffice for a politically federated EAC. 
Chapter three provides an overview of the EAC as the focal REC of this thesis. It traces the 
development of the EAC from the old EAC to the new EAC, highlighting progressive 
developments in the current EAC. These developments which includes a recognition of human 
rights as fundamental principles of the EAC provides the basis for the argument for a human-
rights orientation to migration rights. 
Chapter four entails an analysis of the EAC Treaty and the Common Market Protocol 
provisions on migration rights, noting that the provisions, in some instances and with regard to 
some of the rights, tend to focus more on the formalities of implementation rather than on the 
substance of the rights. 
Chapter five examines the EACJ’s interpretative approach and how this influences the 
rationalisation of migration rights in the EAC. While acknowledging the challenging, or even 
constraining circumstances under which the court is operating, it is argued that the EACJ needs 
to expansively interpret the Treaty provisions, favouring a human rights orientation, in order 
to positively influence the development of the EAC migration rights regime.  
Chapter six examines the status of migration rights within the EAC Partner States. It involves 
an analysis of national laws, practices and as well as relevant case law. The purpose of this 
chapter is to determine whether national laws and practices are in conformity with community 
law, and thus to ascertain the predominant rationale in the implementation of migration rights 
at the national level.  
Chapter seven is the concluding chapter in which the findings of the research are assessed in 
light of its objectives. It concludes that the predominantly economic rationalisation of and 
approach to migration rights within the EAC may not be quite appropriate for advancing its 
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objectives towards a political federation. Hence a reorientation towards a human rights 
approach might be more befitting. The chapter also makes recommendations for further 
research studies arising from the present thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO 
MIGRATION RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
2.0 Introduction 
Under the regional economic integration model, one of the aspects that member States of a 
Regional Economic Community (REC) usually agree upon is the opening up of their territorial 
spaces for each other’s nationals. This is usually done with the objective of creating a single or 
common market in which there is free movement of factors of production. It is within this 
context that nationals of the member States of the REC will be facilitated to move ‘freely’ 
within the States of the Community. In most cases, the key targets of free movement provisions 
will be workers and persons exercising an economic activity. Nonetheless, and as shall be 
explained in this chapter, the free movement provisions in most regional integration treaties 
apply to all nationals of member States. These provisions serve as a premise for the discussion 
and understanding of migration rights of community citizens in this thesis. The historical 
development of migration rights, presented in the previous chapter, strongly casts migration 
rights as an ineluctable product of economic integration. This account seems not to lay any 
particular emphasis on the human rights underpinnings of migration rights, yet upon further 
analysis, migration rights are characteristically hybrid rights. They have a dual conceptual 
basis. 
 
This chapter discusses the conceptual duality of migration rights, and on that basis examines 
the content of each of the migration rights. The chapter also recognises that migration rights do 
not exist in abstract, which leads to a discussion on the concept of community citizenship, for 
community citizens are the holders of these rights. The key argument herein is that over time, 
the economic approach to migration rights seems to be increasingly subsumed by a human 
rights orientation, particularly when it comes to judicial interpretation of these rights. In spite 
of this development, migration rights of community citizens cannot as yet be put on exactly the 
same footing with cognate rights guaranteed to the nationals or citizens of a State.  
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2.1 Conceptual underpinnings of migration rights 
The free movement of persons has aptly been referred to as a hybrid legal right protected both 
under economic integration treaties as well as under human rights treaties1.  The notion of 
hybridity, which could also be applied to the other migration rights, underscores the mixed 
rationales and concepts underlying these rights. More specifically: the economic rationale and 
the human rights rationale. For this reason, migration rights have in some instances been 
referred to as ‘market freedoms’ distinct from ‘rights of citizens’ in the context of the EU2; or 
‘economic freedoms’ as distinct from ‘human rights’ in the African context3. Consequently, 
migration rights (free movement of persons/workers, rights of residence and establishment) 
within the economic or trade context will be categorised together with the free movement of 
goods, capital and services4. The following discussion focusses on expounding on the duality 
of migration rights and the justification for each rationale, without necessarily arguing for 
which rationale holds sway in a given regional context. 
2.1.1 The economic rationale 
The free movement of workers (and/or persons), the right of residence and the right of 
establishment form the core of rights that are accorded to persons within a REC, mainly for the 
purpose of establishing a common market. The common market phase of regional economic 
integration requires that all obstacles to the free movement of factors of production within the 
economic community be removed. Member states of the REC, are required to facilitate and 
achieve the free movement of labour, capital, goods and services within the region to areas 
where they enjoy a comparative advantage and efficiency. This, it is believed, would lead to 
better services and products due to competition; services would be moved where they are most 
required, businesses would be able to take advantage of lower production costs in particular 
                                                          
 
1 Laurence Helfer ‘Sub-regional courts in Africa: litigating the hybrid right to free movement’ iCourts Working 
Paper Series, No. 32, 2015 available at http://jura.ku.dk/icourts/working-papers/. Although his work is specific 
to free movement within African RECs, the notion of hybridity holds true for migration rights generally. 
2 Francis G Jacobs ‘Citizenship of the European Union- a legal analysis’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 595, 
598-599, 604; also Emiliana Baldoni ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union: a legal-historical 
perspective’ 2003 Pioneur Working Paper No. 3. 
3 Enyinna S Nwauche ‘The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice and the horizontal application of human 
rights’ (2013) 13 AHRLJ 31. 
4 The term’ four freedoms’ is common when referring to the free movement of labour, capital, goods and 
services. See for instance: Catherine Barnard The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (2010); Peter 
Oliver & Wulf-Henning Roth ‘The internal market and the four freedoms’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law 
Review 407-441; Sybe A de Vries ‘Balancing fundamental rights with economic freedoms according to the 
European Court of Justice’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 169-192. 
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areas, and generally, this would lead to enhanced trade benefits and economic development. 
The concept of liberalisation of trade and services captures the ethos of the WTO as laid down 
in the agreement establishing the WTO5, the GATT, and the GATS which covers some of the 
aspects covered in this thesis from a purely trade-related perspective. With regard to migration 
rights, although not referred to as such in WTO terminology, the GATS lays down a general 
rule to the effect that WTO Member States that are parties to a labour market integration 
agreement should exempt citizens of  states that are parties to that agreement from requirements 
concerning residency and work permits6. And so, by abolishing visa and work or residence 
permits for citizens of EAC, the Partner States would not only be abiding by the Community 
law, but would also be complying with international trade law. Additionally, the GATS lays 
down rules concerning movement of natural persons trading in services7, an aspect that is 
reflected in the provisions governing the right of establishment under regional integration, as 
shall be further discussed shortly. The foregoing explanation more or less provides the basis 
for the economic rationale for migration rights.  
 
Persons moving in this context are regarded as an economic instrument (labour) that would 
enhance the economic benefits of a company, an industry, a country and region as a whole. It 
therefore makes sense to ensure that free movement of labour, the right of persons to reside 
freely in the areas where they work or set up business, and the right of persons to set up 
businesses in countries other than their own are legally protected and guaranteed. This explains 
why most regional integration treaties provide for these rights, sometimes to the exclusion of 
any other rights8. For instance, the East African Community Common Market Protocol (CMP) 
provides for the following rights: the free movement of labour and services, the rights of 
residence and establishment9. Additionally, it provides for the general free movement of 
persons. More will be said about this further on. The ECOWAS Treaty recognises the rights of 
entry, residence and establishment, which rights are to be recognised by Member States in their 
territories in accordance with the provisions of the relevant Protocols10. The Caribbean 
                                                          
 
5 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1994, preamble.  
6 GATS Article V bis on labour markets integration agreements. 
7 GATS Mode 4, Annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the Agreement. 
8 The treaties also provide for the free movement of capital, goods and services, but for purposes of this work, 
the examples provided are generally limited to the free movement of persons and/or labour, the rights of 
residence and establishment. 
9 EAC Treaty Article 104; and EAC CMP Article 2.4. 
10 ECOWAS Treaty Article 59.1. 
36 
 
Community makes provision for the right of establishment and the free movement of 
community nationals.11 The EU provides for the right to free movement and residence for 
Union citizens, as well as the right of establishment. Rather exceptionally, it also provides for 
other rights of EU citizens including the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to 
the European Parliament and in Municipal elections in their Member States of residence under 
the same conditions as nationals of that State; the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third 
country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection 
of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the 
nationals of that State; and the right to petition the European  Parliament, to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any 
of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language12. 
 
From the array of rights that pertain in the various REC Treaties, it is clear that migration rights 
are a common denominator, mainly because they are deemed necessary for the attainment of 
the community’s economic objectives, specifically opening up the internal market for better 
trade considered an antecedent to improved economic well-being and development. Even in 
cases where additional rights are guaranteed, specifically in the EU, it has been argued that 
despite the move of the EU from the ‘European Economic Community toward a broader 
European Union, the priority is, as in the past, to complete as soon as possible the internal 
market and to assure the conditions of its efficiency. The other dimensions, that is the cultural, 
social and political aspects are still mainly conceived as supporting measures intended to 
facilitate the realization of the central economic and monetary goals’13. 
 
As such migration rights tend to be more of benefit to persons who are economically active 
than those who are not; or rather they seem to be inherently biased towards the economically 
active. This could explain why even where free movement provisions apply to all persons, as 
in the EAC, the ECOWAS and the Caribbean, such provisions will be elaborated in the context 
of the Common Market framework. Within the EU, for example, persons not economically 
                                                          
 
11 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy (RTC) Articles 32-33, 45-46, 
12 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated version), (TFEU) Article 20.2. The Treaty is 
available at http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm. 
13 Marco Martiniello ‘Citizenship in the European Union’ in T Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer 
(eds) From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World (2000) 351. 
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active are required to prove sufficiency of financial resources and health insurance before they 
can exercise their rights to free movement and residence in Member States other than their 
own14. This condition is meant to avert a situation where persons become an economic burden 
on the social assistance systems of the host Member State15. There is a further proposition that 
the conditions discourage ‘benefit tourism’ or ‘free-riding’16 by nationals of one EU Member 
State in another where the social and welfare benefits may be better. In other words, migration, 
and the exercise of migration rights thereof, should be geared towards boosting economic 
productivity, growth and development, and not meant to become a bane on a State’s economy. 
Such conditions as to financial sufficiency, therefore, lend credence to the economic rationale 
of migration rights. 
 
The historical development of migration rights demonstrates that the beneficiaries of these 
rights have been extended over time. First, accruing to workers and business persons, then to 
members of their families, and finally to all nationals of the Member States of the EU. Within 
the ECOWAS and the EAC, although the rights apply to all community citizens, they are 
mainly exercised by workers and business persons, as shall be illustrated in subsequent chapters 
in the context of the EAC. Hence the extension of migration rights to encompass all nationals 
of Member States of a regional community has more or less evolved from the migration of 
workers17. It can thus be argued that the economic rationale provides both scaffold and 
springboard for migration rights as they might be perceived today.  
 
Moreover, and quite paradoxically, the right to free movement and residence, as well as the 
right to establish do not have their origins as such in economics. These rights were a priori 
provided for under human rights law, although these provisions tended to be directed more 
towards nationals or citizens of a State. What the migration rights regime under RECs, 
                                                          
 
14 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
[2004] OJ LI58/77 Article 7 (1)(b). 
15 Ibid. 
16Armand de Mestral & Jan Winter ‘Mobility rights in the European Union and Canada’ (2001) 46 McGill Law 
Journal 1001. This point is further underscored by the ECJ in its judgement in Case C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano 
and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig [2014] ECR at paras 76 & 78. The court expressly denounces the practice 
of ‘economically inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely in order to 
obtain another Member State’s social assistance although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right 
of residence’- para 78. 
17 Elizabeth Meehan Citizenship and the European Community (1993) 17. 
38 
 
supposedly does to an extent, is to extend the scope of persons to whom these rights are 
guaranteed as well as the geographical scope in which these rights are protected. Rights that 
were initially guaranteed to only nationals are, by agreement, extended to nationals of other 
States across all the States in a given REC. Nevertheless, the human rights rationale for these 
rights is in no way subverted.  
2.1.2 The human rights rationale 
The human rights rationale, unlike the economic rationale that views individuals in terms of 
economic instruments or factors of production, emphasises the inherent dignity of a human 
being. In other words, rights accrue to one by virtue of his or her being human, and not 
necessarily by virtue of what one does. The human rights approach implies that rights have a 
transcendental character as well as universal applicability to all individuals indiscriminately.  
 
Migration, and in particular, the right to free movement, has been recognised as ‘an 
indispensable condition for the free development of a person’18; a ‘liberty that individuals need 
instrumentally in order to satisfy basic needs and achieve important goals’19. More precisely, 
migration rights have been considered to be ‘intrinsically valuable for many people who may 
enjoy geographic movement as an expression of individual liberty or as a collective way of 
life’20. In this case, the undertaking of an economic activity would not be a pre-condition for 
the exercise or enjoyment of migration rights.  
 
A number of human rights instruments, both at the international and regional levels21, provide 
for the right to free movement and residence, as well as the right to establish (a component of 
the human right to work). The content of these rights shall be explained in detail in the 
                                                          
 
18 CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), adopted at the 67th Session of the 
Human Rights Committee, on 2 November 1999 para 1. 
19 Rainer Bauböck ‘Citizenship and free movement’ in Rogers M. Smith (ed) Citizenship, Borders, and Human 
Needs (2011) 357. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976; International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) G.A 
res. 45/158 of 18 December 1990; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) (ACHPR); European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR), to mention but a few. 
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immediately ensuing section. Important to note though, is that most States have domesticated 
the human rights treaties and more or less replicated the rights therein in their Constitutions 
and national laws. The universality of human rights has been emphasised under international 
law, whereby a State Party is obliged to ensure the covenanted rights to ‘all individuals within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or 
her nationality’22. The implication of this is that aliens or foreigners, once in the territory of a 
State that has ratified and domesticated the various relevant human rights instruments, enjoy 
all the rights and freedoms guaranteed to nationals, without discrimination. The only 
exceptions will be the exercise of rights pertaining to political participation that are a preserve 
of nationals; and where there is a lawful and objective justification for restricting their 
enjoyment of rights as aliens. This transcendence of human rights across borders is what has 
been referred to as ‘postnational citizenship’23, and of which community citizenship provides 
a compelling example. From this perspective, it can be argued that the human rights rationale 
for migration rights clearly subsumes or overrides the economic rationale since one’s rights 
would still be protected whether or not they are engaged in an economic activity. 
 
In interpreting migration rights, the human rights rationale has not been totally lost on the 
Courts of the Economic Communities. The ECJ has noted that ‘international treaties for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated, or of which they 
are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of 
Community law’24. In fact, in the Gebhard case, the ECJ went further to refer to migration 
rights of EU citizens as ‘fundamental freedoms’25. This has given rise to the averment that by 
referring to them as such, the Court has granted them ‘a similar status to that of fundamental 
rights in national constitutions’26. Indeed, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is provided 
                                                          
 
22 CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, adopted at the 27th Session of 
the Human Rights Committee, on 11 April 1986 para 1. This statement is, however, made in the context of the 
ICCPR. 
23 Yasemin N Soysal Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (1994) 140-141. 
24 Case C-4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [1975] 
ECR 985, para 13. Article 6.3. of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (consolidated version) provides in 
similar vein that ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law’. 
25 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR 
I-4165 para 37. 
26 Miguel P Maduro ‘Striking the elusive balance between economic freedom and social rights in the EU’ in 
Philip Alston (ed) The EU and Human Rights (1999) 452. The debate on the relationship between market 
freedoms and human rights is inconclusive and various scholars hold various views as presented in Philip Alston 
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that ‘[I]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’27. This provision 
cannot be said to exclude citizens’ rights to free movement and residence as reiterated in Article 
45 of the Charter. 
 
Within the ECOWAS and EAC Courts, cases involving the right to free movement will usually 
allege double-barrelled violations of free movement; the one aspect under the economic 
integration law, and the other under human rights law. Despite having been set up to handle 
matters of regional economic integration, the courts have had to deal with the duality of 
migration rights, and made decisions that in part may be said to acknowledge migration rights 
as human rights28. Particularly for the EAC, the Draft Bill of Rights actually re-enacts migration 
rights as human rights and fundamental freedoms29. 
 
Furthermore, the human rights overtones of migration rights become all the more conspicuous 
in the application of the principle of non-discrimination or equality of treatment; and the 
application of limitations or restrictions on these rights. The way in which courts have dealt 
with non-discrimination and application of restrictions, draws substantially from the human 
rights interpretation. This shall become clearer in the ensuing sections which examine and the 
content of each of the migration rights in turn, and the general principle of non-discrimination 
and the limitations and conditions that apply to all migration rights. 
 
The following sections therefore aim to examine migration rights, emphasising their conceptual 
duality and the interplay within the two rationales in practice. The discussion is not so much 
for purposes of demonstrating that different outcomes might be reached by rigidly adhering to 
                                                          
 
‘Resisting the merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law: a reply to Petersmann’ (2002) 13 European 
Journal of International Law at 825. 
27 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 52.1. This Charter is legally binding according 
to the Declaration concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union annexed to the Final 
Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007. 
28 See case before ECOWAS Court Femi Falana & another v The Republic of Benin & others, 
ECW/CCJ/APP/10/07; before the EAC Court Samuel Mukira Mohochi v. The Attorney General of the Republic 
of Uganda, EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011. See also Helfer op cit note 1. 
29 EAC Draft Bill of Rights Article 12. The Draft Bill is available at 
http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=147&Itemid=136 
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a particular rationale for migration rights, but rather to demonstrate that the normative content 
of these rights is largely in concord, regardless of the underlying rationale. Additionally, 
despite the conceptual duality the human rights rationale may be seen as greatly influencing 
migration rights in some respects, which has led to a gradual blurring of any subsisting 
distinctions in the application of the two rationales.   
2.2 The right to free movement 
According to regional integration theory, it is at the phase of the common market that member 
States of a REC are required to open up their borders for each other’s nationals to move freely 
in and out of each other’s territory. The emphasis or priority here would be on nationals of 
member states moving within the region for trade or economic-related purposes. However, 
what now seems to be the trend in most RECs, including those that have not yet established a 
common market, is that the all nationals of member states of the REC can exercise the right to 
free movement in all member states. This is the case with the ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC 
and the CARICOM. The reasons as to why none of these RECs have advanced further in the 
integration or consolidation of free movement regulations are varying. For instance, COMESA 
is still only at the customs union stage, and even then most of its member states are yet to 
implement their obligations thereunder30.  This has inevitably led to time lag in the progression 
of the integration phases. Inevitably affected is the protocol on free movement of persons, 
labour, services and the right of establishment and residence which, though concluded in 2001, 
is yet to come into force31. With regard to SADC, the Facilitation of Movement Protocol has 
not yet received the two-thirds ratifications required for it to come into force. Reasons for low 
ratification range from lack of funding and technical expertise to operationalise it, to lack of 
political will and commitment by member states32. Despite these setbacks, what is of 
importance is that the member states in each of these RECs have principally agreed to free 
movement and they have taken some initial steps in this regard, specifically granting free 
movement of each other’s citizens, albeit for a restricted time. 
 
                                                          
 
30 COMESA Key Issues in Regional Integration: Volume III (2014) at 3 available at http://www.comesa.int/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Key-Issues-on-intergration-III.pdf, accessed on 13 May 2017. 
31 Ibid at 5. 
32 Adrian Kitimbo ‘Is it time for open borders in Southern Africa? The case for free labour movement in SADC’ 
2014 Brenthurst Discussion Paper 4/2014 at 9-10. 
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Where the right to free movement of persons is guaranteed, nationals of member States no 
longer require a visa or other entry permit in order to enter and stay in another member State. 
All that a national of one member State needs to get into the territory of another member State 
is a valid passport or identity card to prove that they are indeed a national of a member State33. 
In this regard, States need to recognise each other’s documents and dispositions of nationality. 
The ECJ has within the context of community law, reiterated the international law position that 
‘it is for each Member State, having due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions 
for the acquisition and loss of nationality’34. States should recognise each other’s nationals 
regardless of how that nationality was acquired35. 
 
When States agree to free movement of persons, they are agreeing not merely to the ‘opening 
or shutting [of] gates, but of changing the working of a complex system of machinery’36. What 
this implies is that States should actually change those national laws and policies that would 
necessarily hinder free movement of community citizens, contrary to Community law37. In the 
context of meeting the objectives of the common market, States are required to remove all 
barriers and obstacles that would inhibit the free movement of workers or labour within the 
Community, which in most cases calls for harmonisation of not only immigration laws, but 
                                                          
 
33 For the EU see - European Commission Freedom to Move and Live in Europe: A Guide to your Rights as an 
EU Citizen (2013) 10-11; for the EAC see EAC CMP  Articles 7.2 (a) & (b), 8- 9; for ECOWAS see Protocol 
A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, Article 3. All these documents 
and Protocols refer to the abolition of visa requirements and the only need for a community citizen to present a 
valid passport or ID. 
34 Case C-369/90 Micheletti and others v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239 para 10. 
The international law position was well enunciated by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case 
(second phase), Judgement of April 6th, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955, at 20 & 23. 
35 Ibid. See also Case C-200/02 Kunquian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] ECR I-9925. In this case, the ECJ rejected the respondent’s argument that the applicants, 
who were nationals of a non-Member State, had taken advantage of Ireland’s jus soli citizenship acquisition 
rules and given birth to their child there who then became a community citizen. The ECJ upheld the rule of 
international law and the UK was bound to recognise the nationality conferred by Ireland on the applicants’ 
child.  
36 Chandran Kukathas ‘Expatriatism: the theory and practice of open borders’ in Smith (ed) op cit note 19 at 
327. 
37 This is a point that has been underscored in a number of cases brought before the ECJ. For example in Case 
C-378/97 Florus Ariël Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207, para 40 in which the ECJ agreed with the Advocate 
General’s opinion that the obligation of Member States to abolish controls of persons at the internal frontiers of 
the Community presupposes the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States governing the crossing of the 
external borders of the Community, immigration, the grant of visas…. In Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge 
des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR I-4921 para 96, the ECJ 
held that: ‘Provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in 
order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom even if they 
apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned’. 
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also labour laws, taxation laws, and other related legislation38. For purposes of meeting the 
objectives of regional integration, the opening up of borders for nationals of member States of 
the Community implies that they are free to enter and exit the territory of any member State 
without any laws or administrative controls to prevent them from doing so39.  This has to a 
large extent been attained in the EU, but the same cannot be said for most of the other RECs 
that provide for free movement of nationals. 
 
The purpose for which one purports to exercise one’s right to free movement within a REC 
will matter and as such vary the conditions under which that right may be exercised, if at all.  
In economic integration treaties that extend the right to free movement to all nationals of 
member States, the right of free movement of workers and business persons will usually be 
provided for separately. The conditions that apply to both category of persons and the formal 
requirements they have to fulfil may be different in each case.  For instance within the EU, 
non-economically active persons wishing to exercise their right to free movement need to have 
sufficient resources and health insurance, a condition that, for obvious reasons, does not apply 
to workers and service-providers.   
 
Furthermore, the free movement regime under regional integration treaties is not totally devoid 
of formalities. Persons still have to go through necessary border and administrative controls. 
In African RECs, and of particular concern, the EAC, entry permits still have to be issued to 
nationals of other member States before they can enter another Partner State. Within the EU, 
nationals of other member States staying in a host member State for more than three months 
have to obtain a registration certificate from the relevant authorities40. What these formalities 
signify is that free movement within RECs, is really not quite as free as when compared to free 
movement within one’s own State. The possible explanation for this is that States still wish to 
exercise control and demonstrate sovereignty over issues of migration, even where they have 
                                                          
 
38 Bosman case ibid para 94, where the ECJ emphasises that ‘provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of 
movement for persons are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community citizens of occupational activities of 
all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures which might place Community citizens at a 
disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State’. This was 
reiterated in Case C-224/02 Heikki Antero Pusa v Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö [2004] ECR I-
5763, paras 31 & 35. The ECJ agreed with the Advocate General’s opinion that a national rule leading to the 
withholding of less from one’s pension if he resides in that State than if he resides in another Member State, 
might deter him from moving to take up such residence. 
39 See Bauböck ‘Citizenship and free movement’ op cit note 19 at 350. 
40 Directive 2004/38/EC op cit note 14, Article 8 (1-3). 
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supposedly opened up their borders. Yet another explanation could be that free movement 
under the auspices of regional integration is still largely influenced by the economic rationale 
and has not yet fully crossed into the political realm in which case it may be viewed purely 
from a human rights perspective. Moreover even from an economic law perspective with regard 
to free movement of labour, the GATS requires that labour market integration agreements 
exempt citizens of parties to those agreements from requirements concerning residency and 
work permits41. However, this may not be the case in practice as shall be illustrated later in 
chapter six. This difference between international commitments and domestic or regional 
tendencies is mainly attributed to the ‘non-willingness of WTO Members to subject their 
domestic policies to the GATS’42, and opting instead to retain their sovereign powers to being 
the ‘final determinants of who enters their markets, for what reason, for how long and on what 
terms’43. 
 
The human rights dimension of the right to free movement tends to be more localised; the right 
to free movement is directed more towards intra-State movement than movement across State 
borders.  International human rights law provides for the right to free movement, which is 
typically enjoyed by citizens of a State and persons who are lawfully in the territory of that 
State to freely move within that State. In fact what is protected under international human rights 
law44 is: i) the right to move freely and to choose one’s place of residence within the territory 
of a State in which one is lawfully in; ii) freedom to leave any country, including one’s own; 
and iii) the right to enter into or return to one’s country45. This provision is replicated in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)46. Interpreting this provision, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter ‘the African Commission’) 
has re-affirmed the importance of the freedom of movement as ‘a fundamental right of 
individuals within States’ but particularly emphasised the right of a citizen of a State to leave 
                                                          
 
41 GATS Article V bis. 
42 Joy Kategekwa Opening Markets for Foreign Skills: How Can the WTO Help? Lessons from the EU and 
Uganda’s Regional Services Deals (2014) 45. 
43 Ibid. 
44 ICCPR Articles 12.1, 12.2, 12.3; UDHR Article 13. 
45 The Human Rights Committee established under the ICCPR has reiterated the position that ‘The Covenant 
does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or reside in the territory of a State Party. It is in principle a matter 
for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory’- see CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of 
Aliens supra note 22 para 5. The CMW in Article 8 also recognises the rights of migrant workers and members 
of their families to leave any country, including their own, and to enter and remain in their State of origin. In 
Article 39, it further recognises the right to free movement and residence of migrant workers and their families.  
46 ACHPR Articles 12.1. & 12.2. 
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and return to their State at any time, and also ‘to travel to, reside in and/or work in any part of 
the State the citizen wishes, without interference from the State’47. With regard to inter-State 
movement, what human rights law provides for is the right to emigrate and not the right to 
immigrate48. While one has the right to leave one’s State, there is no concomitant right for one 
to enter another State. This is where regional integration law goes further than international 
human rights by providing for the right to migrate, even though this usually tends to be 
circumscribed as earlier on discussed.  
 
Usually in exercise of one’s freedom of movement in a State, although a national is required to 
have an identification document which additionally may be used to authorise movement, one 
will hardly be subjected to formalities when moving from one part of the State to another49. 
One should move freely in and to any part of the country without having to fulfil any prior 
conditions, and without obtaining permission from State authorities to do so. National laws that 
require citizens or lawful residents to obtain permission when moving from one part of a 
country to another, have been frowned upon as being inconsistent with human rights law50. 
International human rights law therefore demands that any obstacles to one’s free movement, 
be they administrative, bureaucratic or otherwise be removed for as long as one is a citizen or 
lawfully resident in that State. But then again, freedom of movement is not absolute and States 
may impose lawful and reasonable restrictions upon it. These shall be looked at subsequently. 
 
Under international human rights law, free movement is, therefore, only guaranteed in a State 
in which one is either a citizen or lawfully resident. The notion of lawful residence presupposes 
that one has been granted permission by the relevant authorities to enter and stay or reside in 
that State, and to that extent, aliens or foreigners are guaranteed freedom of movement. Hence, 
foreign nationals do not have the right to move freely from one State to another, unless they 
obtain prior permission in the form of visas or entry permits. By mutual agreement between 
States, visa exemptions may apply to each other’s nationals.  
 
                                                          
 
47Communication Nos. 279/03, 296/05 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan, para 187. 
48 Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteniere ‘International migration, border controls and human rights: assessing 
the relevance of a right to mobility’ (2006) 21 Journal of Borderlands Studies 75. 
49 There are some States which may require their nationals to obtain some sort of authorisation when moving 
intra-State. 
50 CCPR General Comment No. 27 supra note 18 para 17. 
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Member States of a REC, by guaranteeing the right to free movement to each other nationals, 
in effect, extend the right to free movement as guaranteed to their nationals to nationals of other 
member States without discrimination51. In order for this to be done, States should remove all 
physical, legal, administrative and other policy barriers that would in any way inhibit this free 
movement by community citizens. Arguably, the economic rationale seems to be subsumed 
into the human rights rationale, where free movement is exercised without discrimination. 
However, the reality is that among most RECs, border points will still exist and will have to be 
crossed by nationals of other member States, unlike in the State territory where borders may 
not necessarily exist and movement therein is freer. Furthermore, under regional integration 
treaties, further conditions or restrictions may be applied to persons seeking to exercise free 
movement within the Community, than may be applicable to nationals of a State exercising 
free movement within the territory of their State. 
2.3 The right of residence 
The right to free movement is virtually incomplete without the right of residence, since persons 
hardly ever make circular non-stop movements without staying in another place even if for 
only a limited amount of time. Consequently, the right to free movement always goes hand in 
hand with the right to reside in another place or country other than one’s own52. Although these 
rights are fused under international human rights law, the same may not always hold true under 
regional integration treaties. For instance in the case of the EAC, the right of residence is 
delineated as concomitant with the free movement of workers and the right of establishment. 
This tends to suggest that it is guaranteed only to economically active community citizens. 
Moreover, just like the free movement of persons, the normative content of the right of 
residence, whether under regional integration treaties or human rights treaties, is not that 
dissimilar.  
 
                                                          
 
51 Elspeth Guild The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law (2004) 44. 
52 See, for example: UDHR Article 13.1; ICCPR Article 12.1; ACHPR Article 12.1; TFEU Article 20.2 (a); 
ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment Article 2; 
and EAC Treaty Article 104. One of the few exceptions is the Schengen Agreement whose objective is the 
removal of border controls for persons travelling within the European Schengen zone, but it does not ‘address 
the ability of nationals of the Schengen States or other States to reside or work in another Schengen State’- Ulf 
Bernitz & Hedvig L Bernitz ‘Human rights and European identity: the debate about European citizenship’ in 
Alston (ed) op cit note 26 at 522. 
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Within the regional integration framework, to borrow from the language of the European 
Commission, the right of residence may be defined as the right to settle anywhere within the 
territory of the Community53. This right of citizens has been upheld on numerous occasions by 
the ECJ asserting that by virtue of their rights conferred by Treaty, EU citizens are entitled to 
reside in another Member State merely on grounds of their citizenship and without the need to 
be economically active54.  
 
It follows that if the right to free movement is extended to all persons in the Community, 
whether or not economically active, so should the right to reside in the territory of another 
member State. Although this is explicitly the case with the EU, similar logic may be extended 
to the EAC and ECOWAS. This could explain why, say, within the EAC and ECOWAS, the 
right to reside, though not expressly spelt out in the same vein as the right to free movement of 
persons, it is presumed incidental to it. As such the relevant provisions within the EAC and 
ECOWAS treaties may not expressly provide for ‘the right to move and reside freely’, but will 
provide for free movement which entitles a community citizen to stay in the territory of any of 
the member States for a specified period of time. The right of residence is thereby implied 
within the right to free movement. 
 
The definition provided above for the right of residence, though defined within the EU 
framework, might be adapted for other RECs, but only with regard to the substance of it. As to 
how the right will be executed, each regional Community has got its unique rules and 
regulations, which set out conditions and limitations pertaining to the right.  
  
Within the EU, for example, EU citizens can exercise the right to reside freely in another 
Member State for a period of up to three months. Upon the expiry of this period, should the 
individuals wish to extend their stay, they must register with the relevant authorities and obtain 
a registration certificate55. This requirement may, however, be waived by some EU countries 
should they so wish56. What is of importance though is that residence permits have been 
                                                          
 
53 See European Commission Freedom to Move and Live in Europe op cit note 33 at 4. 
54 Jacobs op cit note 2 at 607. See also Zhu, Chen case supra note 35 para 26; Case C-413/99 Baumbast, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 para 84.  
55 Directive 2004/38/EC, op cit note 14 Article 8 (1-3). Under Article 16 (1) of the Directive, citizens who have 
stayed in a host Member State for a continuous period of five years enjoy the right of permanent residence, 
should they wish to take it up. 
56 European Commission Freedom to Move and Live in Europe, op cit note 33 at 17. 
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abolished for EU citizens, and the registration certificate, which is really for purposes of States 
keeping track of population movements57, is not required for workers, self-employed persons 
and providers of services. 
 
Community citizens in the ECOWAS have a right to freely stay in a member State other than 
their own for a period of three months, upon expiry of which they must obtain permission from 
the appropriate national authority for an extension of their stay58. The law, however specifically 
provides that the right of residence is to be granted by Member States to community citizens 
who are within a Member State’s territory for the purpose of seeking and carrying out income 
earning employment59. Once in a host State, an ECOWAS citizen should obtain an ECOWAS 
residence card or a residence permit60. 
 
Within the EAC, a community citizen, other than a worker or self-employed person, only 
requires a pass issued by the immigration officers upon entry. The pass entitles the holder to 
stay in the territory of a Partner State for a period of six months, subject to renewal61.  Besides, 
the right of residence is explicitly guaranteed for workers and self-employed persons and their 
dependants. These will be granted a work and residence permit as the case may be62.  
 
Within the Caribbean Community, although the Treaty makes provision for free movement of 
persons, the right of residence is not spelt out anywhere63. This could be that the right of 
residence is considered as implicit in the right to free movement.  
 
It is quite evident within the EAC and ECOWAS that the right of residence, as expressly laid 
down in the respective legal provisions, is only specifically guaranteed to economically active 
community citizens. For other citizens, it is more or less implied in their right to free movement. 
The conditions set upon the right of residence in each of the RECs tend to present it in a quite 
                                                          
 
57 Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland ECR [2008] ECR I-9705 para 63. 
58 ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment Article 
3. 
59 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP/.1/7/86 on the Second Phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol on 
Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment Article 2. 
60 Ibid Articles 5-6. 
61 EAC Common Market (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations, Annex I to the CMP regulation 3. 
62 EAC Common Market (Right of Residence) Regulations, Annex IV to the CMP 4 & 6.1. 
63 See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) op cit note 11. 
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different light from how it is articulated under human rights law. Human rights law regards the 
right of residence as complementary to free movement. Hence, it provides for the right to 
‘freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State’64. The right to reside is 
not attached to one’s economic activity, but is rather of general application provided one is 
lawfully within a State. Interpreting this right, together with freedom of movement, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has explained that the right should be freely exercised by any person 
lawfully in the State; he or she should not be compelled to reside in any particular area or 
territory of the State to which they have moved65. Besides, foreign nationals should not be 
accorded treatment different from that of nationals when it comes to choosing residence. Where 
this is done, it should be justifiable on grounds of national security, public order, public health 
or morals, and the protection of the rights of others66.  
 
The right of residence from a human rights perspective presents a couple of contrasts with the 
economic approach, in some material aspects. Firstly, there seem to be less inhibitions and 
conditions to free residence from a human rights perspective. Under the human rights regime, 
less attention is given to procedural formalities and conditions upon which one may exercise 
and enjoy one’s right of residence. Under regional integration, the right of residence may only 
be exercised upon fulfilment of set formal conditions, which may vary from REC to REC. 
Secondly, while the right to freely reside in a State under human rights law is only dependant 
on one’s lawful status in that State, a number of regional integration treaties tend to show a 
preference for economically active persons upon whom the right of residence is specially 
conferred. In fact where the community law does not indicate otherwise, it may be presumed 
that one’s right of residence ceases upon one’s termination of work or business in the host 
member State. Where one opts to stay on where the economic activity has ceased, they may 
have to fulfil conditions that apply to other community citizens who are not economically 
active. 
 
Whereas all nationals of member States of a REC may enjoy a generic right of residence in 
other member States; at a technical or even more substantive level, workers and business 
                                                          
 
64 UDHR Article 13.1; ICCPR Article 12.1; and ACHPR Article 12.1. 
65 See CCPR General Comment No. 27 supra note 18 para 7- The right to reside ‘precludes preventing the entry 
or stay of persons in a defined part of the territory’. 
66 UDHR Article 29.2; ICCPR Article 12.3; ACHPR Article 12.2. The same is emphasised in CCPR General 
Comment No. 27 para 4. 
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persons may be subject to less conditions and restrictions as to their right of residence. 
Nonetheless, from the human rights viewpoint, once all persons whether workers or not are 
lawfully within the territory of a State, they should be able to enjoy all rights indiscriminately. 
2.4 The right of establishment 
The right of establishment, unlike the right to free movement and residence, can be said to be 
exclusively enunciated in economic integration treaties67. The right generally applies to self-
employed persons who wish to set themselves up in a State other than their own. This much 
can be discerned from the various regional integration treaties that provide for this right.  
 
Within ECOWAS, the right of establishment is defined as ‘the right granted to a citizen who is 
a national of one Member State to settle or establish in another Member State other than his 
State of origin, and to have access to economic activities, to carry out these activities as well 
as to set up and manage enterprises and, in particular companies, under conditions defined by 
the legislation of the host Member State for its own nationals’68. Under EAC law, the right of 
establishment entitles self-employed persons to take up and pursue economic activities and set 
up and manage economic undertakings in the territory of a Partner State other than their own69. 
Both the ECOWAS and EAC definitions are not dissimilar from that contained in the EU 
Treaty which provides that ‘[f]reedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings....’70 
 
                                                          
 
67 Within the international trade law framework, the GATS provides for liberalisation of trade in services 
through four main modes: (1) cross-border supply; (2) consumption abroad; (3) commercial presence (a service 
supplier of one State establishes a territorial presence in another member state) and; (4) presence of natural 
persons (persons of one member state enter the territory of another to supply services). Of particular relevance 
are modes 3 and 4 which, in ways, relate to the right of establishment, but the emphasis of the GATS is on 
Member States’ commitments regarding the most favoured nation treatment (Article II), transparency (Article 
III), market access (Article XVI), and national treatment or non-discrimination (Article XVII). Mode 4, which 
would be of more interest to this thesis, has been criticised as covering ‘a stricter and much narrower scope’ 
when considered in the larger framework of labour mobility- see Kategekwa op cit note 42 at 47. Consequently, 
the right of establishment within regional integration treaties contains much more substance than any GATS 
related provisions. For this reason, and the fact that within the GATS the relevant provisions do not talk of 
‘rights’ as such, the GATS is not of much relevance to the discussion on the right of establishment in this thesis.  
68 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/85 on the Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the 
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment Article 1. 
69 EAC CMP Article 13.2. This right is applicable to both natural and legal persons- see EAC Common Market 
(Right of Establishment) Regulations, Annex III to the CMP regulation 4. 
70 TFEU Article 49. 
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The right of establishment is not only limited to natural persons, but also applies to legal 
persons71. This emphasis is clear in the text of most treaties, but it has also been well articulated 
by the ECJ in the following terms: 
 
Freedom of establishment, which Article 49 TFEU grants to European Union nationals, 
includes the right for them to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and 
to set up and manage undertakings under the conditions laid down for its own nationals 
by the law of the Member State where such establishment is effected. It entails, in 
accordance with Article 54 TFEU, for companies or firms formed in accordance with 
the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the European Union, the right to exercise their activity 
in the Member State concerned through a subsidiary, a branch or an agency72. 
 
The ECJ has further explained that the right of establishment involves having a permanent and 
continuous presence in the host Member State, which allows a ‘community national to 
participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than 
his State of origin and to profit therefrom’73. This is to distinguish this right from that of a mere 
service provider who does not have to be present in the host State74. Service providers may 
benefit from the provisions on free movement of services if they do not intend to set themselves 
up in another member State. 
 
Much as the right of establishment may appear to be more about facilitating nationals of 
member States to set up business in any of the member States of the regional community with 
relative ease, the gist of it appears to be the principle of non-discrimination. Persons exercising 
their right of establishment should not be treated differently from nationals of the host member 
State, as they are in exactly the same situation75. Different kinds of treatment between nationals 
                                                          
 
71 As explained in chapter one, Section 1.3, this research is restricted to natural persons. Where necessary, 
examples and cases on rights of companies to establish themselves may be used for purposes of illustration or 
where issues raised apply equally to both natural and legal persons. 
72 Case C-39/13 Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Noord/kantoor Groningen v SCA Group Holding BV (C-
39/13), X AG and Others v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Amsterdam (C-40/13) and Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst Holland-Noord/kantoor Zaandam v MSA International Holdings BV and MSA Nederland BV 
(C-41/13) para 20.  
73Gebhard case supra note 25 para 25. 
74 For further discussion on the difference between the right of establishment and the right to provide services 
under EU law, see Alina Kaczorowska European Union Law (2009) 657-659. 
75 Ibid 668. TFEU Article 49 is also specific that freedom of establishment is to be exercised under the 
conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where the establishment is effected. 
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and non-nationals are prohibited, save where there are lawful and objective justifications. In 
the Gebhard case, the ECJ emphasised that the ‘taking up and pursuit of certain self-employed 
activities may be conditional on complying with certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action justified by the general good, such as rules relating to 
organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability’76. What is most 
important is that these apply to both nationals and non-nationals alike. Member States are thus 
required to remove all national measures that may inhibit nationals of other member States to 
set up business in their territories, including discriminatory measures. They may also have to 
harmonise laws pertaining to investment, professional and academic qualifications, taxation, 
registration and licencing, among others so as not to disproportionately disadvantage nationals 
of other member States. However, just like the other migration rights, lawful conditions and 
restrictions may apply to the right of establishment. For instance, one may have to prove 
sufficiency of capital, proof of necessary academic and professional qualifications before they 
can establish themselves in another country.  
 
As mentioned earlier on, the right of establishment may appear to be in a quite separate 
category from the right to free movement and residence. It, more than can be said for the other 
two rights, seems to be more embedded in economic integration law framework. In other 
words, there is a stronger case for it to be regarded as an economic or market freedom, separate 
from human rights, than the other two rights. This is well-illustrated within the framework of 
the EU Treaty wherein the right of establishment is not considered under citizens’ rights, but 
falls exclusively under the part on ‘Union policies and internal actions’77.  Furthermore it is a 
right that is provided for almost only under regional integration treaties. Would this therefore 
mean that it is devoid of a human rights rationale? Alternatively, is the right of establishment 
incapable of being articulated in human rights terms? 
 
International human rights law does not contain the words ‘right of establishment’ as such. 
What is provided for is the general right to work, of which the right of establishment can be 
                                                          
 
(Emphasis added). EAC CMP Article 13.2 similarly provides that for purposes of the right of establishment, 
‘the Partner States shall ensure non-discrimination of the nationals of the other Partner States based on their 
nationalities’. 
76 Gebhard case supra note 25 para 35. 
77 TFEU Part IV (Articles 45-66) deals with ‘Free movement of persons, services and capital’, as opposed to 
TFEU Part II (Articles 18-25) which deals with ‘Non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union’. 
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said to be a component. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) may perhaps be the most comprehensive in enunciating the right to work which 
includes, the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely 
chooses or accepts’78. In essence, a person exercising his or her right to establishment is 
promoting his or her right to work or gain a living.  
 
This interconnection between the right to work and the right of establishment has been well-
captured in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which guarantees the right of every Union 
citizen to ‘seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide 
services in any Member State’79. But even before the EU Charter came into force, the ECJ had 
long considered the right of establishment as a fundamental freedom in correlation with the 
right to freely move and reside80. Additionally, the principle of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment squarely applies to the right to establishment as it does to the right to freely move 
and reside. 
 
The only point of departure between the right to work as provided for under human rights law 
and the right of establishment under regional integration is more or less geographical. The right 
of establishment contains a cross-border element, which if it were lacking, one could be 
covered under the national provisions on the right to work. There is no denying though that the 
right of establishment has possibly been recognised and articulated as such only as a result of 
regional economic integration. 
 
The foregoing discussion whilst focusing on the content and scope of each of the migration 
rights, has revealed at least two major common threads that run through all these rights. These 
are: i) the principle of non-discrimination or equality of treatment; and ii) conditions and 
restrictions.  
                                                          
 
78 ICESCR Article 6.1. This article elaborates upon UDHR Article 23.1 which also provides for the right to 
work. 
79 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Article 15.2. 
80 Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663 paras 16 & 28; Case-115/78 
Knoors v Staatssecretaris voor Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399 para 20; Gebhard case supra note 25. 
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2.5 Non-discrimination or equality of treatment 
The principle of non-discrimination or equality of treatment underlies all migration rights. The 
emphasis of non-discrimination under regional integration treaties is that nationals of other 
member States should not be treated different from nationals of a host member State in aspects 
of free movement81, residence and establishment. For such treatment to be discriminatory, it 
should disproportionately place one at a disadvantage simply on the basis of one’s nationality. 
Hence, a non-national would be placed at a disadvantage compared to a national of a member 
State, which would be inimical to the integration objectives. The definition of discrimination 
within a regional integration context has been well articulated by the Caribbean Court in stating 
that: 
 
Discrimination in the context of Caribbean Community law occurs where, within the 
scope of application of the Treaty, the facts of the case disclose treatment that is worse 
or less favourable than is accorded to a person whose circumstances are similar to those 
of the complainant except for their and the complainant’s nationality, with no objective 
and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment.82 
 
The above definition more or less sums up how discrimination is understood in all RECs. 
Moreover, discrimination has been identified as manifesting itself in two ways: direct (overt); 
and indirect (covert). In the case of direct discrimination, individuals in the same situation are 
accorded different treatment. For example where different set of rules, say pertaining to 
residence or establishment, apply between nationals and non-nationals. In a case where a 
French national was detained and deported from the Netherlands, partly because he had failed 
to produce an ID to prove his nationality, the ECJ ruled that a law in the Netherlands which by 
application required that nationals of other EU Member States residing in the Netherlands, for 
the purposes provided for in the Treaty, must always be in possession of proof of identity, while 
the same was not required of Netherlands nationals, amounted to discrimination as prohibited 
by the Treaty83. In yet another example within the EAC, a Kenyan national who formed part 
                                                          
 
81 Under Community law, non-discrimination will also be applied in the context of free movement of goods, 
capital and services. Hence, under economic law, it is not applied only in as far as it refers to persons. 
82 Shanique Myrie v The State of Barbados, [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ) para 84. 
83 Case C-215/03 Salah Oulane v Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie [2005] ECR I-1215 para 31-
32. Similarly, in its decision in Heinz Huber supra note 57 para 80, the ECJ held that ‘the difference in treatment 
of nationals and Union citizens that arises by virtue of the systematic processing of personal data relating only to 
Union citizens who are not nationals of the Member State concerned for the purposes of fighting crime 
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of a Kenyan delegation to Uganda was singled out and denied entry into Uganda with no 
reasons being proffered. The EACJ found such action by the Ugandan authorities to be 
discriminatory84. 
 
Explaining the principle of non-discrimination or equal treatment, the ECJ has on numerous 
occasions upheld as settled law that ‘the principle of equal treatment prohibits not only overt 
discrimination based on nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by 
applying other distinguishing criteria, lead in fact to the same result’85.  
 
Indirect discrimination will occur where persons in different situations are accorded the same 
or similar treatment. Nationals and non-nationals may, in a particular member State, be subject 
to the same rules and regulations in some instances, but in effect such rules or regulations place 
the non-nationals at a disadvantage. For instance, a case was brought before the ECJ 
challenging the decision of the Italian government to conclude data-processing agreements 
with only those companies in which all or majority shares were in public or state ownership86. 
Such laws were deemed to be discriminatory and an inhibition of the freedom of establishment. 
The Italian government contended that the laws did not discriminate on grounds of nationality, 
hence it was not in breach of Community law. The Court, in agreement with the applicant found 
that there were no companies from other member States in which all or majority of the shares 
were in Italian public ownership and as such the Italian law indirectly discriminated against 
companies from other member States. 
 
                                                          
 
constitutes discrimination…’. In Case C-274/96 Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto Bickel and Ulrich 
Franz [1998] ECR I-7637 para 16, the ECJ held that ‘the exercise of the right to move and reside freely in 
another Member State is enhanced if the citizens of the Union are able to use a given language to communicate 
with the administrative and judicial authorities of a State on the same footing as its nationals’. Hence, the 
conduct of criminal proceedings in a language the accused did not understand amounted to discrimination. 
84 Samuel Mukira Mohochi case supra note 28. For a more detailed discussion of the case see chapter five 
Section 5.2 below. 
85 See Case C-258/04 Office National de l’Emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275 para 26; Case C-
367/11 Déborah Prete v Office national de l'emploi [2012] ECR 0000 para 29; Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia 
Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613 para 31. 
86 Case-3/88 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1989] ECR 4035. See also Ioannidis 
case ibid. In this case, Mr Ioannidis, a Greek national residing in Belgium was denied a tide-over allowance 
while seeking employment in Belgium, where he had just obtained a graduate diploma after three years of study, 
for the sole reason that he had not completed his secondary education in Belgium. The ECJ found this law to be 
discriminatory and placing Union citizens who are non-nationals of Belgium at a disadvantage. 
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Member States should thus desist from implementing and remove any measures that tend to 
discriminate against or accord unequal treatment between their nationals and nationals of other 
member States. Nevertheless, there are exceptions in which States may accord different 
treatment or “lawfully discriminate”. Difference in treatment may be justified if ‘it is based on 
objective considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provision’87. The case of Sotgiu v Deutsche 
Bundespost88 serves as a good illustration. In this case, the applicant, an Italian worker in 
Germany challenged a German regulation which allowed for a higher separation allowance to 
be paid to German nationals who were employed away from their home in Germany, than what 
was paid to non-German nationals employed in Germany away from their homes in their 
country of origin. The ECJ took cognisance that ‘criteria such as place of origin or residence 
of a worker may, according to circumstances, be tantamount, as regards their practical effect, 
to discrimination on the grounds of nationality, such as is prohibited by the Treaty’. However, 
it found that the difference in treatment was justified because for workers whose home was 
within Germany, payment of the separation allowance was only temporary and was bound up 
with an obligation to transfer the residence to the place of employment, whilst the same 
allowance was paid for an indefinite period and was not bound up with any such obligation in 
the case of workers whose residence was abroad, whatever their nationality.  
 
Yet another example of justification may arise where a State may adopt measures to prevent 
reverse discrimination. This occurs where a State treats the nationals of other Member States 
more favourably than its own89, a situation that may not be strange among economic 
communities. In the circumstances, it may be justified to put in place some disparate measures 
in favour of its own citizens. 
 
The principle of non-discrimination as applied in regional integration law without doubt 
substantially borrows from international law, specifically human rights law. This is a fact 
                                                          
 
87 See Déborah Prete case supra note 85 paras 29-32; Garcia Avello case supra note 85 para 31.  
88 Case C-152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153. 
89 Jacobs op cit note 2 at 598. This situation has at some point caused concern within the EAC where some 
Ugandans felt that foreigners were given preferential treatment when it came to business and investment 
matters. See especially Sallie S Kayunga ‘Deepening political integration of the EAC countries: the Uganda 
case’ in Ahmed Mohiddin (ed) Deepening Regional Integration of the East African Community (2005) 186-187. 
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acknowledged by regional courts in their application of the principle to various cases90. The 
ECJ has particularly been credited for taking advantage of ‘a well-recognised fundamental 
right’, that is equality in treatment or non-discrimination, in developing its jurisprudence on 
migration and citizens’ rights in the EU91. Arguably, it is in the application of the principle of 
non-discrimination where human rights law has had a more profound influence on economic 
law; and where any delineation of migration rights either as strictly economic freedoms or 
human rights becomes heavily blurred. 
 
Provisions on non-discrimination permeate all international and regional human rights 
instruments92. Accordingly, non-discrimination or equality of treatment has been described as 
a ‘basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights’93.  This principle has 
been defined by the HRC ‘to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which 
is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal 
footing, of all rights and freedoms’94. The dichotomy of discrimination into direct and indirect 
has long been recognised and established under human rights law95. 
                                                          
 
90 For instance in Shanique Myrie case supra note 82 para 84, the CCJ in assessing the allegation of 
discrimination acknowledged that ‘[g]iven the apparent lack of any specific rules in this (see Article 7.2 RTC), 
the Court must address this claim from the standpoint of relevant principles of international law’. 
91 Eleanor Sharpston ‘Citizenship and fundamental rights- Pandora’s box or a natural step towards maturity?’ in 
Pascal Cardonnel, Allan Rosas and Nils Wahl (eds) Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System: Essays in 
Honour of Pernilla Lindh (2012) 250. Margaritis makes a similar claim when she states that the principle of 
non-discrimination or equality contained in the EEC Treaty ‘set the basis for further development of the level of 
fundamental rights protection in Europe, even though expressed on a basic, inadequate level and in accordance 
with economic principles’- Konstantinos Margaritis ‘Fundamental rights in the EEC Treaty and within 
Community freedoms’ 2013 CES Working Papers, Issue 1 available at www.ceeol.com.  
92 To mention but a few: UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ECHR, ACHPR, ACHR. 
93 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-discrimination (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) para 1. 
94 Ibid para 7.  
95In particular, the definition of discrimination contained in the International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 1968, captures both direct and indirect discrimination. Herein, 
racial discrimination is defined as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’- Article 1, ICERD. A similar definition is contained 
in Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights clearly explains this dichotomy in its General 
Comment on Non-discrimination- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General 
Comment No. 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 2, para. 2) U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20 (2009) para 10. 
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In contrast to regional integration law that places emphasis on nationality as a ground of 
discrimination, human rights law, for obvious reasons, identifies a much wider range of 
grounds, of which nationality is just but one. This, however, ceases to be of consequence due 
to the pervasiveness of human rights generally and the application of the principle of non-
discrimination in particular96. The jurisprudence of the ECJ reveals that even within an 
economic community, the Court has had to enforce provisions on non-discrimination on 
grounds beyond nationality, such as age, sex, race etc. In fact the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Freedoms more or less reiterates the grounds mentioned under international human rights law 
treaties97. This effectively and expressly expands the grounds upon which discrimination is 
prohibited under EU law.  
 
Within the African RECs, both the ECOWAS and EAC laws incorporate the ACHPR, which 
may be directly applied within the area of operation of the respective community laws. The 
African Commission has adopted the international human rights provisions on non-
discrimination. It has identified discrimination as occurring where: ‘a) equal cases are treated 
in a different manner; b) a difference in treatment does not have an objective and reasonable 
justification; and c) if there is no proportionality between the aim sought and the means 
employed’98. Hence the prohibited grounds of discrimination as well as the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination under the ACHPR has direct effect within both ECOWAS and 
EAC law. The application of the principle of non-discrimination within the regional integration 
framework may thus have both an economic and human rights rationale, but it is clear in this 
case that the later rationale clearly supersedes and instructs the former.  
 
Much as non-discrimination may be an overarching principle, there are instances where 
discrimination may be permitted. Human rights law allows for differentiation in treatment ‘if 
the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 
purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant’99. ‘This partly recognises the fact that 
                                                          
 
96 ICCPR Article 2 and ICESCR Article 2.2. See also CESCR, General Comment No. 20, ibid para 7.  
97 EU Charter on Fundamental Freedoms Article 21(1). 
98 Communication No. 313/05 Kenneth Good v Republic of Botswana paras 219, 222.  
99 HRC General Comment 18 supra note 93 para 13. The CESCR also states in more or less the same terms that 
‘differential treatment based on prohibited grounds will be viewed as discriminatory unless the justification for 
differentiation is reasonable and objective. This will include an assessment as to whether the aim and effects of 
the measures or omissions are legitimate, compatible with the nature of the Covenant rights and solely for the 
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‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive discrimination’ may be undertaken by States in favour of 
disadvantaged groups in order to attain some level of equality. This notion may not exactly be 
applicable within the economic law framework. Nonetheless, the point of consensus under both 
human rights law and economic or regional integration law is that discrimination may be 
permitted where there are legitimate and objective reasons for doing so. What may be 
considered as a legitimate and objective justification for non-discrimination may vary from 
case to case. Of importance is that the requirements of objectivity, legitimacy and 
proportionality are met. This test is equivalent to that applied to limitations or restrictions and 
conditions to migration rights.  
2.6 Conditions and limitations on migration rights 
One common characteristic of all migration rights is that they are not absolute, but are subject 
to such conditions and limitations or restrictions as may be imposed by the Community Treaty 
and laws made in compliance thereto. There are two elements to be considered here, that is, 
conditions and limitations. 
 
A condition, as used in this sense, is a requirement that should be met or satisfied before one 
can exercise one’s migration rights100. In other words, without meeting the set condition, the 
right may not accrue. The conditions attached to the exercise of migration rights may vary from 
REC to REC. For example, and as mentioned earlier, the right of EU citizens to freely reside 
within the territory of the EU for a period longer than three months, can only be enjoyed by 
those who are not economically active if they can prove that they have sufficient financial 
resources and a comprehensive insurance cover so as not to become a burden on the host 
country’s social assistance system101.  In contrast, proof of sufficiency of funds is not expressly 
provided for in the ECOWAS and EAC treaties, but may be a legal requirement in specific 
circumstances under the various national laws as will be demonstrated in chapter six below 
when discussing the laws and practices within EAC Partner States. With regard to the right of 
establishment, one of the obvious conditions is proof of sufficiency of capital, and relevant 
                                                          
 
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. In addition, there must be a clear and 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realised and the measures or omissions 
and their effects’- CESCR General Comment No. 20 supra note 95 para 13. 
100 This definition is derived from the definition of ‘condition precedent’ that is to say, it ‘must occur before a 
right accrues’- available at legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com accessed on 16 May 2017. 
101 EU Directive 2004/38/EC op cit note 14 Article 10. See also European Commission Freedom to Move and 
Live in Europe op cit note 33 at 16. 
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academic of professional qualifications, where necessary.  The conditions, however, need to 
be reasonable and applicable equally throughout the Community. Suffice to note that most, if 
not all, conditions pertaining to migration rights within RECs are mainly justifiable on 
economic grounds. This is not only a reflection of the economic underpinnings of the rights, 
but also of the economic reality pertaining in the various member States of the REC. 
 
Community laws also recognise that migration rights may be limited or restricted on grounds 
of public policy, public security and public health102. Unlike conditions, which pre-exist the 
accrual of the right, limitations or restrictions apply in the course of the exercise of one’s right. 
The imposition of limitations should be the exception rather than the norm. As such, the Courts, 
specifically the ECJ which has a wider jurisprudence, have generally opted for a strict approach 
to a State’s application of limitations103. Referring specifically to the ground of public policy, 
the Court has held that ‘its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State 
without being subject to control by the institutions of the Community’104. In other words, the 
application of limitations should always be subjected to Community oversight. The Court went 
further to lay down the rule that ‘restrictions cannot be imposed on the right of a national of 
any Member State to enter the territory of another Member State, to stay there and to move 
within it unless his presence or conduct constitutes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to 
public policy’105.  This exemplifies the strictness with which the Court will address the 
application of limitations. The aim is to ensure that in all circumstances, one’s rights are upheld 
and not entirely negated by the application of the limitation by the State. 
                                                          
 
102 TFEU Article 20.2 refers to citizens’ rights to be enjoyed ‘subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties’; 
TFEU Article 21.1 provides for the right to move and reside freely ‘subject to the limitations and conditions laid 
down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’. TFEU Article 49 provides for the 
freedom of establishment to be exercised ‘subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital’. EAC 
CMP Article 7.5 provides for limitations on the free movement of persons on the grounds of public policy, 
public security and public health. There are similar provisions on free movement of workers in Article 10.11 and 
on the right of establishment in Article 13.8. Limitations on the right of residence in ECOWAS are justifiable on 
grounds of public order, public security and public health- Supplementary Protocol A/SP/.1/7/86 on the Second 
Phase (Right of Residence) of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and 
Establishment Article 3; there is a similar provision on the right of establishment contained in ECOWAS 
Supplementary Protocol A/SP.2/5/90 on the Implementation of the Third Phase (Right of Establishment) of the 
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment Article 4.3. 
103 Case C-50/06 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands [2007] ECR I-04383 
para 42; Case-36/75 Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur [1975] ECR 1219 para 27.  
104 Although this was enunciated by the ECJ, it is equally applicable in other RECs. In the Shanique Myrie case 
supra note 82 para 68, the CCJ made a similar observation. In the case of the EAC, relevant regulations require a 
Partner State imposing limitations on any of the migration rights to notify other Partner States and the Secretary 
General of the EAC.  
105 Rutili case supra note 103 para 28. 
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In order to ensure that States do not overstep their power and authority when imposing 
limitations on rights under Community law, the ECJ lay down criteria upon which limitations 
may be scrutinised if they are to be considered justifiable. In the Gebhard case, the court laid 
down the position as follows: 
 
national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which 
they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it106. 
 
Although in imposing limitations States usually look only to their own interests, by applying 
the above criteria they should be in a better position to make objective decisions. Any restrictive 
measure or derogation from any of the migration rights, be it in the interest of public policy, 
public security or public health can only be justified if it ‘were based on the objective 
considerations independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and were proportionate 
to the legitimate aim of the national provisions’107. This test is or ought to be applied in all 
instances where States implement measures or actions that derogate from any of the migration 
rights, including the fundamental principle of non-discrimination. This test, moreover, more or 
less adapts the human rights test applicable to limitations to or derogations from rights 
guaranteed under international law. 
 
Human rights law, too, recognises that human rights and freedoms are not absolute and may be 
subject to limitations or restrictions108. The right to free movement and residence is no 
exception and reasonable limitations may be imposed on its exercise for the protection of 
national security, public order, public health or morals and the rights and freedoms of others.  
Moreover permissible limitations that may be imposed on these rights ‘must not nullify the 
principle of liberty of movement’109. The HRC has been quite emphatic in stating that 
                                                          
 
106 Gebhard case supra note 25 para 37. 
107 Deborah Prete case supra note 85 para 32. The same emphasis is made in Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie 
D'Hoop v Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191 para 36; Criminal proceedings against Horst Otto 
Bickel supra note 83 para 27; Ioannidis case supra note 85 para 29. See also Case C-303/12 Guido Imfeld and 
Nathalie Garcet v État Belge [2013] ECR 0000 para 64. 
108 UDHR Article 29.2. There are however, a set of rights considered non-derogable and these include freedom 
from slavery; freedom from torture, and right to a fair hearing- See ICCPR Article 4.2.  
109 CCPR General Comment No. 27 supra note 18 para 2. 
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restrictions ‘must not impair the essence of the right; the relation between right and restriction, 
between norm and exception, must not be reversed’110. In accordance thereto, courts will 
usually broadly interpret the right while strictly construing any limitations that may be 
imposed. 
 
The HRC has laid down criteria upon which limitations to the rights of free movement and 
residence will be assessed, if they are to be considered permissible or justifiable. Accordingly, 
the restrictive measure must be provided by law; it must be necessary in a democratic society 
for the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals; it must be 
consistent with all other rights in the Covenant; and it must be proportionate to the interest to 
be protected111. These criteria may have been enunciated with specific reference to civil and 
political rights, but they apply equally to all human rights112. 
 
Limitations and restrictions on migration rights present yet another point of convergence 
between the economic and the human rights rationales. In fact it seems that the limitations as 
applied under regional integration law substantially borrow from or adopt the human rights 
language and interpretation. This can be seen mainly in two areas. First, the grounds upon 
which restrictions on migration rights may be permissible, that is public policy, public order 
and public health, under regional integration law mirror those enumerated under human rights 
law. Second, in assessing whether the imposition of limitations is justified in each particular 
case, Community courts have espoused the human rights law approach of strictly and narrowly 
construing the limitation while broadly construing the right. In so doing, the court ensures that 
the essence of the right is preserved and not entirely negated by the limitation imposed. As 
such the test or criteria of legitimacy, objectivity, appropriateness and proportionality of the 
measures adopted as limitations on fundamental rights are applied with virtually equal 
consistency under both community law and international human rights law. 
 
In construing the justification of limitations under community law, divergences with human 
rights law might be seen in what is considered justifiable in a particular case. Under regional 
                                                          
 
110 Ibid para 13. 
111 Ibid paras 11 & 14. 
112 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has adopted them in virtually the same terms- see 
above note 99. 
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integration law, which is predominantly influenced by economic law, restrictive measures 
imposed by any member State may be considered justifiable if they are meant to protect the 
economic or other interests of the State and do not detrimentally affect the interests of the 
common market or economic Community113. This could explain why despite the concept of 
community citizenship, regional integration law still recognises that nationals of other member 
States may be denied entry or deported from any member State. Hence regional integration law 
seeks to strike a balance between national interests and Community interests, the individual is 
not necessarily at the centre.  
 
Human rights law, on the other hand, strives to strike a balance between the rights of the 
individual and the rights of others. Its main aim is to promote and preserve the inherent dignity 
of a human being in all circumstances. Consequently the extent to which human rights law 
protects an individual’s migration rights is comparatively broader than the migration rights 
guarantees under regional integration law. Some examples that illustrate this point may be 
found within the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
which has articulated the right to protection from displacement and deportation without due 
process as being violations of the right to free movement and residence114. Furthermore, human 
rights law additionally provides for the right to leave and return to one’s country, which is 
aimed at preventing statelessness. This right is in cognisance of the notions of State sovereignty 
to control its borders, among others, as well as the concept of nationality and citizenship. Under 
regional integration law, it is not that the right to leave and return to one’s country is done away 
with, but rather that the exercise of that right is made easier and subject to less formalities and 
                                                          
 
113 The ECJ has actually been criticised for ‘granting too high a role to merely economic interests and economic 
efficiency and for neglecting the significance of social policy choices as a limitation to the exercise of economic 
freedoms’- Wolfgang Weiss ‘The EU human rights regime post Lisbon: turning the CJEU into a human rights 
court?’ in Sonia Morano-Foadi & Lucy Vickers (eds) Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts 
(2015) 72. 
114 Communication Nos. 279/03, 296/05 Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v Sudan; Communication No. 227/99 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v Burundi, 
Rwanda and Uganda; Communication Nos. 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97_196/97-210/98 Malawi African 
Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, 
Collectif des Veuves et Ayants-Droit, Association Mauritanienne des Droits de l'Homme v Mauritania (Malawi 
African Association v. Mauritania). On deportations, the following cases are of relevance: Communication No. 
97/93_14AR John K. Modise v Botswana;  Communication No. 292/04  Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh & 13 others) v Angola (Esmaila Connateh v Angola); 
Communication No. 159/96 Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues 
des Droits de l'Homme, RADDHO, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l'Homme au Sénégal and Association 
Malienne des Droits de l'Homme v Angola (Union Interafricaine v Angola); Communication No. 71/92 
Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO) v Zambia (RADDHO v Zambia). 
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restrictions. Additionally and by way of example, within the EU, the ECJ has in effect decided 
that ‘national measures which deprive an individual of his or her status of citizen of the Union 
and thereby the rights attaching to that status, fall within the scope of application of the Treaty 
provisions on EU citizenship’115. As argued by Eleanor Sharpston, the ECJ has been able to 
come to this conclusion by applying fundamental rights thinking to EU citizens’ right to freely 
move and reside, ‘so as to produce a result that would not have been arrived at under the classic 
economic free movement rights’116. Hence the human rights approach has been incrementally 
applied to migration rights within the EU leading to significant outcomes that enhance 
protection of the rights of EU citizens. As such the lines between the economic rationale and 
the human rights rationale for migration rights seem to become increasingly blurred. 
 
The foregoing discussion has focussed on examining migration rights, their normative content 
and scope of application. Moreover, there is an issue that needs further elucidation: the issue 
of the beneficiaries of migration rights. To whom do migration rights accrue within a REC? 
Furthermore, besides the question of accrual, whom do migration rights benefit? The 
discussion above has applied and hinted at such terms as ‘nationals of member States’ or 
‘community citizens’ without further explanation. It is therefore worthwhile to look further at 
who exactly the beneficiaries of migration rights are since rights do not exist in abstract. The 
following section briefly discusses the concept of citizenship and how it may be applied in 
regional communities, in an attempt to establish its significance and any implications to the 
migration rights discourse among regional economic communities. 
2.7  Defining community citizenship 
A number of regional integration treaties, albeit with different formulations, define or allude to 
what this research refers to as ‘community citizen’.  By way of illustration, the Treaties of the 
EU, ECOWAS, EAC and CARICOM shall be used as guide in understanding and defining 
what is meant by ‘community citizen’.  
 
                                                          
 
115 Koen Lenaerts ‘The court’s outer and inner selves: exploring the external and internal legitimacy of the 
European Court of Justice’ in Maurice Adams et al (eds) Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case 
Law of the European Court of Justice (2013) 48. The author herein was referring to the combined effect of the 
ECJ’s rulings in C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] ECR I-1177; and C-
135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449. 
116 Sharpston op cit note 91 at 254. 
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‘Community citizen’ is a term that gained popularity with the advancement of the European 
Community (EC)117. It was used by scholars as a collective term for citizens of the European 
Community as constituted by the various member States then. However, none of the EC 
Treaties defined nor applied it. It was not until the adoption of the EU treaty that the term 
‘citizen of the Union’ was articulated and defined within the legal framework of the EU. 
According to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’, and ‘citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship’118. Referring to this provision, the ECJ has declared 
citizenship of the Union to be ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’119, a 
status that the Court has steadfastly defended in its efforts to safeguard and enhance the rights 
of citizens of the EU. 
 
As regards the ECOWAS Treaty, it actually uses the term ‘community citizen’, which is 
defined to mean ‘any national of Member States who satisfy the conditions stipulated in the 
Protocol defining Community citizenship’120. The said Protocol goes on to quite expansively 
define a citizen of the Community to include: a national by birth of a Member State; a national 
by descent of a Member State; a child adopted by a citizen of a Member State; and a naturalised 
person of a Member State121. Suffice to note, the Protocol disregards dual nationality involving 
a non-Member State, and for one to become a community citizen, one must renounce the 
nationality of the non- Member State. It further sets conditions for acquisition of community 
membership by naturalised persons of Member States. These include: renunciation of any non-
Member State nationality; having permanently resided in a Member State for a continuous 
period of fifteen years; and if the grant of Community citizenship would not jeopardise the 
fundamental interests of one or more Member States122.  
 
                                                          
 
117 Siofra O’Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to 
Union Citizenship (1996) 17-21. 
118 Treaty on the European Union, 1992 Article 8.1, as consolidated in TFEU Article 20.1 available at 
http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm.  
119 Rottman case supra note 115 para 43; Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale 
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 para 31; Baumbast case supra note 54 para 82. 
120 ECOWAS Treaty Article 1. 
121 ECOWAS Protocol A/P.3/5/82 Relating to the Definition of Community Citizen Article 1 available at  
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap030582&lang=en accessed in August 2014.  
122 Ibid. 
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Unlike the EU citizenship which accrues automatically upon one being a national of a Member 
State, and leaves much within the discretion or sovereignty of each State, the ECOWAS Treaty 
seems to require a lot more before one can be recognised as a community citizen. The 
ECOWAS model does not seem to recognise naturalisation processes in Member States that 
do not conform to its own. Consequently, community citizenship is not automatic for a 
naturalised national of a Member State unless he or she complies with the requirements of the 
ECOWAS protocol. Unfortunately, issues on ECOWAS citizenship seem not to have been 
brought up for adjudication and so it is hard to tell whether ECOWAS States are applying these 
provisions or whether they do not deem them as impinging on their sovereignty quite more 
than they would have liked to cede. 
 
With regards to the EAC, ‘community citizen’ is not explicitly defined as under the EU or 
ECOWAS Treaties. The Common Market Protocol defines ‘citizen’ to mean ‘a national of a 
Partner State recognised under the law governing citizenship in the Partner State’123. The EACJ 
in interpreting the Treaty and Protocol in this regard has held that ‘[T]he Treaty also defines 
persons, formerly foreign nationals as between the individual EAC States prior to entry into 
force of the Treaty, as nationals or citizens of Partner States’124. Plausibly, the concept of 
‘community citizen’ in the EAC is more implied than express. This argument shall be 
developed further in chapter four. 
 
Similar to the EAC, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) does not expressly define 
‘community citizen’, although it uses the term ‘community nationals’ in relation to 
establishment, services, capital and movement125. What the Treaty defines is ‘national of a 
member State’ if such person: (i) is a citizen of that State; (ii) has a connection with that State 
of a kind which entitles him to be regarded as belonging to or, if it be so expressed, as being a 
native or resident of the State for the purposes of the laws thereof relating to immigration; or 
(iii) is a company or other legal entity constituted in the Member State in conformity with the 
laws thereof and which that State regards as belonging to it…126. This definition can be said to 
imply who is understood as a community citizen within CARICOM. 
                                                          
 
123 CMP Article 1. 
124 Samuel Mukira v Attorney General of Uganda supra note 28 para 48. 
125 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas supra note 11 chapter 3. 
126 Ibid Article 32.5 para (a). 
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From the above definitions, community citizen may be understood as a national of a member 
State of a REC, as expressly or impliedly recognised by the REC in its constitutive Treaties. 
This is the sense in which this term shall be used in this research.  
2.7.1  Community citizenship as distinguished from nation-state citizenship 
There are some idiosyncrasies of community citizenship that need highlighting and which 
necessarily set it apart from nation-state citizenship. First and foremost, the concept of 
community citizenship has really developed as a result of regional economic integration, quite 
distinct from nation-state citizenship which is more or less a socio-political circumstance. In 
order to illustrate this point, it is worthwhile to briefly look at the meaning of citizenship or use 
of the word ‘citizen’ as applied in international law. 
 
The concept of citizenship or nationality127 has had varying meanings over time, in some cases 
being exclusionary on grounds such as sex, age and property ownership128. In modern times, 
the concept of citizenship is intricately linked to that of the modern nation-State129, the origins 
of which are usually traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648130. This Treaty lay down 
the international law principle of state sovereignty in which each State should take charge of 
its domestic affairs without interference from other States. As such, one of the tenets of state 
sovereignty is that it is for each ‘State to lay down the rules governing the grant of its 
nationality’131. Elaborating further on this point and in effect providing an international law 
perspective on the concept of citizenship or nationality, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
has stated:  
 
According to the practice of states, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions 
of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
                                                          
 
127 In international law, and in fact most legal literature, the words ‘citizen’ and ‘national’; or ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ are used synonymously. In this work, although both words may be used interchangeably, reference 
to ‘national’ shall specifically refer to a national or citizen of a specific nation State as distinguished from a 
citizen of a regional community. 
128 Meehan op cit note 17 at 17. She notes specially that ‘the citizen, literally the inhabitant of a citadel and then 
a city, was originally a person who enjoyed the full rights of membership of a city-State’. She then goes on to 
explain the various definitions of citizenship in different societies.  
129 David Jacobson Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (1996) 7. 
130 See David Harvey Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (2009) 172; also Bauböck ‘Citizenship 
and free movement’ op cit note 19 at 345.  
131 Nottebohm case supra note 34. 
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of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of 
the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred either directly by the law or as the 
result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population 
of the state conferring nationality than with that of any other state132. 
 
The above legal exegesis, coupled with some scholarly definitions of citizenship133, lend 
credence to the following working definition of citizenship: a civil status involving mutual 
acknowledgement of belongingness between an individual and a State. This status is conferred 
usually in three recognised ways: i) by circumstance of birth (jus soli), where one is born on 
the territory of the State; ii) by descent (jus sanguinis) –having parents that are citizens; iii) by 
naturalisation as set out and determined by the laws of each State. These are more or less the 
well-recognised modes of acquiring citizenship or the means through which a country identifies 
and defines its citizens. 
 
Contrasted with the notion of community citizenship, nation-state citizenship or nationality can 
therefore be said as arising from a legally recognised socio-geo-political circumstance that 
creates that genuine link between the individual and the State. Community citizenship, on the 
other hand, is a creation of Treaty within a regional integration model in which States agree to 
confer certain rights and freedoms to citizens of other member States of the region or 
Community. It is therefore arguable that the difference between the two types of citizenship is 
one of recognition and conferment. In the case of nation-state citizenship, citizens are 
recognised as such, while in the case of community citizenship, rights are conferred upon 
nationals of other member States. 
 
The second point to note and which flows from the first is that community citizenship is not a 
‘stand-alone’ individual status as one would say of nation-state citizenship. Community 
citizenship is derivative of or is complementary to nation-state citizenship. This much can be 
discerned from the language of the Treaties which provide for community citizenship, as 
                                                          
 
132 Ibid.  
133 Bauböck defines citizenship as a ‘relation between individuals and States’ explaining further on that ‘the 
international political system divides populations into groups of citizenships in a similar way that it divides the 
earth into State territories’- Rainer Bauböck Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Rights in International 
Migration (1994) 23, 31. Soysal similarly explains that ‘citizenship entails a territorial relationship between the 
individual and the State. It postulates well-defined, exclusionary boundaries and state jurisdictions over the 
national population within those boundaries’- Soysal op cit note 23 at 140-141. 
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illustrated in the immediately preceding section. One can only be a community citizen if they 
are a national or citizen of a Member State of a regional community that endorses this status.  
 
Furthermore and in accordance with the social contract theory, it may be argued that 
community citizenship, unlike nation-state citizenship, is not a real citizenship on the basis that 
there is no direct contractual relationship between the individual and the Community. This is 
in as far as the people or community citizens usually do not directly have a say in the 
establishment of the Community. The decision to join such a Community and subject the State 
to its laws is usually undertaken at a government’s discretion. It is therefore governments that 
have that direct contract or link with the Community. However, as Meehan argues, the social 
contract could be implied considering, firstly, that the Community was established by elected 
governments that acted on behalf of their peoples; and secondly that ‘the legal order of the 
Community confers rights and imposes duties, not only on governments, but also on 
individuals’; which rights and duties transcend individual nation-states134. Nonetheless, what 
is clearly discernible from these arguments is the position that the relationship that exists 
between the community and the individual is through its State which, along with other States, 
confer by treaty, rights and obligations to the citizens of the Community135. This leads to the 
third and final point of distinction. 
 
Citizenship, in order for it to be considered complete, needs to be both formal and substantive. 
Martiniello explains the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ citizenship thus: 
 
The former refers to a formal link between an individual belonging to a nation-state, 
which is juridically sanctioned by the possession of an identity card or passport of that 
state. The latter refers to the bundle of civil, political, social, and also cultural rights 
enjoyed by an individual, traditionally by virtue of her or his belonging to the national 
community. It also refers to the participation of the individual in the management of the 
public affairs of a given national and political community136. 
                                                          
 
134 Meehan op cit note 17 at 34. 
135 Hall refers to community citizenship as a ‘de jure category of Union citizenship which is created by 
Community law and whose personal scope is referred by Community law to the nationality laws of the Member 
State’- see Stephen Hall Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (1995) 9. La Torre explains 
European citizenship as ‘not a primary or original status but something supplementary or derived’. See Massimo 
La Torre ‘Citizenship and European democracy: European constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon’ in Patrick 
Birkinshaw & Mike Varney (eds) The European Union Legal Order after Lisbon (2010) 203.   
136 Martiniello op cit note 13 at 345. See also Bauböck Transnational Citizenship op cit note 133 at 26. In Re 
Nottebohm supra note 34, the ICJ was similarly of the view that ‘[n]ationality serves above all to determine that 
the person upon whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law of the state 
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This explanation makes it clear that simply belonging to a particular State by virtue of birth, 
descent or naturalisation, what Castles and Davidson refer to as ‘becoming a citizen’137, is not 
in itself sufficient cause for celebration of belongingness to a State. It is only when 
accompanied by the entire range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well 
as duties and obligations to that State (‘being a citizen’138) that one may consider oneself a full 
citizen of a State. The range of rights available to citizens as well as their duties and obligations 
to the State is what will distinguish citizens from non-citizens or aliens. 
 
Under both national and international law, citizens have the full benefit of the entire gamut of 
rights guaranteed under human rights law, save where lawful restrictions apply. Non-citizens 
or aliens, as explained earlier on in the chapter, will normally enjoy most rights in equal or less 
measure as citizens except rights pertaining to political participation or any other that a State 
may reserve specially for its citizens139. 
 
In contrast, the rights of community citizens, as illustrated earlier on, are quite circumscribed 
and narrow in range. Even then the specific rights conferred on community citizens will vary 
from REC to REC. Consequently Castles has referred to community citizenship as ‘quasi-
citizenship’140 because ‘it confers significant rights on the nationals of one Member State living 
in another, but these fall short of full citizenship, especially with regard to political 
participation’141.  Speaking of the range of rights for community citizens, migration rights 
happen to be the common denominator among all RECs. 
                                                          
 
in question grants to or imposes on its nationals. This is implied in the wider concept that nationality is within 
the domestic jurisdiction of the state’. 
137 Stephen Castles & Alastair Davidson Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging 
(2000) 84. 
138 Ibid. 
139 T Alexander Aleinikoff ‘Between principles and politics: U.S. citizenship policy’ in Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 
(2000) op cit note 13 at 119; John McCormick Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction 
(1999) 161-162. See also Kay Hailbronner ‘Nationality’ in T Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail (eds) 
Migration and International Legal Norms (2003) 75. Reservations are permitted under international law, 
including human rights law- See Article 19, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. 
140 Castles & Davidson op cit note 137 at 85. Martiniello, too, refers to European citizenship as ‘nothing more 
than a functional semi-citizenship as opposed to a substantive citizenship’- Martiniello op cit note 13 at 353. 
141 Castles & Davidson op cit note 137 at 98. 
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2.7.2 Community citizenship and the significance of migration rights 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, migration rights are causally linked to the notion 
of community citizenship, as contemporarily understood. The concept of community 
citizenship has developed from the right of free movement of workers, services and goods as 
some of the factors of production whose mobility is necessary to attain an economic 
community’s objectives, specifically that of a common or single market. Conversely, migration 
rights could be considered the pivotal constituents of community citizenship. As illustrated in 
the preceding sections, they are the only rights common to all RECs, and as such can be said 
to be the defining element of community citizenship. 
 
Although migration rights and any other attendant rights should accrue to all nationals of 
member States of a REC, it has been argued with particular reference to the EU that only the 
small minority of mobile EU citizens can take advantage of most EU citizenship rights and 
exercise EU citizenship in their daily life’142. This argument, of course can be applied to all 
RECs, as indeed rights of community citizenship are most beneficial to only mobile citizens. 
This essentially narrows down the scope of persons that may enjoy these rights. This presents 
yet another point of departure from human rights which, in contrast, are not conditioned upon 
any event- in this case, cross-border movement. Accordingly it has been usually the case that 
migration rights do not accrue in purely internal situations; there should necessarily be a cross-
border element. This, however seems to be changing as demonstrated by ECJ case law that has 
recently applied EU citizens’ rights to seemingly internal situations on the basis that an EU 
citizen should not be deprived of ‘the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of his status as a Union citizen’143. Additionally, national measures should 
not have the effect of ‘impeding the exercise of his rights of free movement and residence 
within the territory of the Member States’144. This suggests that a community citizen’s rights 
will be protected even for those immobile citizens if State measures or actions would have the 
effect of deterring them from exercising those rights.  Within the EAC, the Community court 
                                                          
 
142 Martiniello op cit note 13 at 367. 
143 C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-3375 para 56. 
144 Ibid. See also Ruiz Zambrano case supra note 115.  
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found a violation where the State agents, without following lawful procedures, had prohibited 
a Burundian national from leaving the country145.  
 
The fact that community citizens’ rights might be seen as benefitting only mobile citizens 
serves to underscore the significance of migration rights to the community citizenship. It 
therefore seems quite apt to describe migration rights as the linchpin of community citizenship. 
Without migration rights, community citizenship, as understood today, would probably not be. 
2.8  Chapter conclusion 
Migration rights are the basic rights that will be conferred under any regional integration treaty 
and they lie at the core of community citizenship. Despite their predominantly economic 
origins rooted in the free movement of workers under economic integration treaties, migration 
rights have an equally underlying human rights rationale. The chapter has discussed the dual 
rationality and conceptualisation of migration rights leading to the conclusion that the human 
rights rationale seems to have gained prevalence over the economic rationale over the years. 
This has in some cases blurred the distinction between migration rights as economic or market 
freedoms, and migration rights as human rights, an assertion best illustrated by the case law of 
the ECJ146. 
 
Nevertheless, there are several aspects in which migration rights of community citizens are at 
variance with associated human rights of nationals of a State. In other words, free movement 
of community citizens as provided among member States of a REC, may not be quite as free 
as movement of nationals within their territory of their own State. For instance, citizens of other 
member States may be subjected to formalities and administrative procedures, including 
getting entry permits into a host State. These conditions do not apply to nationals of a State 
exercising their right to free movement and residence within their own State. Furthermore 
community citizens are not entirely protected from denial of entry or deportations, where there 
is a lawful justification. On the other hand, nationals of a State are guaranteed their right to 
                                                          
 
145 East Africa Law Society v The Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi and another, EACJ Reference 
No. 1 of 2014. 
146 This argument is best captured in the following statement: ‘In combination with generous ECJ case law, 
intra-European free movement soon transcended pure economic conceptualisations and turned the fundamental 
rights into the nucleus of ‘social citizenship’- David Thym ‘Towards ‘real’ citizenship? The judicial 
construction of Union citizenship and its limits’ in Adams et al (eds) Judging Europe’s Judges op cit note 115 at 
161. See also Sharpston op cit note 91 at 245-271. 
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leave and return to their home State. Furthermore they are protected from measures that would 
render them stateless. Consequently, the human rights approach to migration offers more robust 
protection than an economic approach to citizens’ rights under regional communities.  
 
Yet another dimension to this argument lies within the broader discourse on regional 
integration and state sovereignty. It is apparent that States within a REC only surrender some, 
and not all, of their sovereign powers. Clearly the area of citizenship and migration control in 
most RECs still falls largely within the realm of state sovereignty, as exemplified by the very 
limited scope of rights that are conferred upon community citizens. Nevertheless, by conferring 
migration rights to nationals of other member States, a State cedes some of its sovereign 
powers. The fact still remains, however, that a member State of a regional community much as 
it may recognise some rights of community citizens, such as migration rights, bringing them 
almost at par with its nationals, it does not or may never recognise such community citizens as 
its own nationals and thus unreservedly accord them all the rights that pertain to its nationals. 
Even under international human rights law which recognises the universality of human rights, 
distinctions between nationals and aliens and the rights that pertain to either are well-
acknowledged.  
 
Consequently, while migration rights as provided for in regional integration treaties may not 
be human rights, strictly speaking and may be more of economic freedoms, the manner in 
which Community courts have interpreted them, has incrementally blurred the lines between 
the two rationales. This may be truer on a normative interpretative level rather than on the side 
of practical application. So while the appropriate question to be asked is not necessarily 
whether or not migration rights are human rights, but rather whether their interpretation and 
application follows more an economic approach or a human rights approach. The answer to 
this issue tends to vary from REC to REC. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY: AN OVERVIEW 
3.0 Introduction 
The East African Community (EAC) is one of the eight RECs recognised by the African Union 
as one of the building blocks for the anticipated African Economic Community. The EAC 
currently comprises five Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda1. 
Altogether its geographical coverage is estimated at 1,817.7 thousand square kilometres with 
an estimated total population of 143.5 million2. Established in 1999, the EAC envisages 
integration through four major stages: a Customs Union, a Common Market, a Monetary 
Union, and ultimately, a Political Federation. Presently it is at the common market stage, 
although the next stage has been initiated with the signing of the EAC Protocol on the 
establishment of the EAC Monetary Union on 30 November 2013.  
The chapter provides a brief historical background of the EAC, the focal REC, a comparison 
of the old EAC with the new EAC, whilst pointing out key normative progressive developments 
in the current set-up. The chapter shall mainly present the context in which migration rights are 
to be effectuated and thus lay the groundwork for an argument of a progressive interpretation 
and application of migration rights.  
As discussed herein, the EAC has evolved from a singly trade-integration-focussed REC of the 
1960s that was predominantly driven by the political heads, to a relatively more participatory 
and people-centred REC with far-reaching and comprehensive objectives and goals. Hence any 
ensuing examination of migration rights within the EAC should consider the multifarious and 
broad-based objectives, as well as its far-reaching goals. 
3.1  The EAC: A brief on the geo-political and socio-economic contexts 
The EAC is comprised of three landlocked countries, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, which 
stand to benefit greatly from integration with the other two coastal Partner States, Kenya and 
Tanzania. Although the landlocked countries also happen to be the countries with the smaller 
                                                          
 
1 In March 2016, the Republic of South Sudan was admitted into the EAC, although it is still embroiled in a civil 
conflict. Another probable candidate for admission is the Federal Republic of Somalia. See EAC Secretary-
General’s (SG) New Year Message ‘2013 has come to a close, and 2014 beckons’ 31 December 2013, available 
at http://www.sg.eac.int/.  
2 EAC Secretariat, East African Community Facts and Figures- 2014 (2014) 13 & 16.  
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surface area, with Rwanda and Burundi being among the smallest countries in Africa, they 
inversely have a higher population density. Table 1 below shows a breakdown of estimates of 
surface area, population size and population density of each of the EAC countries, arranged in 
order of highest to least population density. 
Table 1 
Country Surface Area (in 
square kilometres)* 
Estimated 
Population size in 
millions** 
Estimated 
population density 
(persons per square 
kilometre)*** 
Rwanda 263,000 10.9 434.0 
Burundi 278,000 9.7 373.5 
Uganda 2,416,000 34.7 173.0 
Kenya 5,827,000 43.0 74.0 
Tanzania 9,393,000 47.2 53.5 
*Area includes water bodies. Source: EAC Secretariat, East African Community Facts and Figures, 2015 
available at http://www.eac.int/statistics/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=153. 
**Source: EAC Secretariat, EAC Facts and Figures, 2015, ibid. 
*** Source: Ibid. 
 
Despite the relatively high population figures in each of these countries, all EAC states rank in 
the low human development bracket according to the Human Development Reports3. With an 
average score of 0.48044, EAC countries still rank relatively low in areas of education, health 
and income. Apparently, an estimated average of 67.5% of the total population in East Africa 
live in multi-dimensional poverty5. It is therefore not surprising that the World Bank ranks 
most of the EAC countries as low-income countries, save for Kenya which is ranked as a lower 
middle income country6. 
In terms of economy, the current Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stands at an estimated $147.5 
billion7, with agriculture as the highest income earning activity contributing 23.7% of the GDP. 
                                                          
 
3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2014 (2014) available at 
hdr.undp.org.  
4 Ibid, Kenya had the highest Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.535, which is above the average of 0.493 
for low HDI countries, while Burundi had the least HDI of 0.389.  
5 Ibid, Kenya has the least percentage (48.19%) of its population living in multi-dimensional poverty, while on 
the lower end of the scale is Burundi with a whopping 81.81% of its population living in multi-dimensional 
poverty. 
6 Information available at http://data.worldbank.org/country accessed on 21 May 2017. 
7 Information available at 
http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=169&Itemid=157 accessed on 21 
November 2015. 
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Trade and repairs, manufacturing and construction are the next biggest contributors to the 
Community’s GDP at 9.9%, 8.2% and 8% respectively8. The private sector is the biggest 
employer with most of the working population being engaged in agriculture9. It therefore 
follows that levels of industrialisation within the EAC are still rather low. Nevertheless, there 
has been an increase in intra-regional trade10 as well as a steady increase in economic growth 
in most of the EAC countries11. Moreover, the region still has to overcome a number of 
challenges in order to attain substantial economic growth and development. The common 
challenges include12: high production costs; inadequate infrastructure, including transport and 
energy; unemployment, under-employment, skills-gaps; relatively high population growth; and 
low or no value addition to raw materials produced; just to mention a few. 
On the political front, the peace and security situation in the most recent years has been 
relatively stable. Tanzania holds pride of place as one of the peaceful and stable countries in 
the region and in Africa since it gained independence. Kenya, seems to have relatively 
stabilised after the 2007 post-election violence and the promulgation of its new Constitution in 
2010. However, it still faces some security challenges, namely terrorist attacks from the Somali 
Al-Shabaab group, as well as relatively higher crime rate13. Rwanda has enjoyed increasing 
peace and stability since the 1994 genocide and the political environment seems to have 
positively impacted on the country’s economic potential as it has the highest ranking in the 
Ease of Doing Business Index14 among the EAC countries. Uganda, too has enjoyed relative 
peace and stability in the last decade although it is not totally free from ethnic tensions and 
conflicts as well as the Al-Shabaab threat. Burundi’s peace and security situation had been 
quite contained since it held its first democratic elections in 2005, but it has since taken a 
                                                          
 
8 EAC Secretariat EAC Facts and Figures 2015 (2015) 31. 
9 Apparently, three quarters of the Tanzanian population are employed in the agriculture sector; while 82% of 
Uganda’s workforce is in the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sector- African Development Bank (AfDB) et al 
African Economic Outlook 2014: East Africa (2014)154 &170, available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org accessed on 20 November 2015. The World Bank estimates that 90% 
of Burundi’s population is employed in subsistence agriculture- World Bank, World Bank Country Report 2014 
available at www.worldbank.org accessed on 20 November 2015.  
10 EAC Secretariat EAC Facts and Figures 2015, 55-56; EAC Secretariat Status of Elimination of Non-Tariff 
Barriers in the East African Community, Volume 8- December 2014 (2014) 16. 
11 Nikoloz Gigineishvili, Paolo Mauro, Ke Wang ‘How solid is economic growth in the East African 
Community?’ 2014 International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/14/150 at 1-4 available at 
https://www.imf.org/ accessed on 21 May 2017. 
12 AfDB op cit note 9. 
13 Ibid at 88- The report notes that although ‘the State is able to protect the lives and property of its citizens, 
urban areas and parts of the countryside are crime-infested’- a view it does not hold for other EAC States. 
14 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ/countries?display=default accessed on 21 
November 2015. 
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downturn, escalating into a full-blown conflict in 2015 after its President insisted on standing 
for and eventually gaining a third-term in office.  
The EAC States are made up of ethnically-diverse communities, and save for Tanzania which 
seems to have managed to control ethnic divisions, the other EAC countries have been arenas 
for ethnic-related conflicts. The most recent cases being the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; the 
recurring Burundi conflict; the 20-year war that occurred in Northern Uganda ending in the 
first decade of the 21st century; and the post-election violence in Kenya which brought out 
underlying ethnic tensions.  Arguably, ethnic tensions (which may be fused with land dispute 
issues) seem to be at the heart of most conflicts, at least the deadliest ones, within the EAC 
countries. Ethnicity and tribalism which may in some cases, if not most, shape politics within 
the EAC, is a powder keg that has got the potential of spontaneously altering the peace and 
security situation in any of the EAC countries and the Community as a whole.   
Additionally, the EAC as a whole is positioned in a conflict-prone zone surrounded by 
countries with on-going, and in some cases protracted conflicts as in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Somalia, and South Sudan. This has resulted in EAC countries playing host to a 
large number of refugees, some of whom are truly, community citizens. Most of the refugees 
tend to be settled in refugee camps or settlements and this may have an adverse impact on the 
migration rights of those who happen to be community citizens. The issue of refugees and 
asylum-seekers, however, broad, detailed and engaging as it is, falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
As far as democracy, human rights and good governance are concerned, the EAC countries 
present quite an interesting and varied picture15. While they all hold regular elections, there are 
usually concerns as to whether they are free and fair. Tanzania still holds the lead in being the 
most democratic EAC country, especially when it comes to electoral democracy. Kenya seems 
to be on a progressive trend especially after the promulgation of its 2010 Constitution. In 
                                                          
 
15 According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 2015 Rwanda ranked highest with an overall score of 
60.7%, followed by Kenya with 58.8%; Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi scored 56.7%, 54.6% and 48.5% 
respectively. Moreover, the positions of each country shift and vary in each of the four categories assessed, ie 
safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human 
development. With particular emphasis on the rule of law and human rights indices, the EAC countries scored as 
follows: Rule of law- Kenya (67.8%); Tanzania (57.8%); Rwanda (54.8%); Uganda (53.3%), and Burundi 
(42.1%). Human rights- Tanzania (64.1%); Kenya (63.3%); Uganda (57.2%); Burundi (50.3%); and Rwanda 
(46.3%). Details available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/data-portal/ accessed on 22 November 
2015. 
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Uganda, presidential term limits were lifted although regular presidential elections are still 
held. Rwanda seems to be following the same trend, while in Burundi, a third-term bid by its 
President sparked off the on-going conflict. In some of the EAC countries, there is deemed to 
be low checks on powers of government or the executive, which implies that in some of these 
countries the executive or presidency wields substantial power16, with minimal checks by other 
arms of government or civil society.  
When it comes to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the scale is as varied as 
is the context. All the countries have a Bill of Rights enshrined in their respective national 
Constitutions and have also established National Human Rights Institutions to promote and 
monitor human rights observance at the national level. However, most of the EAC countries 
score below average ratings when it comes to human rights and fundamental freedoms17. 
Moreover, when it comes to socio-economic rights, considering that the EAC is made up of 
developing countries, they all face similar challenges in fulfilling their obligations under the 
ICESCR. None of the EAC countries is a welfare state and there are hardly any social benefits 
or grants in any of the States. Although there are social security and health insurance schemes, 
if they do not operate privately, the commonly cater for those involved in formal employment, 
excluding majority of the population.   
The one big challenge that most EAC states face is that of corruption. All EAC countries rank 
below average, with Rwanda having the least perception of corruption compared to other EAC 
countries18.  
This rather broad and general overview of the EAC serves more as an introduction to the region 
and the countries that have agreed to form a regional community of sorts in attempt to overcome 
the many socio-economic and development challenges that they may not be able to overcome 
                                                          
 
16 For example, according to the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2015, under the ‘constraints on 
government powers’ category, Kenya scores 0.56,  Tanzania scores 0.53, both a little above the average 0.5; 
while Uganda scores a below average 0.39. Note that the rankings are on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). For 
more information see http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ accessed on 22 November 2015. 
17 According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2015 Report, while Tanzania and Kenya are rated 
‘partly free’, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are rated ‘not free’- available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/table-country-ratings accessed on 22 November 2015. 
According to the World Justice Project Report 2015, Tanzania scored highest among the EAC countries with an 
average 0.51, followed by Kenya with 0.49, while Uganda was rated at 0.39. Rwanda and Burundi were not 
included in the study. 
18 See Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results accessed on 
22 November 2015. 
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each on its own. Moreover, integration attempts within the EAC date back to colonial times as 
the following section illustrates. 
3.2  Background to the EAC 
The current EAC is more or less a re-establishment of an older model that was established in 
1967 but collapsed in 1977. The old EAC comprised of only three countries: Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda which were all British territories with distinctive administrative set-ups19.  
Economic co-operation among these countries is said to have begun way back in 1917 when 
Kenya and Uganda formed a Customs Union which Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania as it was 
then called) joined ten years later20. In 1948, the Governors of the three territories established 
the East African High Commission which, among other things, operated a customs union, a 
common currency and common services such as transport, communications, research and 
education21. At the start of the 1960s when independence loomed for most African countries, 
and the British were relinquishing their hold on their colonies, the East African High 
Commission was transferred into the hands of Africans and in 1961 it transformed into the East 
African Common Services Organisation (EACSO). The common services administered under 
EACSO included the East African Railways and Harbours; the East African Posts and 
Telecommunications; the East African Customs and Excise Department; the East African 
Income Tax Departments; the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa; East African Literature 
Bureau, to mention but some22. At the time, the level of integration among the three East 
African countries seemed to be quite advanced in some aspects. Comparing the EAC to the 
EEC then, Nye noted that in aspects such as the common currency, common tariff, labour and 
capital mobility, the East Africans were more integrated than the Europeans were23. Indeed, at 
the time, the three East African Countries were seriously considering establishing a political 
                                                          
 
19 Kenya was administered as a British colony; Uganda as a British Protectorate; while Tanzania having been 
initially colonised by Germany became a British mandated territory after Germany’s defeat in World War I. 
20 See John Oucho ‘Prospects of free movement in the East African Community’ (2013) 3 Regions and 
Cohesion 104-105; Edward Best & Thomas Christiansen ‘Regionalism in international affairs’ in John Baylis, 
Steve Smith & Patricia Owens (eds) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations (2011) 435. 
21 Oucho ibid at 105. 
22 Other common services included the East African Directorate of Civil Aviation; the East African 
Meteorological Department; the Treasury; the Secretariat; and several East African Research Departments. See 
Africanization Commission, Report of the Africanization of the Public Services of the East African Common 
Services Organization under the Chairmanship of J. O. Udoji’ (1963) 3 & 91. 
23 Joseph S Nye ‘The extent and viability of East African Co-operation’ in Collin Leys & Peter Robson (eds) 
Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems (1965) 41-42. 
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federation24. Apparently the idea did not pan out25 as the three Governments instead formed an 
East African Community, which was established by the Treaty for East African Co-operation 
signed on 6 June 1967 (hereinafter ‘the 1967 Treaty’). The main objective of this Community 
was to strengthen industrial, commercial and other ties and common services through the 
establishment of a common market as an integral part of the Community26.  
The next decade proved to be a very trying one for the newly established Community leading 
eventually to its collapse. Hazlewood observes, rather interestingly, that ‘[I]t is, in fact, possible 
to interpret the establishment of the Community not as a stride forward in cooperation but as a 
stage in a process of disintegration’27. He attributes this to the fact that by the time of 
establishing the EAC there was less cohesion among the Partner States. The common currency, 
for instance, had been abandoned and nationalistic interests among these newly independent 
States had taken sway. Accordingly, he argues that there was no singular factor that could be 
blamed for the eventual collapse of the EAC, but rather it was a result of ‘so many interacting 
influences and issues’28. These included, firstly, the uneven distribution of benefits, or rather 
the perception of it, with Kenya enjoying the lion’s share at the expense of Tanzania and 
Uganda. Notwithstanding the fact that by the time of signing the Treaty, Kenya was more 
economically developed than the other two States, the Treaty measures meant to address this 
proved to be inadequate29. Secondly, there was a difference in political-economic ideologies 
pursued within the region: Kenya and Uganda were capitalist, while Tanzania was a socialist 
state. Tanzania’s political interest increasingly became focussed to the south and not with its 
East African neighbours. Thirdly, the political leadership, who were the main forces behind the 
integration, failed to get along, with relations deeply souring among all the leaders. 
Hazlewood’s assessment of the fall of the EAC seems inclined to the view that, but for the lack 
of political will, a fact equally admitted in the preamble of the new EAC Treaty, most of the 
factors leading to the EAC’s collapse might have been dealt with, hence averting the 
                                                          
 
24 The Federation Declaration was issued on 5 June 1963 as a pledge by the Government leaders of the three 
countries to form a political federation for East Africa. Papers on a conference held in 1964 to discuss East 
African Federation are published in Leys & Robson ibid.  
25 Arthur Hazlewood ‘The end of the East African Community: what are the lessons for regional integration 
schemes?’ (1979) 18 Journal of Common Market Studies 42. 
26 Treaty for East African Co-operation 1967 (The 1967 Treaty) preamble para 10 & Article 2. 
27 Hazlewood op cit note 25 at 42. See also Reginald Herbold Green ‘The East African Community: a 
valediction forbidding mourning’ (1978) 8 African Review 1-27; D A K Mbogoro ‘The East African 
Community: an economic analysis of the integration scheme’ (1978) 8 African Review 54-76. 
28 Hazlewood ibid at 43. 
29 Ibid at 44 & 53-54. 
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catastrophe30. Although to a great extent agreeing with Hazlewood, Mugomba attaches much 
importance to the ideological differences between mainly Kenya and Tanzania (with Uganda 
being too absorbed in its internal problems to play a neutralising or mediatory role), as being 
much more instrumental in the EAC’s collapse31. With due regard to the multifarious factors 
and influences, it is quite certain that the relations among the Partner States took a downturn, 
leading to the dissolution of the EAC in 1977, when the Community and its corporations ceased 
to perform their functions32.  
Despite the dissolution, there was probably still nostalgia for co-operation among the East 
African States. In 198433, representatives of the three governments met in Arusha to sign the 
East African Community Mediation Agreement for the division of assets and liabilities of the 
former EAC. Thereupon, it was agreed that the three States would ‘explore and identify further 
areas for future co-operation and [to] work out concrete arrangements for such co-operation’34. 
After a sixteen-year hiatus and in pursuance of the 1984 Mediation Agreement, the leaders of 
the three East African countries met in 1993 and established the East African Co-operation, 
with the aim of re-establishing closer co-operation and ties amongst themselves. This was an 
intermediary arrangement set up ‘to explore areas of future co-operation and to make concrete 
arrangements for such co-operation’35. Subsequently in 1996, the East African Secretariat was 
set-up, which then handled the process that eventually culminated in the re-establishment of 
the EAC36. In November 1999, the Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed the 
                                                          
 
30 Ibid at 55. 
31 Agrippah T Mugomba ‘Regional organisations and African underdevelopment: the collapse of the East 
African Community’ (1978) 16 The Journal of Modern African Studies 261-272. 
32 Most authors on the EAC and its collapse, dwell more on the causative factors and not in explaining the form 
or legal character of the dissolution. There’s even scantier information from EAC official sources that are 
accessible via the website such as the current EAC Treaty. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that there was no 
negotiated end to the Community, but it rather disintegrated gradually.-Information available at 
http://www.worldhistory.biz/sundries/31706-east-african-community-the-1967-1977.html last accessed on 18 
November 2015. The EAC Treaty of 1967 was officially abrogated by the East African Community Mediation 
Agreement (Article 16) signed in Arusha on 14 May 1984. 
33 The seven-year lapse could probably be explained by the fact that the political situation at the time left little 
room for negotiations regarding the EAC. For example there was frequent change of governments in Uganda 
during that seven-year period which possibly hindered negotiations concerning the erstwhile EAC. Political 
stability in Uganda was restored after 1986, which might be one of the explanations to why no action was taken 
by EAC leaders until 1993. At that time too, Tanzania was re-building itself economically after abandoning its 
socialist ideals in 1985. 
34 EAC Mediation Agreement Article 14.2. 
35 See http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44&Itemid=54#  
36 The preamble to the EAC Treaty gives a synopsis of the process of re-establishing the EAC. Although the 
process for establishing the Secretariat was initiated in 1994 with the signing of the Protocol on the 
Establishment of a Secretariat for the Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation between Uganda, 
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Treaty Establishing the East African Community (EAC Treaty) and it came into force in July 
2000, upon ratification by all the Partner States. In June 2007, Burundi and Rwanda acceded 
to the EAC Treaty, and upon ratification became members on 1 July 2007.  
3.3 EAC integration under the EAC Treaty, 2000 
According to the EAC Treaty, there are about four major discernible factors that impelled the 
re-establishment of the EAC. These are: the ‘close historical, commercial, industrial, cultural 
and other ties’37 shared by the Partner States; the desire to coordinate ‘economic, social, 
cultural, security and political issues’38; the desire to enhance regional economic 
development39; and the ‘desire to foster and to promote greater awareness of the shared 
interests of the peoples of the Partner States’40. 
Analysing the drivers for EAC integration, Baregu identifies affection and gain as the major 
imperatives. By affection, he refers to ‘a situation where countries come into an integration 
arrangement because they have a lot in common and feel some bonds of affection’41. This 
affective imperative is evident in the EAC Treaty’s preambular references to the historical and 
cultural ties, and the aspiration to foster and promote greater awareness of the shared interests 
of the East African peoples42. With regard to the gain imperative, Baregu explains it as the 
economic motivations for integration which emphasise the welfare gains from trade43. 
Actually, the EAC Treaty largely manifests economic motivations as being dominant drivers 
for integration. This can be seen, firstly from several of the objectives of the Community which 
emphasise economic development44. Secondly, the phases of integration outlined in the Treaty 
                                                          
 
Kenya and Tanzania, the Secretariat became operative in 1996.  In 1997, the Secretariat for the Tripartite 
Commission was directed by the three Heads of State to commence negotiations on upgrading the Agreement 
establishing the Tripartite Commission into a Treaty, hence the current EAC Treaty.  See also Dani W Nabudere 
‘The fast-tracking of federation and constitutionalism in East Africa’ available at 
http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=162&Itemid=70 last accessed 
18 November 2015; Korwa G Adar ‘East African Community’ in Giovanni Finizio, Lucio Levi & Nicola 
Vallinoto (eds) International Democracy Report ( 2011). 
37 EAC Treaty preamble para 1; Article 5.3 para (d) of the EAC Treaty likewise mentions as one of the 
objectives of the Community ‘the strengthening and consolidation of the long standing political, economic, 
social, cultural and traditional ties and associations between the peoples of the Partner States’. 
38 EAC Treaty preamble para 15. This is further elaborated in the objectives of the Community as provided in 
Article 5 EAC Treaty. 
39 EAC Treaty preamble para 11; also Article 5.2, 5.3 paras (a), (b) & (g). 
40 EAC Treaty preamble para 12. 
41 Mwesiga Baregu ‘The federation of East Africa and the imperatives of political unity in Africa’ in Rok Ajulu 
(ed) A Region in Transition: Towards a New Integration Agenda in East Africa (2010) 49. 
42 EAC Treaty preamble paras 1 & 12. 
43 Ibid.  
44 EAC Treaty Article 5.2 & 5.3 paras (a) & (b) are particularly specific to economic aims. 
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follow the classic neo-functionalist approach to integration45. In accordance thereto, the 
milestones in regional integration are, in sequence, a Free Trade Area, a Customs Union, a 
Common Market, a Monetary Union, and finally, if agreed upon, a Political Federation. True 
to this approach, the EAC aims to establish a Customs Union (which is operative); a Common 
Market (now operative); a Monetary Union; and ultimately a Political Federation46. The 
emphasis placed on economic co-operation and development, and the fact that milestones for 
various levels of integration are largely economic, proves the predominance and primacy of 
economic imperatives for EAC integration. Of additional importance is the fact that the EAC 
Treaty has been notified to the WTO and is considered a plurilateral treaty under the WTO 
arrangement47. This may provide further evidence of the predominance of economic objectives 
of the EAC, as this proves that the Treaty falls within and is governed by the international 
economic law and trade law regime. 
Baregu further postulates that threat48, which could be occasioned by factors internal among 
the region or external ones, should be a significant imperative for EAC integration. However, 
it is not expressly mentioned anywhere in the EAC Treaty. This could mean that the threat 
imperative was not one of the major driving factors for the EAC, although at the time African 
countries had identified globalisation as a threat and economic integration as one of the ways 
of overcoming it49. In support of this position, Wanyande emphatically argues that ‘East 
African countries appear to be convinced that the most effective political response to the 
potential threats of globalisation and international terrorism is to integrate’50. He is, however, 
quick to add that the threat imperative within the EAC in no way displaces the significance of 
the economic motives51. True indeed that the EAC Treaty does not mention the need to protect 
Partner States from real or potential threats, however some allusions are made to the threat of 
globalisation. In paragraph eleven of the preamble, the Partner States take cognisance of ‘the 
                                                          
 
45 See discussion in chapter one section 1.1.1. 
46 EAC Treaty preamble para 15 & Article 5.2. Although the functionalist integration approach usually begins 
with the establishment of a free trade area, by the time the EAC Treaty was signed, all three original Partner 
States were then members of the COMESA free trade area. It was therefore deemed appropriate to start the EAC 
at the next stage, i.e. the Customs Union. 
47 The EAC Treaty was notified to the WTO on 9 October 2000 under the Enabling Clause of the GATT, while 
the Common Market Protocol was notified on 1 August 2010 under GATS Article V. 
48 Baregu op cit note 41 at 50. 
49 Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government, 11 July, 2000 – preamble paras 5 & 6. 
50 Peter Wanyande ‘The role of the East African Legislative Assembly’ in Rok Ajulu (ed) The Making of a 
Region: The Revival of the East African Community (2005) 64. 
51 Ibid. 
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developments in the world economy as contained in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation, 1995’. This could, in one way, imply that the EAC countries 
are aware of the trade liberalisation and globalisation effects of the world trading system which 
may place them in a vulnerable economic position. Paragraph sixteen of the preamble further 
takes note of the role of the EAC in the realisation of the African Economic Community, whose 
objectives include promoting ‘the socio-economic development of Africa and to face more 
effectively the challenges posed by globalization’52. It is, therefore, arguable that nuances of 
the threat imperative are apparent in the EAC Treaty. This is further augmented by the 
significance the Partner States attach to the promotion of peace, security, stability and good 
neighbourliness within and among the region53. To sum up this discussion, the imperatives for 
the EAC integration, to borrow Baregu’s terms, are, arguably, affection, gain and threat. There 
is no gainsaying, however, that the economic or gain imperative is apparently the overriding 
one54. 
Baregu chastises the EAC States for not learning from history. He opines that ‘[A]s if no 
lessons have been learned from the collapse of the Community twenty-five years ago, the treaty 
adopts a gradualist and largely functionalist approach and thus does not differ fundamentally 
from the earlier efforts’55 (emphasis added). Much as this criticism may be partly true as 
regards the gradualist and functionalist approach, the current EAC Treaty does in fact contain 
several significant and fundamental initiatives which definitely create a point of departure from 
the old EAC.  
The following section discusses these initiatives or new developments in the EAC Treaty 
which, if adhered to, could be the key to the success of the current EAC integration efforts. 
3.4  Key Developments in the EAC Treaty 
3.4.1 Broad-based Community objectives and principles 
The objectives of the new EAC are quite broader and more far-reaching than the objectives of 
the old EAC. The latter was, without doubt, narrowly focused on trade and economic 
                                                          
 
52 Constitutive Act of the African Union preamble para 6. 
53 EAC Treaty Article 5.3 para (f), Article 6 paras (b) (d) & (e), Article 11.3, Article 123-125 which generally 
provide for the promotion of peace, security and stability within the region and among Partner States. 
54 In a study commissioned by the EAC Secretariat, it was observed that the EAC is an organisation ‘primarily 
concerned with economic issues’- EAC Secretariat ‘Study on the establishment of an East African Community 
Common Market’ Final Report submitted by M.A. Consulting Group (August 2007) 45. 
55 Baregu op cit note 41 at 52.  
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development of the Partner States. The preamble to the 1967 Treaty emphasised the desire of 
the Partner States to strengthen commercial and industrial ties, through long-term removal of 
trade restrictions and the establishment of a common market56. In tandem, virtually all the aims 
of the Community were trade and economic related, geared towards attaining a common 
market57.  It is thus arguable that the old EAC was solely driven by purely economic motives, 
with a singleness of purpose geared towards trade integration. 
As discussed in the previous section, the drivers for the new EAC are manifold. Although the 
economic motive is still predominant, it is clearly not the sole objective. This is reflected in the 
many areas in which strengthened co-operation is envisaged. These include economic, social, 
cultural and political fields, research and technology, defence, security, legal and judicial 
affairs58. Additionally, asides from three objectives that are specifically economic, other 
objectives include: protection of the natural environment through sustainable use of natural 
resources; strengthening political, social, economic, cultural and traditional ties of the peoples 
of Partner States; gender mainstreaming; promotion of peace, security and stability; and 
strengthening partnerships with the private sector and civil society59. 
Furthermore, the Treaty also includes principles that shall govern the achievement of the 
objectives, an aspect that was entirely absent in the 1967 Treaty. The principles of the EAC are 
divided into fundamental and operational principles. The fundamental principles are laid down 
in Article 6 of the EAC Treaty as follows: 
a) mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality; 
b) peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness; 
c) peaceful settlement of disputes; 
d) good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law, 
accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, as well 
as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples [sic] rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; 
e) equitable distribution of benefits; and 
                                                          
 
56 The 1967 Treaty preamble paras 6-10.  
57 Only two out of seven aims of the Community were not overtly economic in nature. These had to do with the 
inauguration of a common agricultural policy, and the operation of common services- Article 2.2 paras (c) & (g) 
respectively. 
58 EAC Treaty preamble para 15 & Article 5.1. 
59 EAC Treaty Articles 5.2 & 5.3. 
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f) co-operation for mutual benefit. 
The operational principles provided for in Article 7 of the EAC Treaty include: people-centred 
and market-driven co-operation; provision by the Partner States of an adequate and enabling 
environment; establishment of an export-oriented economy; the principle of subsidiarity; the 
principle of variable geometry; the equitable distribution of benefits; the principle of 
complementarity; and the principle of asymmetry. 
In one of its landmark decisions, the East African Court of Justice ruled on the importance of 
the fundamental principles thus:  
[T]hese principles are foundational, core and indispensable to the success of the 
integration agenda, and were intended to be strictly observed. Partner States are not to 
merely aspire to achieve their observance, they are to observe them as a matter of Treaty 
obligation. In our view, all the six principles in the Article were each carefully thought 
out, negotiated, appropriately weighted, individualized and crafted the way they are for 
a particular effect. Integration depends on each of them singly and collectively60. 
In accordance therewith, the Court has in a number of cases grounded its decisions in the 
principles of the EAC Treaty, as overarching and prevailing over other subject-specific Treaty 
provisions61. The overall effect of the totality of the objectives and principles of the EAC and 
the importance the Court has attached to them, is an indication that this time round the EAC 
aims at a deeper and more holistic integration than was the case previously. This leads us to 
the second key development. 
3.4.2 Advanced stages of integration 
A perusal of the 1967 Treaty reveals that the EAC’s primary aim was the establishment of a 
common market. Hence its focus was almost entirely on what was deemed necessary to attain 
that end. Consequently, a substantial part of the 1967 Treaty deals with the removal of 
restrictions to free movement of goods, and trade in general, which would ultimately lead to 
the common market which was an integral part of the EAC62. All efforts seemed to veer towards 
                                                          
 
60 Samuel Mukira Mohochi v Attorney General of Uganda, EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011 para 36. 
61 This can be seen in the EACJ’s decision in James Katabazi and 21 others v Secretary General of the East 
African Community & Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2007 and 
subsequent rule of law and human rights cases (see discussion in chapter five), where the Court relied on the 
provisions of the EAC Treaty Articles 6 and 7 to justify its adjudication in a case that involved human rights 
allegations, over which it has no express jurisdiction. 
62 The1967 Treaty preamble paras 6-10; Parts II & III (Articles 5-42) of the 1967 Treaty were solely dedicated 
to the common market. 
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the common market, no more, no less63. There were no delineated progressive stages of 
integration as those in the current EAC Treaty, ie a customs union, a common market, a 
monetary union; and ultimately a political federation. 
Under the current dispensation, the EAC seems to be in for the long haul. In August 2004, the 
EAC Summit of the Heads of State, concerned about the slow pace of integration, instituted a 
committee to examine ways of fast-tracking the political federation. The committee, known as 
the Wako committee after its chairman, after a relatively wide consultative process, presented 
its report in November 2004. One of the recommendations that the committee made was that 
the EAC should adopt an ‘overlap and parallel approach’. This involves the ‘overlapping of 
the four stages of integration to allow the undertaking of parallel activities at each stage’64. 
Accordingly, on 2 March 2004, the Protocol for the Establishment of the East African 
Community Customs Union was signed and became operational on 1 January 2005. After a 
five-year transitional period, the fully-fledged EAC customs union entered into force. On 20 
November 2009, the EAC Heads of State signed the Protocol for the Establishment of EAC 
Common Market (Common Market Protocol) and it entered into force on 1 July 2010. 
Although the EAC has not yet become a fully-fledged common market, the attainment of which 
is still a work in progress, on 30 November 2013 the five EAC Head of States signed the 
Protocol on the establishment of the EAC Monetary Union. The monetary union is to be 
realised progressively 
The Wako committee report also included a timeline for the attainment of the EAC’s 
milestones and it was envisaged that elections and swearing-in of the EAC federal president 
and parliament would take place in 2013. This has been criticised as being too ambitious65, and 
it has indeed proven to be so. Although the political federation still appears to be the EAC’s 
ultimate goal, at a meeting of the Summit of the Heads of State held in Kampala in November 
2013, most of the leaders seemed satisfied with delaying the idea for a while66. 
                                                          
 
63 Although the 1967 Treaty was to be reviewed after fifteen years, which might have been an opportunity to 
deepen integration, the EAC did not survive that long.  
64 EAC Secretariat, Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation (November 2004) para 
320; available at 
http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=100&Itemid=136  
65 Thomas N Kibua & Arne Tostensen Fast-tracking East African Integration: Assessing the Feasibility of a 
Political Federation by 2010 (2005) 14; Korwa G Adar ‘Fast tracking East African political federation: the role 
and limitations of the East African Legislative Assembly’ (2008) 37 Africa Insight 85.  
66 Sadab Kitatta Kaaya ‘EAC- Kagame, Kenyatta snub Museveni on political federation’ The Observer 4 
December 2013.  
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It is worth noting and quite promising that more than a decade after its revival, the EAC seems 
to be going strong, more than can be said of the old EAC which never survived the decade. 
Furthermore, the EAC has entered into a tripartite arrangement with COMESA and SADC to 
establish a free trade area. The Tripartite Free Trade Area was officially launched on 10 June 
2015. This process is, among others, seen as advancing the AU’s objectives of accelerating 
economic integration through the establishment of a continental Free Trade Area and 
eventually the African Economic Community67. This integration of RECs could also in part 
solve the problem of overlapping country memberships that is prevalent among African RECs. 
3.4.3 Institutions of the EAC 
Article 3 of the 1967 Treaty provided for the following institutions of the Community: the East 
African Authority (which comprised of the three Heads of State); the East African Legislative 
Assembly; the East African Ministers; the Common Market Council; the Common Market 
Tribunal; the Communications Council; the Finance Council; the Economic Consultative and 
Planning Council; and the Research and Social Council. These institutions were assisted by a 
central secretariat (Article 3.3, 1967 Treaty). The Court of Appeal for East Africa (hereinafter 
‘Court of Appeal’), although it was provided for under the Treaty, its status was not quite clear. 
It was not listed among the institutions of the Community provided for in Article 3, but was 
provided for in Articles 80-81 under Part IV of the Treaty which dealt with ‘The Functions of 
the East African Community and its Institutions’. Its jurisdiction was restricted to hearing 
appeals from the courts of Partner States as permitted by law in the Partner States. Presumably 
then, the institutions that were listed in Article 3 were the key institutions that were purposely 
set up to further the objectives of the Common Market. Their functions, just like the objectives 
of the Treaty were thus restricted to the promotion of trade and economic co-operation among 
the Partner States. It is worth noting, however, that some of these institutions never became 
fully functional. For example, Viljoen reports that although by 1970 two cases had been 
referred to the Common Market Tribunal, these were never heard since the Tribunal was never 
fully constituted68. 
                                                          
 
67 For more information, see COMESA Key Issues in Regional Integration: Volume III (2014) at 3 available at 
http://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Key-Issues-on-intergration-III.pdf, 1-2 & 129-130 accessed 
on 13 May 2017. 
68 Frans Viljoen The Realisation of Human Rights in Africa through Intergovernmental Institutions (1997) 363. 
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The institutional order under the new EAC is quite different and reflects in part the broad-based 
nature of its objectives. Article 9 of the EAC Treaty provides for the organs and institutions of 
the Community. The organs of the Community provided for in Article 9.1 are: the Summit (of 
Heads of State); the Council (of Ministers); the Coordination Committee; Sectoral Committees; 
the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA); the East African Court of Justice (EACJ); the 
Secretariat; and such other organs as may be established by the Summit. Article 9.2 provides 
for the institutions of the Community as such bodies, departments and services as may be 
established by the Summit. Arguably, the institutional set-up of the current EAC is more or 
less a rationalisation for a more robust and holistic integration than was previously the case. 
Needless to say, there are some shortcomings and weaknesses in the nature of the 
establishment, powers and functions of some of these institutions, some of which are briefly 
pointed out in the ensuing sub-section. 
3.4.4 Democratic features of the EAC 
The old EAC was being driven by the political heads at the time, which is why when they could 
no longer talk to each other, the entire establishment crumbled. The narrow focus of the EAC 
on regional trade did not seem to help matters in other spheres, such as the political and social, 
which were equally if not more crucial at the time. In short, the old EAC suffered a democracy 
deficiency, one of the reasons that contributed to its collapse69. The people of East Africa had 
no say in the affairs of the Community, or if they had, it was negligible. The Legislative 
Assembly which would ordinarily be a representative body of the people was not 
democratically elected. Members of the Legislative Assembly were the three East African 
Ministers and their Deputies; the Secretary-General and Counsel to the Community; and twenty 
seven members appointed by the Partner States, each in accordance with its own procedure70. 
Additionally, the institutional-set-up of the old EAC did not embody the principle of separation 
of powers, one of the key tenets of democracy. The functional institutions of the EAC then 
were ostensibly representative of the executive. The Legislative Assembly, by nature of its 
composition, could hardly be said to be independent. The Court of Appeal for East Africa did 
not have any jurisdiction over community matters, but only served as the highest appellate 
                                                          
 
69 EAC Treaty preamble para 4 mentions the ‘lack of strong participation of the private sector and civil society 
in the co-operation activities’ as one of the reasons for the collapse of the old EAC. 
70 The 1967 Treaty Articles 56 & 57. 
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court for all the East African countries. Even then, its jurisdiction over matters it could hear 
was restricted to criminal and civil matters71. 
One of the progressive features of the new EAC is the desire to be more people-centred. In this 
regard, one of the objectives of the EAC is ‘the enhancement and strengthening of partnerships 
with the private sector and civil society in order to achieve sustainable socio-economic and 
political development’72. In keeping with this and other objectives, is the EAC’s fundamental 
principle on ‘good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law…’73, and the operational principle of ‘people-centred and market-driven co-operation’74. 
The EAC has tried to adhere to these principles. For instance, the Wako committee carried out 
national consultations to garner peoples’ views on fast tracking the political federation and in 
pursuance to one of its recommendations, National Consultative Committees were 
established75. Nevertheless, the Wako committee has been criticised for failing to emphasise 
the role of the peoples of East Africa in the political federation- the envisaged process does not 
provide a link between the East Africans and political federation. What the report recommends 
rather is still much more an elite-driven process76. The criticism, notwithstanding, there is 
comparatively more visible participation, involvement and engagement by and with civil 
society actors, and most notably the business community which enjoys ‘observer status’ with 
the EAC77.  
                                                          
 
71 Viljoen (1997) op cit note 68 at 366. 
72 EAC Treaty Article 5.3 para (g). 
73 EAC Treaty Article 6 para (d). 
74 EAC Treaty Article 7.1 (a). Articles 127-128 set our detailed provisions on the private sector and civil society. 
Article 127 provides for the ‘creation of an enabling environment for the private sector and civil society’; 
Article 128 provides for ‘strengthening the private sector’; and Article 129 provides for ‘co-operation among 
business organisations and professional bodies’.  
75 See Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking the East African Federation: Appendices I-XVIII (January 
2005) available at 
http://www.federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=100&Itemid=136 It lists 
persons and institutions consulted by the Committee. EAC The East African Political Federation: Addressing 
East Africans’ Fears, Concerns and Challenges and Consolidating Its Pillars (2010). For a discussion on the 
role of the private sector and civil society, see Kasaija P Apuuli ‘Assessment of institutional development in the 
East African Community (EAC): 2001-2009’ in Ajulu (2010) op cit note 41 at 120-121. 
76 Adar (2008) op cit note 65 at 91-92. 
77 See James Gathii ‘Variation in the use of sub-regional integration courts between business and human rights 
actors: the case of the East African Court of Justice’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 42; Karen J 
Alter, James T Gathii & Lawrence Helfer ‘Backlash against international courts in West, East and Southern 
Africa: causes and consequences’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 321-324.  
91 
 
Furthermore, under the new EAC, members of the EALA are elected, and not appointed, by 
the National Assembly of each Partner State78. Although this is an improvement from the old 
EAC, the way EALA members are elected still falls short of democratic standards79 and has in 
fact led to a number of court cases. In several of these cases, the EACJ has found national rules 
to be in violation of Article 50.1 of the EAC Treaty80. 
Another aspect in which democratic principles have been entrenched is in the separation of 
powers among the key organs of the EAC. The three organs of government are all represented: 
the executive consists of the Summit of Heads of State and Council of Ministers; the legislative 
arm is the East African Legislative Assembly; while the judicial arm is the East African Court 
of Justice81. The EACJ has a clear mandate of applying and interpreting the Treaty and in so 
doing has upheld the principle of separation of powers within the Community82. These 
developments notwithstanding, organs of the Community have occasionally been criticised for 
not functioning independently83. Regardless, the key point here is that the EAC Treaty has 
entrenched democracy and rule of law safeguards that were not a part of the old EAC Treaty 
and which if adhered to, provide a strong basis for consolidating democracy within the region. 
3.4.5. Inclusion of human rights principles 
The 1967 neither mentioned nor alluded to human rights and fundamental principles. This 
could be explained by the fact that it was focused almost entirely on economic and trade-related 
issues. Besides, human rights advocacy had not yet taken root on the continent on the scale that 
is has presently. As such individual governments were more concerned about independence 
                                                          
 
78 EAC Treaty Article 50.1 provides: ‘The National Assembly of each Partner State shall elect, not from among 
its members, nine members of the Assembly, who shall represent as much as it is feasible, the various political 
parties represented in the National Assembly, shades of opinion, gender and other special interest groups in that 
Partner State, in accordance with such procedure as the National Assembly of each Partner State may 
determine’. 
79 Apuuli op cit note 75 at 110-111.  
80 Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v Attorney General of Kenya and Others, EACJ, Reference 1 of 
2006 & Appeal No. 1 of 2009; Abdu Katuntu v Attorney General of Uganda, EACJ, Reference No. 5 of 2012; 
Antony Calist Komu v The Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, EACJ, Reference No. 7 of 
2012.  
81 EAC Treaty Article 23 which provides for the EACJ as the ‘judicial body’ with jurisdiction to ‘ensure the 
adherence to law in the interpretation and application and compliance with this Treaty’. 
82 Calist Mwatela, Lydia Wanyoto Mutende, Isaac Abraham Sepetu v East African Community EACJ Reference 
No. 1 of 2005 at 20. In this case, the EACJ upheld the independence of the EALA as the ‘representative organ in 
the Community set up to enhance a people centred co-operation’ and its independence needed to be preserved. 
As such it was not bound by decisions of the Council of Ministers. The Court went on to conclude that the 
‘decisions of the Council have no place in areas of jurisdiction of the Summit, Court and the Assembly’. 
83 Apuuli op cit note 75 at 121. 
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and self-determination, and least concerned about the promotion and protection of human 
rights. Within the EAC, this was clearly illustrated by the restrictions placed by the Partner 
States on the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction over human rights issues. Viljoen notes that 
although the Constitutions of Kenya and Uganda, at the time, included a Bill of Rights, the 
Court of Appeal was excluded from handling such matters. For Tanzania, its Constitution did 
not have a Bill of Rights, but even then, the Court of Appeal was ‘excluded from hearing any 
appeal concerning its interpretation’84. Consequently, human rights issues were outside the 
purview of the EAC and confined to the domain of individual Partner States. 
Under the current EAC Treaty, human rights have been recognised as being fundamental to the 
attainment of the objectives of the Community. Hence the fundamental principle on good 
governance includes ‘the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples [sic] 
rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’85. This is further reinforced by the undertaking of Partner States, as one of the 
operational principles of the EAC, to adhere to the ‘maintenance of universally accepted 
standards of human rights’86. Quite noteworthy too, is the inclusion of gender-equality 
provisions that aim at empowering and promoting the rights of women87. 
The relatively more vibrant civil society has made sure that governments are kept accountable 
for their human rights and rule of law obligations. The evidence of this is partly in the number 
of cases brought before the EACJ by civil society actors challenging government actions that 
appear to be in transgression of the EAC Treaty principles on good governance, human rights 
and rule of law. 
In its interpretation of the Treaty, the EACJ has concluded that the EAC Treaty is not a human 
rights Treaty, but rather it ‘governs trade matters as the objective of co-operation among Partner 
States’88. This bolsters the argument on economic drivers being quite predominant in the EAC. 
However, the position of human rights in the EAC Treaty is not entirely lost on the EACJ. It 
has noted that ‘[t]hough the EAC Treaty is bereft of a chapter on Human Rights, nonetheless, 
                                                          
 
84 Viljoen op cit note 68 at 364-365. 
85 EAC Treaty Article 6 para (d). 
86 EAC Treaty Article 7.2. 
87 EAC Treaty Article 5.3 para (e), Article 6 (d); and the entire chapter 22 (Articles 121-122) provides for 
‘Enhancing the Role of Women in Socio-economic Development’. 
88Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda & Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya vs Omar Awadh 
and 6 others, EACJ Appeal No. 2 of 2012 para 48. 
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it contains the hint of such rights in a number of its provisions’89. The hint referred to here 
would necessarily include the human rights references in both the fundamental and operational 
principles of the EAC. Considering its view on the principles of the EAC as discussed above90, 
the Court has gone on to ensure that Partner States adhere to these principles. Even though it 
does not have jurisdiction over human rights matters per se91, a fact it is very much conscious 
of, the EACJ has declared that ‘it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of 
interpretation under Article 27 (1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human 
rights violation’92. Thus it has on occasion found Partner States in breach of their human rights 
treaty obligations contained in Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the EAC Treaty. The role and 
jurisprudence of the EACJ shall be explored in more depth in chapter five. 
The fact that the Treaty does not confer the EACJ with jurisdiction over human rights issues 
possibly suggests reluctance on the part of EAC Partner States’ to prioritise human rights 
issues. Although there is room for the EACJ to attain jurisdiction at a later stage this has not 
yet materialised. A draft Protocol to extend the EACJ’s jurisdiction to human rights matters 
was initiated in 2007, but efforts appear to have stalled. This hesitation by the EAC Partner 
States is indeed reminiscent of the attitude the Partner States had towards the old Court of 
Appeal hearing human rights cases. As the situation stands, it is the EACJ that is doing a very 
commendable job, despite its limitations, and this in itself is a remarkable milestone. 
Meanwhile in 2010, the National Human Rights Institutions of EAC Partner States, in a bid to 
strengthen human rights promotion in the region, adopted a draft Bill of Rights which is meant 
to be a human rights standard-setting document for the region. Despite it being a very 
comprehensive document, there is not much progress that has been made towards adopting it 
as one of the key regional instruments. This could be further evidence of reluctance on part of 
the EAC States to accept the essential role of human rights promotion and protection within 
the EAC.  
                                                          
 
89  The Attorney General of the Republic of Rwanda vs Plaxeda Rugumba, EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2012 para 24. 
90 See Mukira Mohochi case supra note 60. 
91 EAC Treaty Article 27.2 provides that the EACJ ‘The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human 
rights and other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date’. Such 
jurisdiction is yet to be provided. 
92 James Katabazi case supra note 61 at 16. 
94 
 
3.4.6 Elaborate provisions on migration rights 
When compared to the old EAC Treaty, the new EAC Treaty can be said to have introduced a 
migration rights regime that was virtually absent in the former Treaty. Despite the considerable 
movement of labour and workers during the old EAC era, the 1967 Treaty focussed primarily 
on the free movement of goods. There was almost no mention of the free movement of other 
factors of production93. Migration rights, even and rather absurdly, the free movement of 
labour, were essentially not provided for in the Treaty. The only attempt to provide for free 
movement of a specific group of persons was in reference to ‘persons employed in the service 
of the Community, the Corporations or the Bank’ to be ‘accorded such immunities from 
immigration restrictions or alien registration’94. Considering the full gamut of rights and 
freedoms characteristic of the common market, and particularly migration rights, the 1967 
Treaty was substantially lacking in this aspect. 
The new EAC Treaty, true to its comprehensiveness, provides for the free movement of factors 
of production. Additionally, the Common Market Protocol contains elaborate provisions on the 
free movement of persons, including workers; the rights of residence and establishment, and 
free movement of other factors of production as shall be seen in the next chapter.  
3.5 The EAC and community citizenship 
What may not have changed much between the old EAC regime and the current one is the 
notion of community citizenship. Although the term ‘East Africans’ has been much in usage 
even with reference to the old EAC regime, the concept of citizenship was never adopted in 
the 1967 Treaty. Considering the objectives of the old EAC, it is plausible that the erstwhile 
Treaty never envisaged, let alone embraced the concept of community citizenship. This could 
also partly be explained by the fact that it was in actual sense a ‘Treaty for East African Co-
operation’ and as such supranationality was never its objective. Its focus on trade integration 
was too narrow to allow for such a broad concept as community citizenship. The term ‘citizen’ 
was not defined in the 1967 Treaty and the only mention made thereto was with reference to a 
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Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 171. 
94 Ibid at 175; see also the 1967 Treaty Article 3.4 para (b). 
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‘citizen of a Partner State’95. If anything, the meaning attached to ‘citizen’ under the 1967 
Treaty was unambiguously with regard to the ordinary nation-state citizenship. 
The current EAC Treaty does not define the term ‘citizen’ although it makes reference to 
‘national of a Partner State’, which is actually reminiscent of the old Treaty. From this 
viewpoint, it seems like nothing much has changed under the current order. However, as shall 
be argued in the next chapter, the current EAC dispensation favours to a greater degree the 
adoption of the concept of community citizenship, more so as integration deepens and advances 
closer to the phase of a political federation. 
3.6 Chapter conclusion 
The chapter has provided some insights into the historical, geo-political and socio-economic 
context of the EAC, dwelling upon some of the unique and more progressive features in its 
current constitutional framework. Despite the many challenges it faces with regards to 
economic, political and social dynamics, the EAC has made significant strides, particularly 
with the EAC Treaty which is more comprehensive, broad-based and far-reaching.   
There is no gainsaying that EAC integration is mainly driven by economic objectives. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that the EAC Treaty is considered a regional trade agreement 
registered with the WTO. It is therefore appropriate in some, if not most, circumstances to 
consider it as falling absolutely under the international economic and trade law regime. This 
would however be an incomplete and narrow categorisation of the EAC whose objectives go 
beyond trade and economic integration. From the above discussion, it is clear that the EAC 
Treaty is no mere trade agreement, but serves as a constitutional document for the EAC. Asides 
from its broad objectives and principles, it creates a regional organisation with a governance 
structure based on the principle of separation of powers, in imitation of what pertains in national 
jurisdictions. It is the constitutional instrument that lays the ground for the envisaged political 
federation, the ultimate objective of the EAC. Consequently, the democratic values, including 
the rule of law and human rights, which constitute some of the fundamental and operational 
principles of the EAC, become highly significant in its integration process. 
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‘citizen of a Partner State’. 
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Within this context, migration rights have received a significant amount of attention. This 
development may perhaps be a recognition of their centrality in the economic integration 
trajectory or common market phase; or perhaps the EAC States have awakened to the fact that 
migration rights are one way of propelling the achievement of its integration objectives on all 
levels, that is, social, economic, cultural, and political96. In any case, the EAC’s objectives and 
the general tone of the Treaty may be seen to set a context that capitalises on the hybridity of 
migration rights. The following chapter entails a detailed discussion of the EAC regime on 
migration rights as elaborated in relevant EAC law. 
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reasons for an elaborate provision on migration rights within the EAC framework. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSING THE EAC MIGRATION RIGHTS REGIME: THE EAC TREATY AND 
COMMON MARKET PROTOCOL 
4.0 Introduction 
The EAC Treaty provides for the free movement of factors of production, including the free 
movement of persons, labour, services and the rights of establishment and residence. These are 
in turn elaborated upon in the Common Market Protocol (CMP), the most authoritative 
instrument on migration rights in the EAC. This chapter presents provisions of migration rights 
under EAC law and the obligations imposed on the Partner States to ensure that these rights 
are enjoyed by all the intended beneficiaries, for the realisation of the Community’s objectives. 
The provisions as presented in the CMP seem to focus more on formal procedures rather than 
the substantive elements of the rights, which might be an indication of the nascence of the EAC 
and the migration rights regime as a whole. 
The chapter also highlights the ambiguity in the definition of ‘citizen’ as defined and applied 
by the EAC law. It is argued that the concept of ‘community citizen’ in the EAC is implied 
rather than explicit and that there is need for the Community law to be specific and 
comprehensive in defining a ‘community citizen’. This would be more in consonance with its 
ultimate objective of establishing a political federation.   
Finally the chapter discusses some inherent shortcomings within the EAC migration rights 
regime and the community citizenship concept, in which they fail to reflect some of the realities 
within the region. These shortcomings are merely highlighted, but would necessarily benefit 
from further research. 
4.1 Migration rights in the EAC Treaty 
One of the operational principles of the EAC, necessary for the attainment of its objectives is 
‘the establishment of an export-oriented economy for the Partner States in which there shall be 
free movement of goods, persons, labour, services, capital, information and technology’1. The 
free movement of goods, labour, capital and other factors of production is, of course, a sine 
qua non for a common market, one of the four phases of EAC integration. The establishment 
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of the EAC common market is provided for under Article 76.1 which emphatically stipulates 
that within the common market, ‘there shall be free movement of labour, goods, services, 
capital, and the right of establishment’. Suffice to note that this Article comes under the chapter 
of the EAC Treaty entitled ‘Co-operation in Trade Liberalisation and Development’, which is 
basically centred on trade related aspects of integration. This placement emphasises the EAC 
common market as a key phase of economic integration aimed at bolstering trade among the 
Partner States. Hence, what Article 76.1 provides for is the free movement of factors of 
production, in a purely economic sense. Therefore, the provisions of Article 76.1 are narrower 
than the operational objective, which although still trade and economic focussed, envisages, in 
a broader sense, free movement of persons, information and technology in addition to the 
Article 76.1 factors of production.  It is a reasonably compelling argument that the EAC 
common market aims at enhancing trade and/or economic integration which is only but one 
aspect of EAC integration, and so the free movement provisions under Article 76 are essentially 
‘market freedoms’. Moreover, Article 76.1 does introduce the right of establishment, although 
it makes no mention of the right of residence. 
Article 76.1 notwithstanding, the EAC Treaty in chapter seventeen specifically provides for 
‘Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and Residence’. 
Specifically, Article 104 lays the foundation for migration rights provisions within the EAC 
legal framework. When compared to Article 76.1, the provisions of Article 104 are much 
broader, more comprehensive and more reflective of the broad objectives of the EAC Treaty.  
Article 104.1 provides:  
[T]he Partner States agree to adopt measures to achieve the free movement of persons, 
labour and services and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of establishment and 
residence of their citizens within the Community.  
In order to ensure the realisation of the stated migration rights, Article 104.3 provides for some 
of the measures that the Partner States should put in place and these include: easing border 
crossing by citizens of the Partner States; maintaining common standard travel documents for 
their citizens; effecting reciprocal opening of border posts, maintaining common employment 
policies, programmes and legislation, among others.  
Despite these implementation provisions of Article 104, it fails to specifically mention the 
harmonisation of (im)migration laws which is necessary for establishing a uniform EAC free 
movement of persons regime. Instead, and much in tune with Article 76, it emphasises more 
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the harmonisation of the labour related aspect of migration rights. However, for purposes of 
this research, which is not specifically on free movement of labour, free movement of workers 
shall be discussed together with free movement of persons, save for instances where a separate 
discussion of either is deemed appropriate. 
Both Articles 76 and 104 envisage the conclusion, respectively, of a Protocol on the Common 
Market2, and a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services and the Right of 
Establishment and Residence3, to give effect to their provisions. The EAC Protocol 
Establishing the Common Market (hereinafter, the Common Market Protocol or CMP) is 
presently in force, and it incorporates the requirements of the latter Protocol hence negating its 
need. It is actually explained in the preamble of the Common Market Protocol that the EAC 
Council of Ministers decided to conclude one protocol covering the provisions of both Articles 
76 and 104 of the EAC Treaty4. Consequently, the main objective of the EAC common market 
is the ‘realisation of accelerated economic growth and development through the attainment of 
the free movement of goods, persons, labour, the rights of establishment and residence, the free 
movement of services and capital’5. The Common Market Protocol is thus the core EAC 
instrument that details out the specificities of migration rights in the EAC. Suffice to note that 
the CMP, owing to its provisions on the free movement of services6 and to some extent the 
right of establishment, is notified with the WTO under GATS Article V.7(a)7 as an agreement 
liberalising trade in services. However, since the free movement of services does not exactly 
fall into the thesis definition of migration rights, a discussion on this aspect of economic and 
trade law lies outside the scope of this thesis.  
                                                          
 
2 EAC Treaty EAC Treaty Article 76.4. 
3 EAC Treaty Article 104.2.  
4 CMP preamble para. 4. The long title of the Protocol likewise notes that the Protocol is ‘made pursuant to 
Articles 76 and 104 of the Treaty’. 
5 Ibid para 6. 
6 CMP Articles 16-23. 
7 The Article provides for notification of regional trade agreements to the Council for Trade in Services. This 
notification is also an obligation under the CMP Article 56.2. Important to note is that with respect to the 
provisions on free movement of services as laid down in the CMP, the latter borrows heavily from the GATS 
provisions.  For an elaborate discussion on how the CMP incorporates the GATS see WTO ‘Factual 
presentation: economic integration agreement East African Community Common Market (services)’ Report by 
the EAC Secretariat to the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements available at rtais.wto.org, accessed 
on 24 April 2017. 
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4.2 Migration rights under the EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP) 
Article 2.4 of the CMP lists the gist of the Protocol as including provisions on: the free 
movement of persons, the free movement of labour, the right of establishment and the right of 
residence. For the attainment of these freedoms and rights, Article 5.2 provides for measures 
to be undertaken by the Partner States. These measures which elaborate upon those enumerated 
in Article 104.3 of the EAC Treaty include: i) easing cross-border movement of persons and 
eventually adopting an integrated border management system; ii) removing restrictions on 
movement of labour, harmonising labour policies, programmes, laws, social services, 
providing social security benefits and establishing common standards and measures for 
association of workers and employers, establishing employment promotion centres and 
adopting a common employment policy, and; iii) removing restrictions on the right of 
establishment and residence of nationals of other Partner States in their territory8. 
With regard to migration rights, the CMP specially provides for them and the obligations of 
Partner States under various Articles as follows: free movement of persons (Articles 7-9); free 
movement of workers (Articles 10-12); right of establishment (Article 13); and right of 
residence (Article 14). The implementation of each of these freedoms and rights is provided 
for in respective regulations that are annexed to the CMP. The CMP and its annexes form an 
integral part of the EAC Treaty9. The presentation that follows is of each of the various 
migration rights as provided for in the CMP and the respective regulations. 
  4.2.1 Free movement of persons 
Article 7 of the CMP provides for the free movement of persons who are nationals of Partner 
States within the EAC. The free movement of persons within the EAC is based on the principle 
of non-discrimination10 whereby nationals of other Partner States should enjoy the right to free 
movement in a host Partner State on equal standing with its nationals. Consequently, EAC 
Partner States are obliged to ensure free entry of each other’s nationals into their respective 
territories without a visa; to ensure their free movement within the State and to allow them to 
stay on the territory of the State for the period stipulated; and to allow them free exit without 
                                                          
 
8 CMP Article 5.2 paras (b-d). 
9 EAC Treaty Article 151.4; CMP Article 1 defines Treaty to mean the EAC Treaty and any annexes and 
protocols thereto, while Article 52 specifically provides that annexes to the CMP are an integral part of the 
CMP. 
10 CMP Article 7.2 and Article 3.2 para (a) provide for the principle of non-discrimination within the EAC on 
grounds of nationality. 
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restriction11. Restrictions on the free movement of persons may only be applied by a Partner 
State on grounds of public policy, public security or public health12. 
For purposes of ensuring uniformity of implementation of the provisions of Article 7 among 
the Partner States, regulations on the free movement of persons were passed13. These 
regulations apply to nationals of a Partner State who travel to another Partner State for purposes 
of visiting, seeking medical treatment, transiting, study and any other lawful purpose other than 
as a worker or self-employed person14. Citizens moving in between Partner States are required 
to use legally designated entry and exit points and also to comply with the established 
immigration procedures of a Partner State15. At such designated entry or exit points, a citizen 
is required to produce a valid ‘common standard travel document or a national identity card 
(ID)’, and to ‘declare all information required for entry or exit’16. Once this is complied with, 
the citizen shall be issued with a pass to enter and stay on the territory of the host Partner State 
for a period of up to six months17. This period may be extended upon application by the citizen 
with justification for a longer stay18.  
The regulations do not spell out the specific or detailed measures that all of the Partner States 
must implement to actualise the free movement of persons, but they provide guidelines of 
generalised areas of action in accordance with Article 104.3 of the EAC Treaty and Article 5.2 
of the CMP. These include: easing of border crossing for citizens of the Partner State; reciprocal 
opening of border posts; manning of border posts for twenty four hours; the necessary 
infrastructure and standards for border management; and harmonisation of immigration 
procedures19. Although the regulations mention the need to harmonise immigration procedures, 
it does not mention harmonisation of immigration laws of Partner States. This could partly be 
due to the fact that regulation of migration is one of the contentious areas in which States retain 
significant control and may not readily cede their sovereignty, not even for integration 
purposes. 
                                                          
 
11 Ibid Article 7.2. 
12 CMP Article 7.5. 
13 The East African Community Common Market (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations, Annex I to the 
CMP. 
14 Ibid regulation 4 paras (a-e). 
15 Ibid regulation 5.1.  
16 Ibid regulation 5.2 paras (a-b). 
17 Ibid regulation 5.3. 
18 Ibid regulations 5.4 & 5.5. 
19 Ibid regulation 8. 
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It is also worth noting that the regulations do not provide for denial or cancellation of passes 
as the regulations on other migration rights do. Probably because, the passes are for a short 
term compared to the passes and permits issued under the other migration rights provisions. 
As regards implementing the provisions of free movement of persons within the EAC, the visa 
requirements for citizens of the Community were abolished in all the Partner States. One only 
requires a valid national passport to travel within the EAC. Of recent, the Governments of 
Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have accepted the use of valid national IDs in lieu of passports as 
valid travel documents by their nationals moving in between these Partner States. The 
Government of Tanzania has categorically refused to recognise national IDs as valid travel 
documents, while the Government of Burundi is also still quite hesitant.  
Furthermore, in the spirit of facilitating free movement of persons, an East African Passport 
was officially launched in 1999. Every national of an EAC Partner State is entitled to the EAC 
passport upon application and payment of a fee of ten US dollars ($10)20. The EAC passport is 
not yet widely used throughout the Community. This could be due to the fact that it is used in 
parallel with national passports which have international recognition and yet the EAC passport 
is only recognised within the EAC21. Hence national passports are more valuable than the EAC 
passport. Additionally, the recognition of national IDs as travel documents might prove to be 
more convenient and thus further discourage citizens from acquiring an EAC passport.  
Travel documents aside, citizens of EAC countries are also required to fill in immigration forms 
at the border posts, just like any other foreigners entering and exiting any of the EAC Partner 
States. These immigration forms have been harmonised throughout the Community. 
Upon close scrutiny, it seems like the provisions on free movement of persons as laid down in 
the CMP are more concerned about harmonising and easing formalities at the border posts, and 
not so much as granting free movement as may be understood in the sense of intra-state free 
movement. In other words, save for less requirements when entering another Partner State, 
EAC citizens still have to go through virtually the same procedures as other foreigners. Hence, 
movement of EAC citizens within the EAC cannot be said to be exactly free as it is still subject 
                                                          
 
20 http://eac.int/travel/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112-eapassport&catid=42-travelling-
in-ea&Itemid=78. The fees too are bound to change with the adoption of an e-passport- 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EAC-to-start-issuing-electronic-passport/-/2558/2398648/-/q76opa/-
/index.html accessed on 11 December 2015.  
21 Plans for the EAC passport to be internationally recognised are still underway.  
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to some regulation and bureaucratic procedures. When compared to, say, free movement of EU 
citizens within the Schengen area, the term ‘free’ movement within the EAC might seem like 
a misnomer. 
Furthermore, free movement of persons (other than workers and self-employed persons) is 
technically not correlated with the right of residence in the EAC legal framework. Citizens of 
the EAC who move to another Partner State for purposes other than work or business as self-
employed persons may stay on the territory of the host Partner State for up to six months and 
are not entitled to residence permits, but passes. This analysis shall be expounded upon under 
the section on the ‘right of residence’. 
In effect, what free movement of persons within the EAC entails is the right of citizens of 
Partner States to freely enter, stay and move in the territory of the host Partner State, and to 
freely exit the territory of any Partner State, subject to the administrative and immigration 
procedures of the host State. Compared to international human rights law, the EAC free 
movement of persons regime attempts to extend the guarantee of free movement, previously a 
preserve of only nationals of a State, to all citizens of the EAC Partner States. But then again, 
not exactly to the same extent, since border posts and immigration procedures are still 
significant under EAC law and yet they would be considered as barriers to free movement 
under international human rights law, if they were to be applied within a State territory. 
Consequently, EAC law may be said to guarantee EAC citizens protection from arbitrary denial 
of entry and exit as well as costly migration costs, but does not exactly attempt to protect them 
against administrative and bureaucratic immigration procedures as EAC citizens. Hence, they 
may still be denied entry or deported in the course of exercising their freedom of movement 
under Community law as illustrated in the Mukira Muhochi case (see below, chapter five). In 
the event of this happening, Community law then serves to augment the international human 
rights law position of one having a right to emigrate but not to immigrate.  
4.2.1.1  Free movement of workers 
In addition to the provisions on free movement of persons, the EAC Treaty and the CMP 
specifically provide for the free movement of workers who are nationals of Partner States 
within the EAC. A worker is defined in Article 1 of the CMP as ‘a person who performs 
services for and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration’. Article 10 of 
the CMP emphasises non-discrimination of nationals of Partner States in relation to 
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employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment22.  Key among the 
provisions on the movement of workers are the guarantees to ‘move freely within the territories 
of the Partner States’, and to ‘stay on the territory of a Partner State for the purpose of 
employment’23. Workers are also entitled to labour protection without discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, and so the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
the right to social security, among others, apply equally to nationals of other Partner States and 
nationals of the host Partner State24. The CMP also provides for the right of a worker to be 
accompanied by a spouse and a child, who may also be entitled to be employed or engage in 
any economic activity as self-employed persons25. Hence, the worker’s right to free movement 
is in effect extended to his or her spouse and children.  
Free movement of workers is subject to restrictions on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health26. There is a further restriction on employment of nationals of other Partner 
States in the public service of the host Partner State save for where the national laws of a Partner 
State permit27.  
In order to realise the free movement of workers, the Partner States are obliged: i) not to apply 
national laws or administrative procedures whose effect is to deny citizens of other Partner 
States employment that has been offered28; ii) to harmonise their labour laws, policies and 
programmes in order to facilitate the free movement of labour29, and iii) to harmonise their 
national social security policies, laws and systems to provide for self-employed persons who 
are citizens of other Partner States30.  
The regulations on free movement of workers31 aim to ensure uniform implementation among 
Partner States of the provisions of Article 10 of the CMP32.  A citizen moving to work in another 
EAC Partner State is required to present a passport or national ID as well as a contract of 
                                                          
 
22 CMP Article 10.2. 
23 CMP Article 10.3. 
24 CMP Article 10.3 paras (e-f), Article 10.7 and Article 10.9. 
25 CMP Article 10.5.  
26 CMP Article 10.11.  
27 CMP Article 10.10. 
28 CMP Article 10.9. 
29 CMP Article 12.1. 
30 CMP Article 12.2. 
31 The East African Community Common Market (Free Movement of Workers) Regulations, Annex II to the 
CMP. 
32 Ibid regulation 2. 
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employment, and any other information that may be required at the immigration point33. The 
worker is then issued a pass valid for six months pending application for and issuance of a work 
permit which must be applied for within fifteen days of arrival in the host Partner State34. Where 
the applicant’s employment is for a period not exceeding ninety days, the applicant will only 
be issued a special pass35. For employment exceeding ninety days, the applicant, upon meeting 
all requirements, shall be issued with a work permit valid for an initial period of two years 
renewable, but the duration of the work permit should not exceed the duration of the contract 
of employment36. 
The spouse and child of the worker only need to present a valid travel document and any other 
information required at the immigration point, upon which they are issued with a six-month 
pass. The spouse and child should apply for a dependant pass, which if issued shall be in 
accordance with the duration of the worker’s work permit37. Should the spouse or child of the 
worker obtain employment in the host Partner State, they too should apply for their own work 
permit38. 
The regulations provide for the denial and the cancellation of a work permit. In the case of a 
denial, the affected worker may appeal the decision according to the Partner State’s laws. 
Where the worker does not appeal or where the appeal is rejected, he or she and his or her 
family will have to leave the country39. In the case of permit cancellation, the worker is given 
thirty days, depending on the reason of cancellation, either to regularise his or her status, or to 
leave the country40. 
The regulations additionally oblige Partner States to avail information on job vacancies; 
provide equal treatment in employment to all citizens of the Community, and ensure that their 
rights are equally upheld41. 
                                                          
 
33 Ibid regulation 5.2. 
34 Ibid regulations 5.4 & 6.1. Under regulation 6.3 a person already in the territory of a Partner State may secure 
employment in which case he or she is required to apply for a work permit within fifteen days of securing 
employment.  
35 Ibid regulations 6.4 & 6.5.  
36 Ibid regulations 6.7 & 6.8. 
37 Ibid regulations 5.5 & 9.1.  
38 Ibid regulation 9.2. 
39 Ibid regulation 7. 
40 Ibid regulation 8. 
41 Ibid regulations 12 & 13. 
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As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, for purposes of realising the aspirations of the 
Community law with regard to free movement of workers it is important that all laws that 
promote the free movement of labour such as the labour laws, taxation laws, social security 
etc. are harmonised42. In this regard, the CMP and the regulations on the free movement of 
workers aim to ensure such harmony and uniformity. As to whether the EAC Partner States are 
actually fulfilling their obligations or making considerable efforts to conform their laws, 
policies and practices to these norms is a matter warranting further exploration43. 
Overall, the provisions on the free movement of workers under the EAC framework are more 
detailed and elaborate compared to those on the free movement of persons. Apparently 
provisions on free movement of workers go beyond prescription of uniform migration 
formalities to more substantive guarantees of equal treatment of migrant workers and members 
of their families. The possible implication could be that economically active EAC citizens 
enjoy better migration rights guarantees than those that are not economically active- an 
indication of the predominance of the economic rationale for migration rights in the EAC. 
4.2.2 Right of establishment 
The right of establishment is provided for in Article 13 of the CMP. This right applies to both 
natural and legal persons (corporations and firms), as discussed earlier in chapter two. The right 
of establishment entitles a ‘national of a Partner State to take up and pursue economic activities 
as a self-employed person, and to set up and manage economic undertakings in the territory of 
another Partner State’44. Such self-employed persons are also entitled to join the social security 
scheme of a host Partner State in accordance with its laws45, as well as to join professional or 
trade organisations on equal footing with nationals of the host Partner State46.  The right of 
establishment is also in accordance to GATS Mode 4 on movement of natural persons 
                                                          
 
42Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association and Others v Bosman and Others 
[1995] ECR I-4921 para 94; Case C-224/02 Heikki Antero Pusa v Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö 
[2004] ECR I-5763 paras 31 & 35. 
43This research shall not go into such detail as the immensity of the work on free movement of workers can only 
be adequately covered in a separate research. For more on labour legislation among EAC countries, see paper by 
Flora M Musonda ‘Migration legislation in East Africa’ 2006 International Migration Papers 82. 
44 CMP Article 13.3 para (a). 
45 CMP Article 13.3 para (b). 
46 EAC Regulations on the right of establishment regulation 12, see below note 48. 
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supplying services. Hence the relevant CMP provisions have to comply with the EAC Partner 
States’ GATS commitments47. 
According to the regulations on the right of establishment48, a national of a Partner State 
seeking to enter another Partner State as a self-employed person only need present a valid 
passport or national ID and declare all information required at the point of entry49. Just like any 
other East African exercising his or her freedom of movement. Following this, he or she and 
any accompanying members of their family shall be issued a six-month pass50 pending issuance 
of a work permit which must be applied for within thirty days from the date of entry51. The 
application for the work permit must be supported by, inter alia, proof of licence or any other 
permission necessary for the purpose of the establishment; proof of sufficient capital and other 
resources for the purpose of establishment; and proof that the applicant is engaged in the 
activity for which he or she has been licensed or given authority for52. The applicant may then 
be issued with a work permit equal in duration to the licence or permission granted for the 
establishment53.  
Similar provisions apply with regard to the denial and cancellation of the work permit54 as those 
discussed above under the regulations on the free movement of workers. 
The right of establishment is to be realised progressively in accordance with the schedule of 
the progressive liberalisation of services55. The EAC Council of Ministers is, however, 
responsible for overseeing the removal of restrictions to the right of establishment in all Partner 
States56. It is also responsible for approving the harmonised classification of work permits, 
forms, fees and procedures, both for the right of establishment and the right of residence57.  
Since 2009 when the CMP and its regulations came into force, there does not seem to be much 
progress made in implementing them. The liberalisation of services and realisation of other 
                                                          
 
47 A detailed presentation on how the EAC complies with the relevant GATS commitments can be found in 
WTO ‘Factual Presentation’ op cit note 7 at 8-15. 
48 The East African Community Common Market (Right of Establishment) Regulations, Annex III to the CMP. 
49 Ibid regulation 5.2. 
50 Ibid regulations 5.3 & 5.4. 
51 Ibid regulation 6.1.  
52 Ibid regulation 6.4. 
53 Ibid regulations 6.5 & 6.9. 
54 Ibid regulations 7 & 8. 
55 Ibid regulation 10.1. The East African Community Common Market Schedule of Commitments on the 
Progressive Liberalisation of Services is Annex V to the CMP.  
56 Ibid regulations 10.3- 10.6. 
57 Ibid regulation 6.10. Also regulation 6.5, EAC Regulations on the right of residence. 
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aspects of the right of establishment seem to be taking a rather slow course. One commentator 
dissatisfied with the progress of implementing these provisions of the CMP observed that: 
… nationals of EAC partner states are still subjected to lengthy and often frustrating 
procedures of acquiring work permits. The five partner states (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, and Uganda) still have different policies and procedures of acquiring work 
permits. The classification structure, application documents and fees required are all 
different. This has further complicated the administration of work permits and further 
prevented East Africans from enjoying the benefits of a common market58. 
By November 2014, at a meeting of the Sectoral Council of Ministers responsible for EAC 
Affairs and Planning, it was still noted that the provisions on work and residence permits for 
citizens of the Community had not yet been harmonised as envisaged59. What pertains in the 
various EAC countries shall be further explored in chapter six below. 
The overriding principle in the implementation of the right of establishment is that of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality60, or equality of treatment. Hence, nationals of other 
Partner States who wish to engage in business as self-employed persons should be accorded 
equal treatment as nationals of the host Partner State as they are exactly in the same situation61. 
States are therefore obliged to remove all legal and administrative obstacles to the right of 
establishment62, more so if they have an unjustified discriminatory effect against nationals of 
other Partner States. Differences in treatment will only be justified where there are lawful and 
objective justifications63.  
Article 13.10 of the CMP provides that ‘[t]he provisions of this Protocol shall not prejudice the 
application of national laws and administrative procedure and practices providing for special 
treatment for third parties accorded by individual Partner States on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health’. The provision seems to suggest that differential treatment on 
the basis of nationality is acceptable if it is justified under the specified grounds (public policy, 
public security or public health). If this is the case, such differential treatment among citizens 
of the EAC would fall squarely within the ‘lawful and objective justification criteria’ applicable 
                                                          
 
58 Andrew Luzze ‘EAC states should harmonise work permits’ Daily Monitor 2 July 2014. 
59 Gahiji ‘EAC legal team urged to harmonise regional work, residence permit rule’ News of Rwanda 4 
November 2014. 
60 CMP Article 13.2. 
61 See discussion in chapter two section 2.4 above. 
62 CMP Article 13.11; regulations 10.2, 10.3 & 10.4 EAC Regulations on the right of establishment. 
63 See Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] 
ECR I-4165. 
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to the right of establishment. What is, however, more confusing is the reference in Article 13.10 
to ‘third parties’. Under Article 1 of the CMP, ‘third parties’ are defined as ‘foreign countries 
or persons’.  Whether the term ‘foreign’ is in relation to the Community as a whole, or to the 
individual Partner States, it is not quite clear.  An almost similar provision with regard to the 
right of residence refers to ‘citizens of the other Partner States’64 and not ‘third parties’. It would 
therefore seem that the intention of Article 13.10 was to make provision for special treatment 
of citizens of other Partner States and not third parties in the sense of persons from outside the 
Community. An interpretation which deems ‘third parties’ as those foreign to the EAC might 
render Article 13.10 either quite absurd or rather misplaced, unless it is used in a sense that 
takes cognisance of the most favoured nation principle under GATS Article V. This is one of 
the provisions that would greatly benefit from judicial interpretation. 
On the whole, the provisions on the right of establishment under the CMP seem to capture the 
gist of the normative content of the right as discussed in chapter two. What remains to be seen 
is whether EAC citizens are actually benefitting from these provisions in the various Partner 
States. This shall be explored subsequently in chapter six. 
4.2.3 Right of residence 
Article 14 of the CMP provides for the right of residence. Under the CMP, the right of residence 
is available only to citizens of other Partner States who are workers or self-employed persons, 
and their spouses, children or dependants65. All such persons who meet these requirements shall 
be issued with a residence permit66. 
The regulations on the right of residence67 once more emphasise the categories of persons to 
which they apply, that is, a worker, a self-employed person, and their spouse, child or 
dependant68. A work permit is therefore one of the required documents that should support a 
residence permit application69.  Similarly, an applicant for a dependant pass (the spouse, child 
or dependant) must present, inter alia, a copy of the work permit or residence permit of the 
worker or self-employed person’ and ‘a document proving the relationship with the worker or 
                                                          
 
64 CMP Article 14.6 on the right of residence provides: ‘The provisions of this Article shall not affect any 
provisions of national laws, administrative procedures and practices of a Partner State which would be more 
favourable to citizens of the other Partner States’. 
65 CMP Articles 14.1 & 14.2; regulation 4, EAC Regulations on the right of residence. 
66 CMP Article 14.3. 
67 The East African Community Common Market (Right of Residence) Regulations, Annex IV to the CMP. 
68 Ibid regulations 5.1, 6.2 & 8.  
69 Ibid regulation 6.3.  
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self-employed person’70. The duration of the residence permit or dependant pass is determined 
by the duration of the work permit71. The renewal of a residence permit is, therefore, subject to 
the renewal of the work permit72.  
The CMP recognises that Partner States may, in accordance with their national laws and 
procedures, provide more favourable treatment to citizens of other Partner States73. One 
possible interpretation of this is that a Partner State may extend the scope of persons to whom 
they may avail the right of residence. Hence, the right of residence for EAC citizens, other than 
workers, self-employed persons and members of their families, is not exactly regulated by 
Community law, but is at each State’s discretion.  Likewise, the decision to grant permanent 
residence is solely within the remit of the individual Partner States74.  
The right of residence is also subject to limitations on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health75.  Where any of these grounds is applied, the affected persons will be expelled 
from the host Partner State76. A person may also be expelled if he or she breaches or fails to 
fulfil the conditions of the resident permit77. On the other hand, a person (including members 
of his or her family) shall be deported where he or she has been denied a permit and any 
resulting appeal has been rejected; where a permit or dependant pass has been cancelled; and 
where the affected person or persons have failed to leave the territory of the host State within 
the time specified by the competent authority78. 
It has been noted that the right of residence, under international human rights law, goes hand 
in hand with the right to free movement. EU law similarly recognises the right of residence as 
correlative to the free movement of persons. The right of residence under regional integration 
is understood to mean the right to settle anywhere within the territory of the Community. In 
the EAC, the right of residence apparently does not apply to all citizens of the Community. It 
is only those citizens of other Partner States who have been granted work permits, either as 
workers or self-employed persons, that are guaranteed the right of residence in the Community.  
                                                          
 
70 Ibid regulation 8.3 paras (b-c). 
71 Ibid regulations 7.1 & 7.2.  
72 Ibid regulation 7.6. 
73 CMP Article 14. 6. 
74 CMP Article 14.7. 
75 CMP Article 14.4.  
76 EAC Regulations on the right of residence regulation 11.1 para (a). 
77 Ibid regulation 11.1 para (b). 
78 Ibid regulation 12. 
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This could explain why in the sequential articulation of migration rights in the CMP and its 
annexes, the right of residence comes after the right of establishment and not after the free 
movement of persons as is usually the norm.  
Comparing the right of residence in the EAC and in the EU, it is apparent that the scope of 
application of the EAC right of residence is more restrictive than in the EU where the right of 
residence applies to all citizens of the Union without the need for them to be economically 
active79. The EU law, however only grants such an unconditional right of residence to any EU 
citizen staying on the territory of another Member State for a period not longer than three 
months. For those EU citizens who are not economically active but wish to stay longer than 
three months, they must register for a registration certificate, which shall be granted upon proof 
that they have sufficient financial resources and comprehensive sickness insurance cover.  In 
contrast, the EAC provides for a longer pass: citizens of other Partner States may stay on the 
territory of a host Partner State for a period not longer than six months, and such pass may be 
renewed where justifiable. Additionally, there is no requirement for non-economically active 
EAC citizens to prove sufficient funds or sickness insurance cover whilst exercising their 
freedom of movement within the Community.   
The six-month pass issued to citizens of other EAC Partner States entitles them to stay on the 
territory of the host Partner State for that duration. This could be interpreted to mean that a 
right of residence is implicit within the six-month pass for EAC citizens who are neither 
workers nor self-employed persons nor members of their families, should they wish to stay for 
that long. This interpretation is even more plausible under human rights law, which underlies 
the EAC Treaty as one of its fundamental and operational principles. Therefore, while the right 
of residence of workers, self-employed persons and members of their families is expressly 
guaranteed in the CMP, that of EAC citizens that are not economically active is implied within 
their right to free movement. In any case the CMP gives Partner States leeway to implement 
national measures that may be more favourable to citizens of other Partner States80. It would 
therefore be worth looking into if any of the various Partner States issues residence permits 
                                                          
 
79 Case C-200/02 Kunquian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-413/99 Baumbast, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-
7091 para 84. 
80 CMP Article 14.6. 
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(instead of six-month passes) to EAC citizens who are not economically active, and if so, under 
what conditions such permits may be granted.  
4.3 Non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination on grounds of nationality is one of the principles of the EAC common 
market81. There are a number of provisions of the CMP which emphasise this principle82. In 
fact the principle cuts across all the migration rights discussed above, save for the right of 
residence where there is no singular express provision guaranteeing non-discrimination. A 
possible explanation for this could be that the right of residence applies to persons who already 
benefit from the provisions on free movement of workers and the right of establishment. Non-
discrimination for such persons would thus already be guaranteed in either category. 
Moreover, the CMP is guided by the fundamental and operational principles stipulated in 
Articles 6 and 7 of the EAC Treaty. As these principles take into cognisance the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and ‘other universally accepted standards of human 
rights’83, the principle of non-discrimination as regards migration rights should be interpreted 
and applied in accordance thereto.  
4.4 Limitations and conditions 
All migration rights under the EAC regime are subject to limitations. The free movement of 
persons and workers, the right of establishment and the right of residence may all be limited 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Whenever a Partner State imposes 
any of these limitations, it should notify other Partner States84. This provision, which 
immediately follows the limitation clause on all migration rights in the CMP, can be said to act 
as a check on what might be a Partner State’s unilateral arbitrary and high-handed actions that 
would go against the spirit of the Treaty. In fact, the EACJ has held that the provision creates 
an obligation on a Partner State imposing a limitation to notify other Partner States accordingly, 
otherwise the Partner State would be in breach of its Treaty obligations85.   
                                                          
 
81 CMP Article 3.2 para (a). 
82 Examples of provisions of the CMP that emphasise non-discrimination: Articles 7.2, 10.2, 10.3 para (c), 10.7, 
13.2, 13.5, 13.6 and 13.11 para (e). 
83 EAC Treaty Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 respectively. 
84 CMP Articles 7.6, 10.12, 13.8 & 14.5. 
85 Samuel Mukira Mohochi v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011 
paras 113-116. 
113 
 
The regulations on migration rights also require that citizens of other Partner States ‘comply 
with the established migration procedures’86 of the host Partner State. This provision not only 
confirms the sovereignty of each of the Partner States over migration matters, but it assumes 
that all Partner States have conformed their migration procedures to Community law 
requirements. For as long as the national procedures and laws referred to in the CMP are not 
brought into conformity with Community law  nor harmonised among the Partner States, they 
may constitute a restriction on the migration rights of community citizens. This was clearly 
illustrated in the Mukira Muhochi case, which shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Article 54 of the CMP, moreover, provides for the right of redress where one’s rights and 
liberties as provided for in the Protocol have been infringed. Hence, a Partner States application 
of limitations may be challenged either in the national courts or in the EACJ.  
Before delving into an in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence of the EACJ on migration rights, 
one of the pertinent issues that begs discussion is determining who the subjects of the migration 
rights in the EAC are. Although in the preceding discussions, the term ‘community citizens’ 
has been used, the EAC laws hardly use this term. The formulation favoured in the texts of the 
EAC laws is ‘citizen or national of a Partner State’. Considering that the framers of the Treaty 
and its Protocols took such care to avoid using the term ‘community citizen’ or ‘citizen of the 
Community’, say as used in the EU law or even the ECOWAS law’, does this mean that the 
concept of community citizen does not apply in the EAC? This may appear more like a mere 
technicality but it is an issue of crucial significance to migration rights. 
4.5 Citizens of Partner States or community citizens? Nationalism versus community 
in the EAC 
The EAC Treaty, the CMP and its annexes prefer to refer to the subject of migration rights as 
‘citizen or national of a Partner State’. In fact the term citizen under Article 1 of the CMP is 
defined to mean ‘a national of a Partner State’. Accordingly, virtually all the provisions in the 
Treaty and the CMP wherever the word ‘citizen’ appears, it is qualified as ‘citizen of the Partner 
State’ or ‘citizen of other Partner States’87, as the case may be. The only exception in the CMP 
                                                          
 
86 EAC Regulations on free movement of persons, regulation 5.1; Regulations on the free movement of workers 
regulation 5.1; Regulations on the right of establishment regulation 5.1. 
87 For example, EAC Treaty Article 104.1 & 104.3 paras (a & b) refer to Partner States and their citizens or 
citizens of the Partner States; CMP Articles 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 8, 10, 12.2, 14 & 39 contain the phrase ‘citizen of the 
[other] Partner State’. 
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seems to be Article 50.4 where the word ‘citizen’ is used in a way that is not so specific. 
Paragraph (b) of the Article provides for an annual review by the Council which shall ‘include 
an assessment of the results achieved in the realisation and enjoyment of the freedoms and 
rights of citizens guaranteed under this Protocol’. Herein, ‘citizen’ could be understood in the 
broader sense of ‘community citizens’ (refer to discussion in chapter two) or it might be 
interpreted in a narrow and nationalistic sense denoted in the CMP definition of ‘nationals of 
a Partner State’. 
The definition and application of the word ‘citizen’ in the EAC’s key instruments could suggest 
some hesitation on the part of the EAC States to fully embrace ‘community citizenship’ and all 
it entails. To this extent it could be argued that the new EAC has indeed inherited the 
nationalistic tendencies that were prevalent in the old EAC. However, the context of the EAC 
has changed and when one critically analyses the EAC instruments, and even looks beyond 
them, there is an undeniable reference to and understanding of the concept of EAC citizens or 
community citizens.  
The definition of ‘citizen’ itself, as provided in the CMP could be interpreted as emphasising 
the derivative nature of community citizenship. That is to say that a ‘community citizen’ should 
be and is in fact a citizen or national of a Partner State. Conversely stated, a citizen or national 
of a Partner State is a community citizen. Going by this interpretation, the EAC definition of 
‘citizen’ is in a way comparable with the EU Treaty which recognises every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State as a citizen of the Union. The only difference lies in the fact that 
in the EU instruments the phrase ‘citizen of the union’ is expressly used in various relevant 
provisions, which is not the case with the EAC instruments.  
Moreover, reading the definition of ‘citizen’ in light of the objectives of the EAC Treaty 
favours the broader interpretation of community citizen. Two main objectives particularly 
stand out: first, the desire to strengthen social, cultural and traditional ties in order to promote 
a people-centred development; and second, the ultimate establishment of a political federation. 
While the first objective seems to presume some kind of bond among the East African peoples, 
a bond similar to that referred to in Re Nottebohm88, the possibility of a federation justifies 
                                                          
 
88 Nottebohm case (second phase), Judgement of April 6th, 1955, I.C.J. Reports 1955. Refer to chapter 2 above 
section 2.7.1. 
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further the former objective, making the notion of a ‘community citizen’ more plausible than 
not.  
The objectives and aspirations expressed in the EAC Treaty are further bolstered by other 
evidence which supports the applicability of this concept within the EAC. The EAC passport, 
for instance, could be said to provide prima facie evidence of EAC citizenship. At the very 
least, it demonstrates that there is a two-tiered citizenship within the EAC, that is the national 
citizenship validated by a national passport, and community citizenship validated by the EAC 
passport, although the latter is determined by the former.  
Furthermore and despite of the absence of the term in virtually all EAC legal instruments, the 
pervasive use of the words ‘East Africans’, ‘East African citizens’ and even ‘community 
citizens’ renders them common parlance within East Africa. These terms are used in several 
documents emanating from the EAC secretariat89, by a number of authors90, but most notable 
of all is the EAC Draft Bill of Human Rights. In addition to using the term ‘East Africans’ in 
a couple of provisions91, the Draft Bill provides for duties of individuals among which are: 
preserving and strengthening the national independence and territorial integrity of East Africa; 
preserving and strengthening social and regional solidarity in East Africa; and paying taxes 
imposed by law in the interest of the Community92. As discussed in chapter two, citizenship 
must be both formal or nominal and substantive. Substantive in the sense that one is a member 
of a polity in which one’s status is defined by one’s rights and obligations93. By providing for 
both rights and duties of citizens, the EAC Draft Bill of Rights, although not yet an official 
document of the Community and hence has no binding power, buttresses the applicability and 
                                                          
 
89 For example, The EAC Development Strategy (2011/12-2015/16) makes numerous references to ‘East African 
People’ or ‘East Africans’- pp. 27, 30, 35, 37, 48 & 53. On p. 69 mention is particularly made of an ‘East 
African citizenry’. The Report of the Committee on Fast-tracking East African Federation (Wako committee 
report) (2004) paras 62, 65 & 206 similarly make references to ‘East Africans’, ‘citizens of East Africa’, or 
‘people of East Africa’. The Secretary General’s speeches usually contain the term ‘East Africans’- see 
http://www.sg.eac.int/. 
90 For example, John Oucho ‘Prospects of free movement in the East African Community’ (2013) 3 Regions and 
Cohesion 116; Deng K Biong, ‘Sub-regional legal instruments on international migrants’ rights and their 
implementation mechanisms: the case of the East African Community’ (2010) 39 Africa Insight 149-163; 
Korwa Gombe Adar ‘Fast-tracking federation: a problematic dynamic?’ in Rok Ajulu (ed) A Region in 
Transition: Towards a New Integration Agenda in East Africa (2010) 74-78; Kituo Cha Katiba Citizenship and 
Identity Struggles in East Africa: Towards More Inclusive Policies and Practices (2005) as cited in Oucho at 
116 &121. 
91 The EAC Draft Bill of Rights Article 13.2 provides: ‘All East Africans shall have the right and the 
opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs of the Community….’ In similar vein Article 38.1 
provides: ‘All East Africans have the right to participate in the affairs of the Community….’ 
92 EAC Draft Bill of Rights Article 43.4 paras (d-f). 
93 See chapter two section 2.7.1 above. 
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reality of a ‘community citizen’ in the EAC as the subject of the rights guaranteed under 
Community law. 
The EACJ has not specifically addressed the concept of ‘community citizen’ as an issue arising 
in any of the cases before it. When referring to the subjects of the Treaty rights, the court 
usually sticks to the Treaty formulation of ‘citizen of a Partner State’94, save in one case where 
it actually used the term ‘community citizens’ to collectively refer to nationals of EAC Partner 
States95.  While adjudicating on the limitation clause contained in Article 30.2 of the EAC 
Treaty, the EACJ juxtaposed the applicant’s personal interest to prosecute his case with the 
interest of other ‘citizens of the East African Community’ to ensure legal certainty. It concluded 
that the importance of Article 30.2 was ‘to balance the interest of the individual complainant 
against the collective interests of all the other community citizens’ 96(emphasis added). It can 
thus be said that although not officially decided upon by the Court, the concept of community 
citizens or EAC citizens is one of which the court is consciously, or perhaps sub-consciously 
aware. 
Bearing in mind the correlation between migration rights and community citizenship, the 
guarantee of these rights within the EAC presumably leads to the conclusion that the subjects 
of these rights are community citizens, and that any reference to ‘citizen’ as used in the Treaty 
should have a communalistic rather than a narrow nationalistic import. In fact, in a rather 
astonishing turn, the regulations on the free movement of workers provide for the obligation of 
Partner States to ‘facilitate access to employment opportunities by the citizens of the 
Community’97 (emphasis added). This rather unique provision presents a clear departure from 
the strikingly ubiquitous ‘citizen(s) of a Partner State’ formulation contained in the EAC Treaty 
and the CMP.  
In light of the above arguments, it is highly probable that the definition of ‘citizen’ contained 
in the CMP could be interpreted in more than one way. One being the narrow nationalistic 
sense, and the other to mean ‘community citizen’. However, if the narrow sense were adhered 
to, then the letter of the law would be at odds with the broader objectives and spirit of the 
Community. This discussion has in essence asserted that the subjects of migration rights within 
                                                          
 
94 Mukira Mohochi case supra note 85. 
95 Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda and Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya v Omar Awadh 
and 6 Others, EACJ, Appeal No. 2 of 2012. 
96 Ibid paras 51-52. 
97 EAC Regulations on the free movement of workers regulation 12.1. 
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the EAC are indeed community citizens, a term which though not admitted nor expressly used 
within the text of the Community law, is very much inferred. Such inference can aptly be 
summed up by the following observation by the EACJ: 
‘The Treaty also defines persons, formerly foreign nationals as between the individual 
EAC states prior to entry into force of the Treaty, as nationals or citizens of Partner 
States,(see: Article 1 of the Protocol) The Treaty accorded these persons wide ranging, 
preferential and superior treatment and rights in terms of movement, establishment, 
residence and working within the Partner States’98. 
 
4.6 EAC citizenship and migration rights: shortcomings and some practical 
dilemmas  
In order to enjoy the migration rights under the EAC common market, one has to be a citizen 
or national of a Partner State. In most of the East African countries, the definition of ‘citizen’ 
or ‘national’ tends to be ethnocentric99, whether overtly or in a nuanced manner. For instance, 
the Constitution of Uganda provides in its Article 10 for citizenship by birth for every person 
born in Uganda ‘one of whose parents or grandparents is or was a member of any of the 
indigenous communities existing and residing within the borders of Uganda as at the first day 
of February 1926’. It goes on to provide that every person one of whose parents was a citizen 
by birth may also acquire citizenship by birth100. The law on nationality in Burundi, recognises 
nationality by birth where one’s father is Burundian by nationality. This is regardless of 
whether one is born in or outside Burundi. A Burundian mother may pass on nationality to an 
illegitimate child or a child that has been repudiated by his or her father101. The Constitution of 
Kenya, in Article 13.2 provides that ‘citizenship may be acquired by birth or registration’, 
                                                          
 
98 Mukira Mohochi case supra note 85 para 48. 
99 Bronwen Manby Struggles for Citizenship in Africa (2009) 30-31; See also Francis Deng ‘Ethnic 
marginalization as statelessness: lessons from the Great Lakes Region of Africa’ in T Alexander Aleinikoff & 
Douglas Klusmeyer (eds) Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices (2001) 184, 189. He argues that 
citizenship in Africa is ‘predicated on elements of ethnic and cultural affiliation’, with the “tribe” as the salient 
element. Both Deng and Bronwen seem to agree that African concepts of citizenship are ethnocentric which 
may result into exclusion of some groups or communities that are not recognised as indigenous ethnic groups of 
that particular State. The role of ethnicity has been expounded upon in a working paper by the present author: 
Caroline Nalule ‘The concept of community citizenship in the East African Community: the role of ethnicity’ 
(A paper presented at a conference organised by the East African School of Diplomacy, Governance and 
International Studies at Uganda Martyrs’ University Nkozi 15 April 2015). 
100 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 as amended. 
101 Loi No 1/013 du 18 juillet 2000 portant réforme du code de la nationalité, Laws of Burundi Section 3. 
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however, citizenship by birth does not necessarily mean jus soli- born on the soil, but rather 
that either one of one’s parents is a citizen102. The Rwandan definition of citizenship too has 
undertones of ethnocentrism, but it could be said to be remedial as well:  Article 7 provides for 
nationality by origin, that is, Rwandan origin- probably in attempt to restore the status of those 
Rwandans in exile who had previously been deprived of their nationality, hence the mention 
of specific dates between 1959 and 1994103. Of all the East African countries, Tanzania’s 
definition of ‘citizen’ seems to be more inclusive, without nuances of ethnicity or emphasis on 
descent. Hence it might be seen as exceptional. The Tanzania law provides that citizenship may 
be acquired by birth by everyone born in Tanzania, but either of that person’s parents should 
be a citizen104.  
The implications of an ethnocentric definition of citizenship is that persons who fall outside 
the legally recognised ethnic groups shall not be accepted or recognised as nationals or citizens 
regardless of how long they or their generations have been on the territory of that particular 
State. This results into statelessness.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has highlighted some causes 
of statelessness as including: conflict of nationality laws which may affect children born 
abroad, especially where such laws emphasise jus sanguinis transmission of nationality; gender 
and ethnic discrimination; and administrative obstacles which usually take the form of 
bureaucratic procedures and official discrimination105. Although the number of stateless 
persons in East Africa is not known, the mentioned causes of statelessness are widespread in 
the region leading to a high probability that there is a considerable number of stateless persons 
and groups. For example the Nubians in Kenya were for a long time not recognised as nationals, 
a matter that was presented before the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (ACERWC). The Committee found in favour of the Nubian children and 
recommended that the Kenyan government take all necessary measures to ensure that children 
of Nubian descent that were otherwise stateless acquired Kenyan nationality106. 
                                                          
 
102 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 14.1 & 14.2. 
103 The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003.  
104 The Tanzania Citizenship Act, 1995 Sections 5 & 6. 
105 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Solidarity, 2012 15-16, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5100fec32.html.accessed on 29 October 2015. 
106 ACERWC Communication No. 002/09, IHRDA and Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) (on behalf of 
children of Nubian descent in Kenya) v Kenya. 
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The East African countries also host a number of refugees some of whom originate from among 
the Partner States themselves. For instance Tanzania hosts refugees from Burundi, Burundi 
hosts refugees from Rwanda and vice versa107. A number of refugees of Rwandan origin have 
settled in other Partner States for a long period of time; some of these especially their children 
may not have citizenship either of the host State or the State of origin (although the Constitution 
of Rwanda seeks to remedy this). This presents a dilemma regarding the EAC definition of 
‘citizen’, which rather than alleviate the problem only perpetuates it. Such persons are for all 
intents and purposes East Africans, their origin is indisputably an East African Partner State, 
but since they lack national citizenship they cannot be recognised as community citizens. 
Therefore they cannot exercise their migration rights despite belonging to the Community. This 
is one area that the EAC needs to address as it seeks to consolidate regionalism and establish a 
political federation. 
Other groups of peoples that are of concern are the cross-border communities and the nomadic 
pastoralist communities within East Africa. The EAC ‘citizen’ definition may not necessarily 
adversely affect people belonging to cross-border communities if they are recognised as 
nationals of the Partner States where they belong.  In fact regional integration might actually 
provide a solution to this colonial injustice. The migration rights regime under the CMP might, 
however, affect them. For the cross-border communities, national borders have never really 
existed. As Biong explains, these groups of people ‘continue to maintain their historical 
identities in-tact and thus do not necessarily respect states’ boundaries. They informally move 
across these boundaries at will, with a view to carrying out family businesses with their kin and 
kiths [sic], who, as a result of the accident of political history, happen to be at the colonial 
wrong side of the border’108. The EAC free movement of persons provisions can be said to have 
formalised what was prior to informal, or to have legalised what was previously illegal. But 
this formalisation and regulation might not be seen in the same way as the affected 
communities. It might have bureaucratised or even made complex what was hitherto an easy-
come-easy-go affair among these communities. Whether or not this is the case remains to be 
seen.  
                                                          
 
107 UNHCR, 2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profiles for Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a6c6.html accessed on 29 October 2015. 
108 Biong op cit note 90 at 150. See also Oloka-Onyango, J. ‘Who owns the East African Community?’ a paper 
presented at a DENIVA Public Dialogue on the East African Community, held at Kampala, November 2005 
cited in Biong 152-153.  
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Nomadic pastoralists exist in almost all EAC countries109. It is not exactly clear how the EAC 
migration rights regime deals with this special group of peoples. They are definitely not 
covered under the free movement of workers’ provisions since they are not moving for 
purposes of employment. Neither are they covered by the right of establishment nor right of 
residence provisions since they are not setting up businesses nor seeking residence permits. 
They are also not moving goods, capitals or services to be covered under other common market 
provisions. They might probably be considered under the free movement of persons, but 
perhaps not! The regulations on the free movement of persons are quite clear as to whom they 
apply: visitors, students, those seeking medical treatment, those in transit, and those entering 
for any other lawful purpose. Would nomadic pastoralists qualify as persons entering for a 
lawful purpose? Probably not! Nomadic pastoralism as a way of life is characterised by 
movement or migration by groups in search of pasture for their livestock110.The EAC 
instruments are silent on this issue and it is therefore hard to find where exactly these groups 
fit within the EAC migration rights regime. The EAC needs to find some solutions on how to 
accommodate the right to free movement of nomadic pastoralists within its laws, regulations 
and policies.  
In light of the above discussion, migration rights within the EAC cannot yet be said to be 
applicable to all persons in the EAC, in the same way that ‘community citizens’ may not quite 
apply to all peoples of the East Africa. These can be deemed as technical flaws inherent in the 
Treaty and CMP, but which can be remedied to make the concept of community citizen all the 
more inclusive, and migration rights being applicable to all community citizens.  
4.7 Chapter conclusion 
Having looked at migration rights as provided for under EAC law, it remains unclear what their 
rationale is. On the face of it, it may seem quite obvious that their rationale and possible 
justification is essentially economic. This is so because, firstly, the CMP is the authoritative 
EAC document with regard to migration rights, giving the impression that migration rights of 
citizens of the EAC are tethered to the common market. Secondly, both the EAC Treaty and 
                                                          
 
109 Examples of nomadic pastoralist groups include: the Karimojong of Uganda, the Pokot of Kenya, and the 
Barbaig in Tanzania. 
110 AU, Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods 
and Rights of Pastoralist Communities (2010) 4, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/policy-
framework-pastoralism/ accessed on 31 October 2015. 
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CMP are registered with the WTO as regional trade agreements under the GATT and GATS 
(for purposes of this thesis, the GATS is of more relevance). This would imply that they fall 
under the realm of international economic law, which they do, but only in part111. The GATS 
only deals with trade in services (which includes labour integration agreements), but these are 
just some of the aspects of migration rights as discussed above. Hence the economic law 
coverage of migration rights is restricted. Even then, economic law focuses mainly on the 
liberalisation aspect of trade in services and not at the substance of the rights. Hence EAC law 
provides more substance to the rights than could probably be found under the GATS.  
If the EAC were a purely an economic integration project, it would make perfect sense for the 
migration rights to have a purely economic rationale. But since it is not, then the placement of 
all migration rights in the CMP could be delimiting. The placement of migration rights, in 
particular the free movement of persons and the right of residence, in the CMP not only narrows 
their applicability, but also suggests that their existence is dependent on the EAC common 
market. Should the common market fail or the CMP be abrogated, these rights might also cease 
to be. This suggestion, however, would be incongruous with the Community objectives of 
‘strengthening and consolidation of the long standing political, economic, social, cultural and 
traditional ties and associations between the peoples of the Partner States’, and the 
establishment of a political federation112. 
The EAC Draft Bill of Rights, though not yet adopted, provides an insight into what would be 
a more comprehensive and far-reaching approach to migration rights within the EAC. Article 
12 of the Draft Bill provides for the right of every person: ‘to move freely throughout East 
Africa and to reside and conduct business in any part of East Africa; to enter, leave and return 
to, East Africa; and to a passport or other travel document’. This provision fits more into the 
wide-ranging objectives of the EAC – migration rights are presented as fundamental rights and 
freedoms of all persons in the Community, and more specifically, all citizens of the 
Community. When juxtaposed with the CMP provisions on migration rights, Article 12 of the 
Draft Bill of Rights goes beyond the economic rationale of migration rights as presented in the 
                                                          
 
111 The EAC Treaty only mentions the WTO in its preamble to the effect that the EAC takes cognisance of the 
developments in the world economy as contained in the WTO agreement. However in Article 130.1 the Partner 
States undertake to honour their commitments in international organisations of which they are members. This 
includes the WTO, of which all EAC Partner States are members. Accordingly, the CMP in part incorporates the 
relevant provisions of the GATS in its provisions on free movement of services. See also above note 7 of this 
chapter. 
112 EAC Treaty Article 5. 
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CMP, and is much more reflective of citizens’ rights in the context of a polity- in this case the 
envisaged EAC political federation. 
Furthermore, the current definition of ‘citizen’ provided under EAC law is not only ambiguous, 
but also equivocal, in spite of the clear objectives of the Community. Thus, the EAC needs to 
adopt an unequivocal definition of ‘community citizen’, which is also comprehensive enough 
to reflect the reality of the various peoples that make up the EAC. In this sense, regionalism 
must be seen to transcend over nationalism, and this is what the EAC law should reflect in 
order to lay a sound normative foundation for the political federation.  
It has also been noted that the migration rights provisions are focussed more on formalities than 
the substantive aspects of the rights. This is especially so with the provisions on free movement 
of persons which seem to regulate movement of EAC citizens rather than ensure free 
movement. A comparison was made between the EAC and the EU where movement of EU 
citizens is relatively freer. However, the circumstances pertaining to each region should be 
appreciated. In contrast to the EU, the EAC is relatively nascent; it is a less developed region 
with various peace and security concerns which may necessitate a more cautious approach. It 
is also less technologically developed, hence monitoring movement may be problematic. 
Nevertheless EAC citizens need to benefit more from the substance than the formalities of 
migration rights. 
The next chapter attempts to examine and analyse how the EACJ, the judicial organ of the 
EAC, has interpreted and applied migration rights. Has it confined itself to applying these rights 
in a purely economic sense or has it adopted a human rights approach in its interpretation and 
application of migration rights? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE INTERPRETATION AND RATIONALISATION OF MIGRATION RIGHTS IN 
THE EAC: THE ROLE OF THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE1 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter follows up on the discussion from the previous chapter and seeks to analyse the 
interpretation and unfolding ideological conceptualisation of migration rights within the EAC, 
with particular attention to the role that is being prominently assumed by the East African Court 
of Justice (EACJ or ‘the Court’). The chapter shall therefore examine jurisprudence of the 
EACJ, against the background of its jurisdictional confines, in order to assess how migration 
rights in the EAC are being rationalised. Are these rights perceived in a purely economic sense 
or as fundamental rights and freedoms of EAC citizens? Has the EACJ adopted a human rights 
approach with regard to migration rights or does it view them as purely ‘economic or ‘market 
freedoms’?  
The EACJ’s jurisprudence on migration rights is quite sparse. By end of 2014, it had only 
adjudicated one case, on the merits, that discusses aspects of migration rights of EAC citizens. 
That is the case of Samuel Mukira Mohochi v The Attorney General of Uganda2. This case 
which shall be discussed in detail in a separate section in this chapter does not touch upon all 
migration rights. The case only discusses the free movement of community citizens, but it 
nonetheless canvasses several other issues such as non-discrimination, a Partner State’s 
sovereignty in managing migration as against its obligations under Community law; 
application of limitations on migration rights, and precedence of Community law over national 
law. The case is a landmark and it provides an indication on how the EACJ might view 
migration rights (free movement of persons, right of residence and rights of establishment) 
generally. It is argued herein that while the rationale for these rights in the EAC may not be a 
                                                          
 
1 A substantial part of this chapter has been re-written as an article, which has been accepted for publication and 
will appear in a revised form in Journal of African Law published by Cambridge University Press- Caroline 
Nalule ‘Defining the scope of free movement of citizens in the East African Community: The East African 
Court of Justice and its interpretive approach’ accepted for publication in Journal of African Law.  
2 Mukira Mohochi case, EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011- see below section 5.2. There are a couple of other cases 
that touch on free movement, but these were not dealt with in substance. Mbugua Mureithi wa Nyambura v The 
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda and the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, EACJ 
Reference No. 11 of 2011, a case that raised similar issues as those of the Mukira Mohochi case was dismissed 
on the grounds that it was filed outside the two-month limitation period. In East African Law Society v The 
Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi, EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2014, the issue was whether or not a ban 
prohibiting a Burundian citizen travelling out of his country had been issued in accordance with the laid down 
procedure. Hence it was more of a procedural than a substantive issue.  
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purely economic one, at the same time it is not one grounded in human rights. Rather the EACJ 
has devised a neutral ground that does not expressly endorse either of the rationales. Instead it 
perceives of migration rights as Treaty-guaranteed rights without much rationalisation on their 
theoretical basis.  
Any court, in interpreting the law, may avail itself to a number of interpretative approaches or 
techniques. Conway3 identifies several which include: i) the textual or literal meaning, which 
is based on the ordinary or technical meaning of the words; ii) teleological or purposive, which 
looks at the object and purpose of the legal instrument; and iii) historical or originalist, which 
looks at the intention of the framers4. Within these approaches, judges may in varying 
proportions rely on formal reasons (based on authoritative sources of law such as the 
Constitutions, Statutes, precedents on statutory interpretation, general principles of law etc.), 
and substantive reasons (based on moral, economic, social and political content and 
arguments)5. One of the contentions in this chapter is that the EACJ’s interpretative approach 
is preponderantly textual based on formal reasons, to which end the term ‘textual-formalism’ 
shall be applied herein. Moreover, the use of the term ‘formalism’ has also been associated 
with judicial-restraint or caution as opposed to judicial activism or pragmatism6. In a formalist 
model, courts tend to strictly uphold the separation of powers, viewing their role as ‘merely 
being to discern and apply -the "intent" of the legislature’7.  Hence the courts tend to do less 
gap-filling in the exercise of restraint or caution. Accordingly, the use of the term ‘textual-
formalism’ shall also connote judicial restraint or caution on the part of the EACJ. The textual-
formalism approach could, inter alia, be due to the jurisdictional limits of the EACJ.  
It is also argued that in the EAC, migration rights are definitely the linchpin of community 
citizenship, and that the latter concept may more or less be defined by the former. Hence, the 
role of the EACJ as well as national courts is critical for ensuring effective compliance with 
and protection of migration rights of citizens in the EAC. 
                                                          
 
3 Gerard Conway The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (2012) 19-21. 
4 There are other interpretation techniques he identifies such as consequentialist reasoning, evolutionary or 
innovative interpretation, and first versus second order justification. 
5 Robert Summers & Michele Taruffo ‘Interpretation and comparative analysis’ in D Neil MacCormick & 
Robert Summers (eds) Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (1991) 498-499. 
6 Richard Posner ‘Legal formalism, legal realism, and the interpretation of statutes and the constitution’ (1986-
87) 37 Case Western Law Reserve Law Review 180-181. 
7 William Eskridge ‘Dynamic statutory interpretation’ (1987) 135 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1489-
1490. 
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5.1 The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) 
The EACJ is established under Article 9 of the EAC Treaty as one of the organs of the 
Community. Under Article 9.4, the EACJ, just like all the other organs and institutions of the 
EAC is mandated to act within the limits of the powers conferred by the Treaty. Accordingly, 
chapter eight of the Treaty provides for the EACJ, its role; composition, appointment, tenure 
and removal of judges; jurisdiction, powers and mandate, among others. The role of the Court 
is stipulated as ensuring the ‘adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and 
compliance with’ the Treaty8. In interpreting this provision, the EACJ has asserted itself as ‘the 
final authoritative forum in matters of interpretation and application of the Treaty’9; and that 
despite any concurrent jurisdiction that the Treaty may confer on other Community or national 
institutions, the EACJ still remains with ‘jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty which… includes the Annexes and Protocols 
thereto’10. 
A reference with regards to matters pertaining to the interpretation and application of the Treaty 
can thus be made to the EACJ by: a Partner State against another Partner State or organ or 
institution of the Community11; the Secretary-General against a Partner State that has failed to 
fulfil its Treaty obligations12; any legal or natural person who is a resident in a Partner State 
against a Partner State or institution of the Community that has acted in breach of the Treaty13. 
The Court is therefore widely accessible by various parties provided it is a matter that is within 
its jurisdiction. It needs to be stressed that although accessibility by applicants may be wide, 
the Court may only entertain cases that are against a Partner State, an organ or institution of 
the Community. The Court has rejected the application of the doctrine of direct horizontal 
effect14.  
                                                          
 
8 EAC Treaty Article 23. 
9 The East African Law Society v The Secretary General of the East African Community, EACJ Reference No. 1 
of 2011 p. 24. 
10 Ibid. The applicants in the case were challenging the validity of amendments made to the Treaty as well as 
dispute resolution provisions of the Customs Union Protocol and the Common Market Protocol, which they 
alleged ousted the jurisdiction of the EACJ.  
11 EAC Treaty Article 28.  
12 EAC Treaty Article 29. In Hon. Sitenda Sebalu v The Secretary General of the East African Community; the 
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda & 2 others, EACJ Reference No.1 of 2010 (Sitenda Sebalu I) - the 
Secretary General was found to have failed to fulfil his obligations in invoking the powers vested in him under 
Article 29 to ensure that the Protocol on the Court’s extended jurisdiction is concluded. 
13 EAC Treaty Article 30. 
14 This point was clearly determined in Modern Holdings (EA) Limited v Kenya Ports Authority, EACJ 
Reference No. 1 of 2008 in which the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference since the 
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The Court also handles disputes between the Community and its employees15, as well as 
arbitration matters for which the Court is expressly designated as the arbiter in the agreement 
between the contracting parties16. Furthermore, national courts or tribunals, while adjudicating 
matters which may concern the interpretation or application of the Treaty may refer the relevant 
issues or questions to the EACJ to provide a preliminary ruling17. Under Article 36, the 
Summit, the Council or a Partner State may request for an advisory opinion from the Court 
regarding a question of law arising from the Treaty18. 
5.1.1 Jurisdiction of the court 
The jurisdiction of the EACJ has been one of the frequently contested issues in several cases 
before the EACJ. The contestation has been over two major aspects: the first one regards the 
EACJ’s exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty, and 
the second one is with regard to its jurisdiction over human rights matters. As a result, the Court 
has on many occasions had to interpret the exercise of its jurisdiction as provided for in the 
Treaty, in particular, Article 27. Before the Treaty was amended in 2006 and 2007, Article 27 
expressly provided that: 
1) The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty. 
2) The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction 
as will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date. To this end, the 
Partner States shall conclude a protocol to operationalise the extended jurisdiction. 
The first aspect of contestation of the EACJ’s jurisdiction arose as a result of amendments to 
the EAC Treaty which affected the Court’s jurisdiction. These amendments were made 
                                                          
 
respondent was not an institution of the Community, hence ‘not one of the respondents envisaged under Article 
30 of the Treaty’. 
15 EAC Treaty Article 31. 
16 EAC Treaty Article 32.  
17 EAC Treaty Article 34.  
18As at end of December 2015, the Court had only handled two advisory opinions: In the Matter of a Request by 
the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion EACJ, Application No.1 of 
2008; and In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory 
Opinion made pursuant to Articles 14 (4) And 36 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community and Rule 75 (4) of the East African Court Of Justice Rules Of Procedure, 2013, Request for an 
Advisory Opinion No. 1 of 2015. 
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subsequent to the case of Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & others v The Attorney General of Kenya 
& others19, which so provoked the EAC political organs to strike back at the Court. 
In 2006, a reference in which the applicants, led by Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o, were challenging 
the elections of Kenyan representatives to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), was 
brought before the Court. The Court found that the manner in which the Kenyan representatives 
had been ‘elected’ was rather ‘fictitious’ and in violation of the EAC Treaty. The Court also 
reiterated its supremacy over national courts in matters of interpretation and application of the 
Treaty20. However, what really incensed the EAC political organs was the interim ruling that 
had been handed down earlier, in which the Court barred the EAC from recognising the Kenyan 
representatives until it had decided the case on its merits21. This decision did not go down well 
with the Kenyan government and the EAC Council of Ministers, who considered the Court to 
be overstepping its jurisdiction22. As a backlash to the Court, they proceeded to make 
amendments to the EAC Treaty.  
A number of provisions in chapter eight of the EAC Treaty were affected by the amendments. 
First, under Article 23, the Court was split into two divisions: the First Instance Division and 
the Appellate Division23. Secondly, under Article 27.1 a proviso was added which excludes the 
Court’s interpretational jurisdiction from ‘the application of any such interpretation to 
jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States’. Thirdly, Article 30.3 was also 
inserted which excluded the jurisdiction of the Court over matters which have been reserved 
under the Treaty to an institution of the Partner States. 
In a reference before the EACJ in which these amendments were challenged, the applicant 
argued that the amendments to Article 27.1 and 30.3 grant concurrent jurisdiction to the organs 
and institutions of the Partner States hence taking away the original jurisdiction of the EACJ 
                                                          
 
19 EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006. The appellate division of the EACJ upheld the decision of the lower division- 
see Attorney General of Kenya v Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & others, EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2009. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Anyang’ Nyong’o case, EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006 ruling of the court delivered on 27 November 
2006 available at http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACJ/2006/3.pdf, accessed on 5 June 2017. 
22 For a further discussion on the Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o case and the ensuing backlash, see especially James 
Gathii ‘Mission creep or a search for relevance: the East African Court of Justice's human rights strategy’ 
(2013) 24 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 265-271; and Karen J Alter, James T Gathii and 
Laurence Helfer ‘Backlash against international courts in West, East and Southern Africa: causes and 
consequences’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 300-306. 
23 Initially there was only one Court with no divisions. 
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with regard to the interpretation of the Treaty24. These provisions, it was contended, could be 
seen as clipping the Court’s jurisdiction and at most, ousting it, since matters that would have 
been handled by the EACJ by virtue of its Treaty mandate, would now be handled national 
organs and institutions.  
With regard to the proviso in Article 27.1 the Court found that while prior to the amendments, 
the jurisdiction of the Court was ‘wide and unlimited’; it was now limited. Furthermore, the 
proviso was not only vague but was also inconsistent with the Treaty since it conferred 
jurisdiction on organs of Partner States which were not defined by the Treaty25. The Court 
therefore held that although the impugned amendments (Articles 27.1 and 30.3) did not take 
away or oust the jurisdiction of the EACJ, they undermined its supremacy/ jurisdiction over 
the interpretation of the Treaty26. Having so declared, the Court advised that the amendments 
be revisited. This has not yet been effected.  
The set-backs to the Court’s jurisdiction were further manifested in both the Customs Union 
Protocol27 and the Common Market Protocol (CMP) whose provisions were subsequently 
challenged. With regards to the CMP, Article 54.2 (b) provides that Partner States guarantee, 
in accordance with their Constitutions, national laws and administrative procedures that, ‘the 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authority or any other competent authority, 
shall rule on the rights of the person who is seeking redress’.  
In a couple of cases before the Court28, it was contended by the applicants that this provision, 
too, ousted the jurisdiction of the EACJ, with regards to rights under the CMP (including 
migration rights), in favour of national courts. In both cases, the Court, in essence, ruled that 
this provision did not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret and apply the Treaty, its 
Protocols and Annexes29, but rather set up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms which are 
‘unlikely to have any adverse bearing on the Court’s discharge of its functions as provided for 
under … the Treaty’30. 
                                                          
 
24 The East African Centre for Trade Policy and Law v The Secretary General of the EAC, EACJ Reference No. 
9 of 2012 para 32. 
25 Ibid paras 55-56. 
26 Ibid paras 58-59, 68. 
27 Article 24 of the Customs Union Protocol establishes the Committee on Trade Remedies and confers upon it 
the jurisdiction to settle disputes in accordance with the Customs Union Regulations. 
28 East African Centre for Trade Policy and Law supra note 24; The East African Law Society supra note 9. 
29 The East African Law Society ibid at 30-31. 
30 The East African Centre for Trade Policy and Law case supra note 24 paras 79-82. 
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In light of the foregoing, it is deducible that the effect of the Treaty amendments and the redress 
mechanism under the CMP is that the EACJ might end up not handling many cases of migration 
rights. They might instead be channelled to national courts which, owing to a perceived lack 
of judicial independence, may not always uphold citizens’ rights31. This could also possibly 
lead to lack of uniformity in interpretation and application of Community law on migration 
rights32, unless the national courts make use of Article 34 of the Treaty and seek the EACJ’s 
ruling on interpretation of the Treaty. This avenue, moreover, seems not to be popular as yet33. 
Besides the EACJ’s exclusive jurisdiction, the second aspect in which the EACJ’s jurisdiction 
has been challenged is with regard to Article 27.2 which provides for its extended jurisdiction 
over human rights matters, among others34. 
Article 27.2 of the Treaty is clear that the Court’s human rights jurisdiction shall be 
operationalised by a protocol at a subsequent date. This protocol has not yet been concluded, 
leading the Court to find this inaction to be in contravention of the Treaty35. Failure to extend 
the Court’s jurisdiction has not, however, prevented applicants from referring matters involving 
allegations of human rights violations to the Court, which has in turn had to clarify its position. 
In the landmark case of James Katabazi and Others v Secretary General of the EAC and the 
Attorney General of Uganda36 the applicants challenged their re-arrest and subsequent 
detention by the government of Uganda’s security forces immediately after the High Court had 
                                                          
 
31 Gathii ‘Mission creep’ op cit note 22 at 272 & 293. 
32 This point was argued in both The East African Law Society case supra note 9, and the East African Centre 
for Trade Policy and Law case supra note 24. In the former case, Court concurred with the applicant and opined 
that ‘[i]f interpretation and application of the Treaty were to be out-sourced to national judicial, administrative 
and legislative institutions, however competent, to interpret as they see fit, in accordance with national 
institutions and laws, then the Community would have on its hands a real possibility of multiple interpretations 
of similar provisions of the Treaty which, in our view, would present a real risk to the integration process’. In 
the latter case, Court expressed similar sentiments- see para 62. 
33 The first and only preliminary reference by the end of 2015 was made in that same year by the Ugandan High 
Court on the question of national courts’ jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty. 
34 In Sitenda Sebalu I supra note 12, the EACJ made a finding that the delay to extend the Court’s jurisdiction as 
provided in Article 27.2 of the Treaty, was in contravention of the principles of good governance as provided in 
the Treaty. It was further concerned that the Republic of Uganda, in delaying to submit comments on the draft 
Protocol, was indefinitely holding back the process of extending the EACJ’s jurisdiction. Gathii ‘Mission creep’ 
op cit note 22 at 263 footnote 79, reaches the following conclusion: ‘The point here is that the EAC’s Council of 
Ministers has not supported and in fact has formally opposed extending the jurisdiction of the EACJ to include 
human rights or in fact jurisdiction over the Customs Protocol and the Common Market Protocol’. In November 
2013, at the 15th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State, it was decided that the issue of the EACJ’s extended 
jurisdiction over human rights should be handled with the African Union. See para. 16 of the Communique at 
http://eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=130&Itemid=131, accessed on 5 November 
2015. 
35 Sitenda Sebalu I ibid. 
36 EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2007. 
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granted them bail. They alleged that the government of Uganda had violated their human rights 
and as such had breached its obligations under Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the EAC Treaty. The 
respondents challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the reference on the ground that it 
involved human rights matters for which the Court did not yet have jurisdiction. The Court 
agreed with the respondents that indeed it did not have jurisdiction to ‘adjudicate on disputes 
involving violation of human rights per se’37.  However, bearing in mind the provisions of 
Article 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the Treaty, which explicitly mention human rights as principles of 
the Community; and Article 8.1 para (c) which enjoins Partner States to abstain from 
jeopardising the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Court made the following 
decision: 
While the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it 
will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27 (1) 
merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights violation38. 
 
With this precedent, the EACJ thus made its position clear with regards to dealing with cases 
that raise human rights concerns and it has indeed gone ahead to adjudicate upon many such 
cases39. Following its precedent, in several of these cases it has found Partner States to be in 
breach, not of their human rights obligations as such, but rather in breach of their Treaty 
obligations under Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the Treaty ie, part of the fundamental and 
operational principles of the EAC. In a subsequent case40, the Appellate Division of the Court 
elucidated the rationale used by the Court in coming up with its decision in the Katabazi case, 
hence justifying the Court’s basis for exercising jurisdiction over human rights matters in spite 
of Article 27.2. The Court stated: 
The significance and genius of the Katabazi case is not so much in the Court`s famous 
refusal “not to abdicate” its jurisdiction. Rather, it was the Court`s ability to find and 
supply, through interpretation of the Treaty, the source and basis for the Court`s 
jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case then before the Court. To this end, the Court 
in the Katabazi case proceeded to probe, to examine and to asses (sic) at great length 
                                                          
 
37 Ibid at 15. 
38 Ibid. 
39 About 30% or more of the cases decided on merits by the EACJ concern issues of fundamental and 
operational principles of the EAC Treaty, which include human rights protection. See also James Gathii 
‘Variation in the use of sub-regional integration courts between business and human rights actors: the case of the 
East African Court of Justice’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 41& 59. 
40 Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya v Independent Medical Legal Unit, EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2011 
(hereinafter ‘the IMLU case’). 
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and in great depth the source that allowed the Court to claim and exercise jurisdiction 
in the matter41. 
 
The Court, in this case went on to show exactly why it cannot completely abdicate from 
determining matters involving human rights issues by establishing the nexus between human 
rights and the EAC Treaty. It stated that: 
The respective Partner States’ responsibilities to their citizens and residents have, 
through those states voluntary entry into the EAC Treaty, been scripted, transformed 
and fossilised into the several objectives, principles and obligations now stipulated in, 
among others, Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Treaty, the breach of which by any Partner 
State, gives rise to an infringement of the Treaty. It is that alleged infringement which, 
through interpretation of the Treaty… constitutes the cause of action in a reference42. 
 
It is now a moot point in cases where allegations of human rights are raised that the Court will 
necessarily establish a nexus between the facts alleged and the Treaty provisions alleged to 
have been violated before it makes its decision. In most cases alleging human rights violations 
the Court has actually found such nexus vide Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the Treaty43. 
5.1.1.1  Analysing EACJ’s jurisdiction over human rights matters 
One of the issues that has been debated upon and which is also clear from the contestations 
before the EACJ regarding its jurisdiction, is whether the EACJ (or any other regional court 
for that matter) should be concerned with human rights matters instead of confining itself to 
integration issues. Considering that human rights have been incorporated into the regional 
integration agenda by being explicitly mentioned as objectives and/or principles of the REC, it 
                                                          
 
41 Ibid at 10. The Court in this case overturned the decision of the lower Division on the grounds that the lower 
Court had not supplied substantive reasons establishing its legal foundation for its jurisdiction in the reference. It 
had just used the precedent of the Katabazi case without further evaluation. Furthermore, the case had been filed 
outside the two-month limitation period prescribed by the Treaty and on this basis, the Court held in favour of 
the Appellants. 
42 Ibid at 12. This was reiterated in The Attorney General the Republic of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba, EACJ 
Appeal No. 1 of 2012 para 27. 
43 For instance, Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda & another v Omar Awadh & others, EACJ Appeal 
No. 2 of 2012; The Attorney General of Rwanda v Plaxeda Rugumba case ibid; the IMLU case supra note 40; 
Hilaire Ndayizamba v The Attorney General of Burundi & The Secretary General of the EAC, EACJ Reference 
No. 3 of 2012; Democratic Party v The Secretary General of the EAC & others, EACJ Reference No. 2 of 2012; 
Sitenda Sebalu I, supra note 12. Although in some of these cases the Court dismissed the applicants’ claims on 
other grounds, on the issue of jurisdiction it held that it did have jurisdiction although the allegations raised 
involved human rights issues. 
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becomes difficult to sustain the argument that regional courts should steer clear of human rights 
matters44. This is what the EACJ has demonstrated with regard to its contestable jurisdiction 
over human rights matters. Commenting on the Court’s position, Possi is of the view that the 
EACJ lacks an explicit human rights jurisdiction, but this has not prevented it from interpreting 
provisions of the EAC Treaty, including references to human rights norms45. He seems to 
suggest that the human rights jurisdiction of the EACJ is implicit. This is in contrast to some 
scholars who hold the view that the EACJ is overstepping its mandate46. Gathii, a renowned 
scholar on regional courts in Africa, views the EACJ’s stance as judicial activism, which is 
inter alia filling in a void left by unsatisfactory human rights redress mechanisms in the 
national jurisdictions of the Partner States47. He further propounds that by taking this decision 
on human rights matters, the EACJ has not only asserted its independence from the executive 
and legislative organs of the EAC, but in fact ‘[r]ather than serving as a tribunal to resolve trade 
disputes as envisaged by its original designers, the EACJ has evolved… into a Court to hold 
member governments accountable for violations of human rights’48. Despite this assertion, it 
shall shortly be argued that the Court still proceeds with much caution with regards to human 
rights matters, and that even its so-called activism was only possible because of express Treaty 
provisions that could support the Court’s entertainment of cases involving human rights claims. 
As the Court observed in Sitenda Sebalu I, the EACJ’s explicit lack of jurisdiction over human 
rights matters is obviously adversely affecting the Community’s integration process. This is so 
because, the EAC is envisaging a more holistic integration of which the principle of good 
governance, which includes promotion and protection of human rights, is fundamental to the 
process. It has been argued49, and quite persuasively, that this failure to extend the Court’s 
                                                          
 
44 See also Solomon T Ebobrah Legitimacy and Feasibility of Human Rights Realisation through Regional 
Economic Communities in Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African States (Unpublished 
LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2009) 79-83. One of the compelling arguments that he puts forth, in 
justifying African RECs involvement in human rights matters, is that since members of the RECs were also 
members of the OAU (now AU) they were required to respect the principles of the OAU-based ACHPR. This 
positions RECs as building blocks for the ACHPR as well.  
45 Ally Possi ‘The East African Court of Justice: towards effective protection of human rights in the East 
African Community’ (2013) 17 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online. 
46 Lucyline N Murungi  & Jacqui Gallinneti ‘The role of sub-regional courts in the African human rights 
system’ (2010) 7 Sur International Journal on Human Rights available at 
http://www.surjournal.org/eng/conteudos/getArtigo13.php?artigo=13,artigo_06.htm, accessed on 10 November 
2015.  
47 Gathii ‘Mission creep’ op cit note 22 at 250-251. 
48 Ibid at 250. 
49 Ibid at 252; Possi op cit note 45 at 18; In Sitenda Sebalu I supra note 12, the Court interpreted the failure to 
conclude the protocol extending the Court’s jurisdiction as a ‘hidden agenda’ on the part of a Partner State to 
hold back the process indefinitely. 
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jurisdiction illustrates resistance by Partner States to promote and protect human rights, not 
only in the Community but also in their national jurisdictions. Conversely put, the failure of 
Partner States to promote and protect human rights in their own domestic jurisdictions is 
manifesting itself at the Community level, and thus negatively impacting on the integration 
process. Further evidence of this resistance is the failure, in some cases, to enforce the decisions 
of the Court50. This in turn adversely affects the Court’s effectiveness as the organ established 
to ensure adherence to the Treaty. 
As this previous section has shown generally for the EAC, although the Court lacks express 
jurisdiction over human rights matters, the coming into force of the CMP may provide an 
opportunity for the Court. The CMP, which the Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply, 
provides for migration rights and this could be an avenue through which the Court might 
directly assert jurisdiction over specific human rights matters. This, however, depends on how 
the Court is rationalising migration rights in the Treaty, and whether in so doing it is adopting 
a human rights approach.  This calls for an examination of the Court’s position which thus far 
can be discerned from the case of Samuel Mukira Mohochi. 
5.2 Samuel Mukira Mohochi v The Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda51 
This is so far the only case that deals with migration rights, particularly the free movement of 
persons, that the EACJ has decided on the merits. The brief facts of the case are as follows.  
The applicant, Samuel Mukira Mohochi, a Kenyan citizen, was part of a fourteen-member 
delegation that travelled to Uganda on 13th April 2011 to meet the Chief Justice of Uganda. On 
arrival at the airport in Uganda, the applicant was denied entry while his colleagues had no 
problem going through. The applicant was thereafter served with a copy of a “Notice to Return 
or Convey Prohibited Immigrant”. Later on, after a six-hour wait at the airport, he was put on 
a Nairobi-bound flight and returned to Kenya. The applicant brought the reference before the 
                                                          
 
50 In the Sitenda Sebalu I the Court ordered that quick action be taken by the EAC to conclude the Protocol to 
operationalise the Court’s extended jurisdiction as envisaged under Article 27 of the Treaty. One year on the 
Court’s order had not been enforced, leading to a follow-up reference. In Hon. Sitenda Sebalu v The Secretary 
General of the EAC, EACJ Reference No. 8 of 2012 (Sitenda Sebalu II), the applicant contended that failure of 
the EAC to implement the Court’s decision to extend the Court’s jurisdiction amounted to contempt of Court 
and infringement of the Treaty. In a rather ambiguous decision, the Court agreed with the argument that the 
EAC had acted in contempt of its decision. However, in what may be viewed as a retraction, it held that the role 
of determining the Court’s jurisdiction was for the Council of Ministers and the Court could not dictate to the 
Council how to perform its functions. In other words, Court seemed to disregard its order to extend its 
jurisdiction ‘quickly’, and left it to the Council to do it in its own time. 
51 EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011. 
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EACJ alleging that the actions of the Ugandan immigration officials (for which the Attorney 
General was sued in his representative capacity) violated Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the EAC 
Treaty, as well as Article 7 of the CMP (which provides for the free movement of persons 
within the EAC). He further alleged violation of his fundamental rights and freedoms including 
discrimination, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to a fair and just 
administrative action, right to information, and freedom of movement, among other rights 
guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). In response, the 
respondent denied violation of the EAC Treaty or the CMP, and argued that the applicant was 
denied entry in accordance with the limitation clause embodied in Article 7.5 of the CMP. 
Specifically, that the applicant was denied entry on grounds of public security, and that the 
Treaty did not take away Uganda’s sovereignty to deny entry to persons who are nationals of 
Partner States. It was further contended that the EACJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case as it 
raised human rights matters and that the Court could not enforce the provisions of the ACHPR 
that were alleged to have been violated. 
The key issues that the Court had to determine included: 
i). Whether the Treaty and the CMP take away the sovereignty of Uganda to deny entry to 
unwanted persons who are citizens of Partner States of the EAC. 
ii). Whether the actions of the Ugandan immigration officials were in conformity with 
Articles 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the Treaty. 
iii). Whether the actions of the Republic of Uganda were in conformity with Article 104 of 
the EAC Treaty52 and Article 7.6 of the CMP. 
Upon deciding that the matters raised by the applicant were issues of interpretation and 
application of the Treaty and hence under the Court’s jurisdiction as provided in Article 27.1 
of the Treaty, the Court gave its decision on the merits. With regards to issue i), the Court held 
that, ‘Uganda’s sovereignty to deny entry to persons who are citizens of Partner States was not 
taken away by the Treaty and the Protocol, but the exercise thereof can only be valid if it is 
                                                          
 
52 EAC Treaty Article 104 provides for the Partner States’ commitment to promote ‘free movement of persons, 
labour and services and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of establishment and residence of their citizens 
within the Community’. This Article of the Treaty is elaborated in the CMP and its Annexes- see previous 
chapter. 
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done in strict compliance with the requirements of Articles 104 of the Treaty and Articles 7 
and 54.2 of the Protocol’53. 
In its findings on issue ii), the Court considered the following alleged actions committed by the 
Republic of Uganda against the applicant: the denial of entry, alleged discrimination, 
declaration of prohibited immigrant, alleged detention and the subsequent return to Kenya. All 
these actions were committed without informing the applicant of his alleged misconduct nor 
was he accorded an opportunity to be heard. The Court found that these actions of the 
respondent’s officials were illegal, and not only in violation of the EAC Treaty and the CMP, 
but also of national law, ie the Ugandan Citizenship and Immigration Control Act, which the 
immigration officials claimed to have applied. Court came to the conclusion that ‘the 
Applicant’s return to Kenya was unjustified, high-handed and was procured through unlawful 
means’54 since the applicant was never given reasons for such treatment nor accorded the 
opportunity for a fair hearing before his removal. It was accordingly decided that ‘the actions 
and decisions to declare the Applicant a prohibited immigrant, deny him entry into Uganda, 
detain him and return him to Kenya were illegal, unjustified, unlawful and inconsistent with 
transparency, accountability, rule of law, and universally accepted standards of human rights 
and, therefore, in violation of his rights and Uganda’s obligations under Articles 6 (d) and 7 
(2) of the Treaty and Articles 7 (2) and 54 (2) of the Protocol’55. 
It was thus found for issue iii) that the actions of the respondent State ‘were in violation of the 
freedom of movement of the Applicant which is among the foundational principles of the 
Common Market… the same actions are in violation of Article 104 of the Treaty’56. 
Furthermore the respondent had failed to adduce any evidence to justify imposing a limitation 
on the applicant’s freedom of movement as provided under Article 7.5 of the CMP. The Court 
also held that the respondent had failed to discharge its burden of proving that it had notified 
other Partner States of imposing such limitation as required by Article 7.6 of the CMP. Hence 
the respondent was in violation of Article 7 of the CMP57.  
                                                          
 
53 Mukira Mohochi supra note 51 para 56. 
54 Ibid para 109. 
55 Ibid para 110. 
56 Ibid para 112. 
57 Ibid paras 115-116, 130. 
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The case was therefore decided in favour of the applicant. The respondent was largely found 
to be in breach of its Treaty obligations.  
The issues raised in this case are not only applicable to Uganda, but to all the EAC Partner 
States, a fact that the Court noted in its obiter dictum by remarking that these were issues of 
‘regional concern’58. Furthermore, although the key issue raised in the case was with regard to 
free movement of persons (community citizens), a number of points were made that could 
apply equally to other migration rights.  
The ensuing discussion raises four points of analysis regarding the case, that might help in 
rationalising migration rights in the EAC as interpreted by the EACJ. 
5.2.1. Precedence of Community law over national law 
One of the respondent’s arguments was that Uganda as a sovereign state had the discretion to 
decide whom to allow or deny entry regardless of whether they are East African citizens or not. 
The respondent particularly sought to rely on regulation 5.1 of the Regulations on free 
movement of persons which provides that EAC citizens who seek entry in or exit from a Partner 
State must do so in accordance with established immigration procedures and national laws. 
Whereas the Court did not deeply delve into the meaning of this provision, probably because 
it was not explicitly identified as an issue, it found that the EAC Treaty and its protocols and 
annexes had the force of law in Uganda vide the East African Community Act, 2002, Laws of 
Uganda. Hence the Treaty, its protocols and annexes ‘became directly enforceable within the 
country and took precedence over national law that was in conflict with them. Existing legal 
provisions became qualified and started to be applicable only to the extent that they were 
consistent with the Treaty and the Protocol’59. What this suggests is that regulation 5.1 and 
other similar regulations which provide for the application of national laws and immigration 
procedures of Partner States, should not be read as elevating national law over Community law 
on matters that have been agreed upon by the Partner States. Such matters necessarily include 
migration rights and as such the Community law should supersede national laws. In other 
words, national laws and immigration procedures should be in harmony with and reflect the 
provisions of Community law. Thus regulation 5.1 should be read as conforming to and 
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effecting the general provisions on free movement of community citizens within the EAC in 
accordance with Article 104 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the CMP. 
The EACJ was thus affirming the principle of direct application of Community law even to 
other migration rights including the free movement of workers, the right of establishment and 
the right of residence. It is clear that should matters arise with regard to violation of any of 
these rights, the EACJ will not hesitate to castigate any Partner State whose application of EAC 
citizen’s migration rights is at variance with the Treaty or the CMP. As such the EACJ can be 
seen as championing harmonious and uniform application of Community law, hence asserting 
itself as an indispensable organ and agent for successful realisation of the objectives of EAC 
integration. Thus the way it rationalises migration rights is crucial for forming a sense of 
uniformity in the approach that the Partner States may adopt towards these rights. 
5.2.2. The EACJ’s approach in interpreting migration rights: ‘rights’ in which sense? 
During submissions, the respondent contended that the applicant’s allegations were human 
rights matters over which the EACJ had no jurisdiction. This was in response to the applicant’s 
claims that not only did the respondent’s actions violate his freedom of movement as an EAC 
citizen, but that they also violated several of his fundamental rights and freedoms as guaranteed 
under the ACHPR.  The applicant’s contention was that by violating his rights, the respondent 
State was in breach of its obligations under Articles 6 para (d), 7.2 and 104 of the EAC Treaty, 
and Article 7 of the CMP. Counsel further made the point that the rights created in Article 7 of 
the CMP were ‘subjective rights to which citizens of the East African Community are entitled 
in their individual capacities and those rights are enforceable vide the Court’s jurisdiction 
under… the Treaty and it matters not whether those rights are said to be ‘human rights’ or 
rights by whatever lexicon’60 (emphasis added). 
This latter argument by counsel for the applicant indicates that there is some confusion on the 
conceptual basis of migration rights in the EAC. Is it human rights, economic or otherwise? 
The Court agreed with the respondent that it did not have jurisdiction over human rights 
matters, and further emphasised that the ‘EAC Treaty is neither a Human Rights Convention 
or a Human Rights Treaty… but rather a Treaty to govern the widening and deepening of, inter 
alia, the political, economic, social, cultural, research, technology, defence, security, legal and 
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judicial co-operation between the Partner States’61. With this statement the Court opted for the 
safe textual interpretation- it simply stated the case as it is reiterating the provisions of the EAC 
Treaty. Apparently, it did not emphasise the human rights nuances in the Treaty and noted that 
there are no provisions in the Treaty, the Protocol and Annexes designated as ‘the human rights 
provisions’62. It, however, recognised the fact that human rights are part of the fundamental 
principles of the Community on which the integration of the EAC depends63. Had the Court 
chosen to aver that the rights alleged were indeed human rights, it might have been faced with 
the dilemma of lack of jurisdiction, which might explain why it opted to tread cautiously.  
The Court therefore followed the precedent in the James Katabazi case in reaching its decision 
to adjudicate upon the matter. Its strategy was not to adjudicate the matter as one alleging 
human rights violations per se, but rather as one to do with violation of the Treaty provisions. 
As to whether the rights alleged to have been violated were human rights or otherwise, the 
Court decided that the provisions in the Treaty and Protocols ‘are provisions of the Treaty, 
plain and simple. The object and scope of which is reflected in the titles and sub-titles of the 
chapters and articles therein’64. Consequently, the Court determined that the applicant’s cause 
of action was ‘the alleged infringement of a Partner State’s Treaty obligations which we find 
to be a matter which lies outside the province of human rights’65.  Hence, the Court opted not 
to designate as ‘human rights’ the rights provided for within the Treaty, but rather as ‘Treaty-
guaranteed rights’66.  It actually commented on all migration rights noting that ‘[t]he Treaty 
accorded these persons wide ranging, preferential and superior treatment and rights in terms of 
movement, establishment, residence and working within Partner States’67 (emphasis added). It 
further on stresses that the applicant’s freedom of movement and right to redress are ‘hallowed 
rights guaranteed by the Treaty’68. 
The Court can therefore be said to have adopted a fool-proof and neutral approach to 
rationalising migration rights within the EAC. Further evidence of the Court’s stance of 
restricting itself to the Treaty provisions can be seen in the manner in which it handled the issue 
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of applying a limitation on the applicant’s freedom of movement. The respondent argued that 
the immigration officials had denied the applicant entry into Uganda as it was in the ‘security 
interests of the people of East Africa’69, hence the limitation clause provided for in Article 7.5 
of the CMP70 was applied. Court, however, dismissed this argument since other than simply 
making the averment, no proof was provided that the applicant was indeed a security threat. 
Laying down a rather subjective test, the Court held that a ‘Partner State before imposing a 
limitation on an individual would have to satisfy itself that the measure is merited in each 
particular case’71. Apparently the respondent state had failed this test and so Article 7.5 was 
not applicable. Furthermore, the respondent State had failed to comply with Article 7.6 of the 
CMP by not notifying other Partner States of the limitation it claimed to have imposed on the 
applicant. This was considered as a further breach by the respondent State of its obligations 
under the CMP. 
Worth noting with Court’s handling of this issue of applying limitations on the applicant’s free 
movement, is that it simply evaluated the evidence in terms of the Treaty provisions. It did not 
look beyond the Treaty provisions to reach its findings. In other words, it did not use the 
objective criteria for evaluating applicability of limitations, that is, lawfulness of a measure, 
non-discrimination, proportionality and objectivity as stipulated under human rights law, or 
even as propounded in the Gebhard case72.  
The position taken by the EACJ might probably be explained by the fact that the respondent 
did not provide any facts upon which to apply the criteria73; and having found that the 
respondent’s actions were unlawful, it might have considered it unnecessary to borrow from 
the criteria used by the ECJ or in human rights law. Another probable explanation could be that 
since the Court was not treating the violations as human rights violations per se but as violation 
of Treaty-guaranteed rights, it was obvious that it would restrict itself to the express provisions 
of the Treaty and evaluate the facts in accordance thereto. One might infer from this that the 
provisions of the Treaty are self-sufficient and it is not always necessary to look beyond or 
                                                          
 
69 Ibid para 65. 
70 CMP Article 7.5 is to the effect that free movement of EAC citizens can be restricted on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health. 
71 Mukira Mohochi supra note 51 para 115. 
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outside the Treaty for other authorities. It might also be inferred that the Court is actually 
treading with caution by ensuring that it comes up with a fool-proof position with regards its 
jurisdiction. The Court’s reasons notwithstanding, the test it laid down is highly subjective. 
While leaving much room for Partner States’ to use their discretion, it does not provide 
objective criteria to guide the application of limitations to migration rights.  
What seems to emerge from the Court’s position, is that it does not exactly treat migration 
rights as purely economic freedoms. But neither does it regard them as distinctly human rights. 
It prefers to adopt the textual interpretational approach whereby it views the free movement of 
persons and indeed other migration rights within the EAC context as flowing from the Treaty. 
Hence the use of the term ‘Treaty-guaranteed rights’. Moreover this textualism is not only 
evident in the Mukira Mohochi case, but seems to be a favoured approach of the Court in a 
number of cases before it, as the subsection below illustrates.  
5.2.3 The EACJ and textual-formalism74 
As explained in the introductory section of this chapter, textual-formalism75 is a term that has 
been adopted to describe the EACJ’s interpretative approach. Textual-formalism refers to the 
Court’s preference for textual and narrow interpretation coupled with apparent exercise of 
restraint or caution.  
Looking at some of the key cases decided by the EACJ, it appears that the Court has favoured 
the textual approach above any other and will readily reject any argument that is not supported 
by the express provisions of the Treaty. A characteristic that seems to run through almost all 
EACJ judgements is the court’s emphasis on defining terms. There are rather tautological and 
discursive arguments on meanings of words, and as it happened in the Mohochi case, some 
issues, for instance regarding the unlawful detention of the applicant, are decided basing on the 
ordinary or technical meaning of the key word. Although other non-textual approaches may be 
considered, in the final analysis, it is the textual approach that is usually overly predominant 
and decisive. Moreover in some cases where an expansive reading of the Treaty provision 
might have been possible, the Court has opted for the narrower interpretation in strict 
accordance with the text of the Treaty. The illustrative cases below will be discussed under 
broad subject-matter headings. 
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Time limits: Before the Treaty was amended in 2006/07, there was no limit placed on time 
within which natural or legal persons could file cases before the EACJ. This changed with the 
introduction of Article 30.2 which provides for a considerably short period of two months 
within which natural and legal persons can file cases before the Court. The Court has strictly 
adhered to this time-limit arguing that it is for purposes of legal certainty, which requires a 
‘strict application of the time limit’76. Hence, it has even rejected the argument on ‘continuing 
violation’, commonly acceptable in human rights matters, conclusively stating that ‘there was 
nothing in the express language’ (emphasis added) of the Article that suggests that continuing 
violations were exempted from the two-month limit. In a statement more telling of its overly 
cautious and restrained stance, the Court held that ‘nowhere does the Treaty provide any power 
to the court to extend, to condone, to waive, or to modify the prescribed time limit for any 
reason’77. The court seems to have effectively shut out any other argument that would allow 
for any flexibility or even expansive reading of this particular provision despite arguments that 
the two-month limit is unfair and unreasonable on individual litigants in a region with 
comparatively low levels of transparency and access to information. The Appellate Division 
thereby reversed the more expansive and purposive reading by the First Instance Division that 
had allowed for continuing violations under Article 30.278, thus setting a precedent that has 
since been followed in subsequent cases. This has led to several cases not being heard on merits, 
including one that touched on free movement of persons, almost similar to the Mohochi case79.  
Principle of horizontal direct effect: The EACJ’s decision on what might have been an 
establishment of the principle of horizontal direct effect further supports the argument that 
textualism is the court’s favoured approach. In what could have been an opportunity for the 
EACJ to extend its authority to national public bodies and private companies, the Court held 
that it had no jurisdiction over matters brought by natural or legal persons, in which the 
respondent was neither a Partner State nor an institution of the EAC80. The court was not at all 
convinced with the contention that the respondent was a public body in a Partner State, carrying 
out services that come within the auspices of Community law. It thus rejected the invitation to 
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read the Treaty purposively and apply the principle of horizontal effect. This shows a clear 
divergence in approach between the ECJ and the EACJ. Whereas the ECJ was unrestrained in 
laying down the principle of horizontal direct effect, extending it even to private bodies that 
would be obliged under community law81, the EACJ refrained from applying it to public bodies 
that carry out services regulated by Community law. It has actually been argued that by this 
decision, the EACJ ‘shot itself in the foot’ thereby alienating the business community 82 that 
would have been likely litigants on matters to do with the CMP and economic and trade 
integration in general.  
Remedies: The EAC Treaty is not specific on the remedies that the EACJ may offer. The Court 
has interpreted its remedial powers as being restricted to making ‘declarations of illegality of 
the impugned acts’83, and orders as to costs. Any other orders, the Court has deemed to be 
beyond its jurisdiction to make84. In one particular decision, the Court remarked that the 
particular case, like many others before it, was not grounded in tort or contract and so it could 
not make an award as to damages85. According to the EACJ, its jurisdiction to grant such 
remedies is excluded by the joint effect of Articles 23, 27 and 30 of the EAC Treaty. Moreover, 
a close reading of these Articles cannot, prima facie, be seen as restricting the court’s array of 
remedies. The EACJ’s textualism can be contrasted with the ECJ’s expansive and teleological 
reading of its powers. The latter Court, even though, it could not find an express provision on 
extensive remedial powers, established the principle of state liability in which a Member State 
of the EC could be liable to pay damages86. One might argue that the ECJ, unlike the EACJ, 
was addressing a national court which could then see to the application and enforcement of the 
                                                          
 
81 C-36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke 
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principle. From this perspective, the situations of the EACJ and ECJ may not be comparable, 
but one would be missing the key point which is, the principle that was established for purposes 
of enhancing Community law. To further the argument, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) 
which is in a more or less similar position as the EACJ could present a more appropriate 
comparison. In a case, almost similar in facts to the Mukira Mohochi case, the CCJ was able to 
not only set a more objective test for application of limitations on free movement of community 
citizens, but also went ahead to award damages to the applicant, even in the absence of an 
express Treaty provision to that effect87. The Court was able to award compensatory damages 
to the applicant having endorsed the principle of state liability in one of its earlier decisions88. 
The CCJ’s interpretational approach, which like the ECJ’s has tended to be more teleological, 
serves to illustrate the contrasting approach of the EACJ which may stand out as being rigidly 
textual. 
The above examples have served to bolster the argument that the EACJ has got a proclivity for 
a narrow textual interpretational approach. It is actually seen as exercising extreme caution or 
restraint, probably in order not to upset the Partner States or other organs and institutions of 
the Community. This is a lesson it may have learnt from the post Peter Nyong’o case 
backlash89. 
To return to the court’s approach in interpreting migration rights, whether or not the Court’s 
rationale would have been different had it been endowed with jurisdiction over human rights, 
remains a matter for debate. More so had the EAC Draft Bill of rights been enacted into law, 
the interpretation of migration rights in the EAC could possibly be altered. This is so because 
under the Draft Bill of Rights, migration rights are provided for as human rights90. Although at 
the moment this is merely speculative, the Court’s position could probably be altered since 
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reading the EAC Treaty, the CMP and its annexes in conjunction with the EAC Bill of Rights, 
if enacted as it is, would favour more a human rights-oriented interpretation. However, even 
with the current status quo, is their room for the EACJ to rationalise migration rights as human 
rights? 
5.2.4 The case for a more human rights-oriented approach to migration rights in the 
EAC 
One of the issues raised by the applicant in the Mukira Mohochi case, that is worth discussing, 
was the allegation that the respondent State had violated his fundamental rights and freedoms 
‘against discrimination, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to a fair and just 
administrative action, the right to information and freedoms of assembly, association and 
movement guaranteed by Articles 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter’91 (i.e. the ACHPR). 
Probably due to treading cautiously over jurisdictional matters, the Court did not delve 
specifically and extensively into these allegations, as may be the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights or a national Court or tribunal might have done. The moment it 
decided that its jurisdiction was limited to interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty, it 
avoided overstepping that jurisdiction which might have been the case had it adjudicated on 
the applicant’s allegations that specifically raised issues of the ACHPR. The court rather made 
sweeping references to the ACHPR, holding that as the applicant was ‘singled out of a 
delegation, declared a prohibited immigrant, denied entry, returned to Kenya without being 
furnished with reasons why and without being heard in his defence was clearly at variance with 
and in violation of Uganda’s obligation to adhere to the rule of law, accountability, 
transparency as well as the recognition and protection of human rights in accordance with the 
Charter, as provided under Articles 6 (d) and 7 (2) of the Treaty  and 7 (2) of the Protocol’92. 
In concluding thus, the Court seemed to be following the precedent of the Appellate Division 
in the IMLU case93 in which it provided the basis for the Court’s handling of matters that 
involve human rights. In that case it stated that the Court should find and supply ‘the cause of 
action flowing from the Treaty (that is different and distinct from violations of human rights) 
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on which to peg the Court’s jurisdiction… [and which provides] the legal linkage and basis for 
this Court’s jurisdiction… separate and distinct from human rights violations’94. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, asides from human rights being some of the fundamental 
principles of the EAC Treaty, the formulation of migration rights within the CMP has strong 
human rights overtones. A case can therefore be made for a human-rights oriented 
interpretation to migration rights.   
First and foremost, the Court has acknowledged that the EAC Treaty through ‘bereft of a 
Chapter on Human Rights,… contains the hint of such rights in a number of its provisions’95. 
The Court does not however proceed to point out the provisions with such hints, but Articles 6 
para (d) and 7.2 would definitely be among them. Considering that the Draft EAC Bill of rights 
perceives of migration rights as human rights, then it could be argued that the provisions on 
migration rights in the EAC Treaty and the CMP are ‘hints’ of such human rights provisions. 
This is more so considering that these rights have corollary provisions under international 
human rights law and thus might easily be interpreted in a similar, if not the same, manner. The 
Mukira Mohochi case presented an opportunity for the Court to demonstrate this co-relation, 
but the opportunity was entirely missed as the Court did not delve into it. Had it done so, it 
might have found express jurisdiction to handle human rights matters to a limited extent, that 
is, migration rights- as these have been elaborated in the Treaty, whose interpretation and 
application is certainly within its jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the provisions of the EAC Treaty, specifically Article 6 para (d) mentions the 
fundamental objective that Partner States shall recognise, promote human and peoples’ rights 
in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. How 
then would the Court be able to find indisputably that an act or measure of a Partner State has 
infringed that provision without evaluating it against the provisions of the ACHPR? In 
exercising its jurisdiction, it can be strongly argued that Article 6 para (d) of the Treaty actually 
invites the Court to determine whether an act or measure taken by a Partner State is in 
accordance with the provisions of the ACHPR. In this case, Court would have to look into the 
provisions of the ACHPR, make a finding thereof, before it can determine whether a Partner 
State has violated its obligations under Article 6 para (d) of the EAC Treaty. As such the Court 
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in the Mukira Mohochi case should have considered each of the allegations made by the 
applicant as against the provisions of the ACHPR. It would then have made a finding on the 
applicant’s fundamental human rights and freedoms (as guaranteed by the ACHPR) that had 
been violated and then concluded with its finding that the respondent State had actually violated 
Article 6 para (d) and 7.2 of the EAC Treaty. However, the Court has, in this regard, opted to 
narrowly construe its jurisdiction by ruling that it ‘cannot purport to operate outside the 
framework of the Treaty and usurp the powers of other organs created for the enforcement of 
obligations created by other instruments including the African Charter and Protocol’96. It 
should be noted though that when the Court made this statement, the facts it was basing on 
were quite different. In that case, the applicant alleged that the Partner States of the EAC (apart 
from Tanzania) had failed to make declarations in acceptance of the competence of the African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in line with the Protocol to the ACHPR establishing the 
African Court, and that this failure amounted to infringement of various provisions of the EAC 
Treaty97. This is quite distinct from where one alleges that a Partner State has violated one’s 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ACHPR. This is because of the express provisions of 
Article 6 para (d) of the EAC Treaty. In such an instance, it should be incumbent for the Court 
to evaluate the facts in accordance with the ACHPR before making its decisions on whether or 
not Article 6 para (d) has been infringed. This was actually the position taken by the Appellate 
Division in a decision that overturned that of the First Instance Division98. It is arguable, 
therefore, that the Court could choose to interpret migration rights as human rights guaranteed 
by the Treaty or at the very least accord them a human rights interpretation even without the 
extended jurisdiction.  
Hence, if the Court could show the co-relation between migration rights or ‘Treaty-guaranteed 
rights’ and human rights; as well as optimally exploit the avenue provided in Article 6 para (d), 
it achieves two things: one is a human rights approach to migration rights within the EAC; and 
second, exercise jurisdiction over such rights without necessarily awaiting a Protocol to extend 
its jurisdiction over human rights matters. This is because, it already has the jurisdiction over 
matters of migration rights under the EAC Treaty and its Protocols and Annexes. Hence an 
interpretation of migration rights from a human rights viewpoint would be a way for the Court 
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to incrementally yet tactfully overcome the jurisdictional hurdle. In other words the text of the 
EAC Treaty and the CMP offers a sufficient avenue through which the EACJ, whilst adhering 
to textual-formalism, may still be in position to provide a more expansive and far-reaching 
interpretation and rationale for migration rights within the EAC. 
5.3 Chapter conclusion 
The EACJ’s interpretational approach, at last, after the Peter Nyong’o case and the ensuing 
backlash, is largely textual. The Court, in exercising much caution and restraint, will in most 
cases reject an argument or interpretation that is not supported by the express text or literal 
meaning of the text of the Treaty. This approach is clearly manifest in the way it has interpreted 
migration rights as Treaty-based. In interpreting and conceptualising migration rights in the 
EAC, the Court has not completely endorsed them as purely economic freedoms, and has also, 
in a way, avoided a human rights interpretation, probably because of its lack of explicit 
jurisdiction over human rights matters. Although the Court makes the distinction between 
Treaty-guaranteed rights and human rights, this is usually made when it is seeking to justify its 
jurisdiction to handle matters that involve or raise human rights violations. It has not made the 
distinction for the mere purpose of establishing the rationale or conceptual basis of migration 
rights in the EAC. It should be noted, though, that in terms of rationalising migration rights, 
the Court has not exactly decided against a human rights approach. Hence, the Court’s position 
on migration rights and their conceptual basis might be altered if the Court’s jurisdiction could 
be extended to cover human right matters. This could only be done in a gradual and incremental 
way as the community integration further advances, but only if the Court is willing to make the 
shift from textual-formalism. 
The Mukira Mohochi case, which so far is the landmark case on migration rights, and freedom 
of movement of persons in particular, canvassed a number of issues that show the importance 
attached to migration rights and also demonstrate that migration rights in the EAC, are 
undoubtedly, the linchpin of community citizenship- a citizenship that clearly goes beyond the 
economic rationale for integration. It should be noted that Mr. Mukira Mohochi was exercising 
his freedom of movement as an EAC citizen and not in the economic sense- he was not moving 
any factors of production nor was he a factor of production on the move. This illustrates that 
free movement of community citizens within the EAC goes beyond the economic objectives 
of integration. It also goes to prove that migration rights in the EAC are not exclusively the 
preserve of the business community, which can be seen as eschewing the EACJ, to a large 
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extent99. Hence providing for these rights under the CMP, which ideally aims at promoting 
economic objectives of integration, might actually be delimiting not only their application, but 
also their interpretation. In the Court’s decision, it referred to the freedom of movement as 
being ‘among the foundational principles of the Common Market’100, but elsewhere it also 
noted that violating this freedom was a threat to the integration process101 in general. Hence 
the Court recognises the importance of migration rights to the integration process in a holistic 
sense. This position might have been further fortified had the Court opted for a human rights 
interpretation of these rights. The Court’s limited jurisdiction might have had an influence on 
the Court’s prevailing interpretation and rationalisation of migration rights in the EAC. 
The Court’s jurisdiction is further affected by Article 54.2 of the CMP which provides for the 
right to redress through national courts and tribunals for persons whose rights under the 
Protocol have been violated. This provision might have had the effect of reducing the number 
of cases on migration rights that are referred to the EACJ. Consequently, this provision read 
together with the other amendments that affect the jurisdiction of the EACJ render it necessary 
to explore and assess the implementation of Community law and objectives with regard to 
migration rights in the domestic jurisdictions of the EAC Partner States.  
                                                          
 
99 Gathii ‘Variation’ op cit note 39. 
100 Mukira Mohochi case, supra note 51 para 112. 
101 Ibid para 76. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ASSESSING EAC PARTNER STATES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE EAC 
MIGRATION RIGHTS REGIME: ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL LAWS AND 
PRACTICES 
6.0 Introduction 
The successful implementation of the EAC Treaty and the realisation of its objectives is a 
responsibility that rests greatly on the Partner States. Accordingly, Article 8 of the EAC Treaty 
obligates Partner States to, inter alia, ‘plan and direct their policies and resources with a view 
to creating conditions favourable for the development and achievement of the objectives of the 
Community’, as well as the implementation of its provisions1. Yet more precisely, the Treaty 
expressly requires of Partner States to ‘abstain from measures likely to jeopardise the 
achievement of the objectives or the implementation of the Treaty provisions’2. Therefore, in 
order to assess the level of compliance with the EAC’s objectives and provisions on migration 
rights, it is necessary for one to examine what pertains in each of the Partner States and assess 
whether or not this is in compliance with the Treaty and the Common Market Protocol (CMP). 
This is the aim of this chapter. 
 
The chapter shall present an analysis on how each of the selected Partner States makes 
provision, both in law and practice, for the free movement of persons, the right of residence 
and the right of establishment; and assess the extent to which these have been conformed to 
Community law and as such harmonised with each other. Suffice to note that migration rights 
have so many aspects to them, particularly, the right of establishment, but what is presented 
herein is not exhaustive and is only for purposes of illustration on the status of implementation. 
The issues discussed herein, admittedly, may merely scratch the surface, but can nevertheless 
be used to make some assessment on the level of compliance with Community law. An 
examination of some of the relevant jurisprudence from the national courts, scanty though it 
may be, will provide an indication of whether national courts are championing the objectives 
of the Community. This will in effect be an assessment of the extent to which national courts 
are promoting and protecting migration rights of community citizens within the respective 
Partner States. 
                                                          
 
1 EAC Treaty Article 8.1 para (a). 
2 Ibid Article 8.1 para (c). 
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A 2006 report on migration legislation in East Africa found that there was still much to be done 
in all the three Partner States (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as they then were) in terms of 
harmonising migration laws, improving or even enacting new ones3. This study, moreover, was 
done before the coming into force of the CMP and its regulations, which clearly outline the 
measures to be taken by the Partner States with regard to the free movement of persons, right 
of residence, right of establishment and other Treaty rights. It is argued in this chapter that 
individual Partner States, albeit to varying degrees, have made some progress towards 
promoting these migration rights. Even then, there is apparently a higher degree of compliance 
with, say, the free movement of persons than with the right of establishment for instance. 
Moreover as the chapter shall demonstrate, there is more that still needs to be done in terms of 
harmonising laws, improving or enacting new laws in order for the migration rights of EAC 
citizens to be effectively guaranteed. It is also contended that although under Community law, 
States are expected to cede some aspects of their sovereignty in matters to do with migration 
rights of community citizens, they still retain it to a great extent4, which adversely impacts on 
the integration process of the EAC. This, it is argued, might be as a consequence of some of 
the compromises that had to be made whilst negotiating the CMP. As such, what is reflected at 
the national level might be a pointer to shortcomings inherent in the entire EAC migration 
rights regime.  
 
The chapter shall be presented under the headings of each of the migration rights, that is 
freedom of movement of persons, right of residence, and right of establishment. Moreover, it 
is necessary, first of all, to explain how each of the selected Partner States incorporates 
Community law into the domestic system. This too shall further enlighten on the position of 
migration rights of EAC citizens within each State’s domestic legal regime. 
6.1 The status of EAC Law in the Partner States 
The Constitutions of most, if not all, EAC Partner States do not contain specific provisions on 
the East African Community. Some, however, contain general provisions on international and 
regional agreements or treaties, which may be used to determine the status of Community law 
in that specific country. The Constitution of Uganda in its National Objectives and Directive 
                                                          
 
3 Flora M Musonda ‘Migration legislation in East Africa’ 2006 International Migration Papers No. 82 42. 
4 As demonstrated in the Mukira Mohochi, EACJ Ref. No. 5 of 2011 discussed in previous chapter section 5.2. 
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Principles of State Policy, provides for the participation of Uganda in international and regional 
organisations that stand for peace and the progress of humanity. The Republic of Uganda also 
undertakes to ‘promote regional and Pan African cultural, economic, and political cooperation 
and integration’5. Uganda’s involvement in the EAC is thus in accord with its national 
objectives and conversely, Uganda is by virtue of its Constitution, obliged to fulfil its 
obligations under international and regional treaties it has ratified, including the EAC Treaty. 
Uganda ratified the EAC Treaty and domesticated it vide the East African Community Act 
2002. The makes the EAC Treaty in its entirety, law in force in Uganda. 
 
The Constitution of Rwanda also makes provision for international treaties and agreements. 
The most notable provision is Article 190 which provides that ‘international treaties and 
agreements which have been conclusively adopted in accordance with the provisions of the law 
shall be more binding than organic laws and ordinary laws except in the case of non-compliance 
by one of the parties’. This provision of the Rwandan Constitution represents the monist 
tradition of most Francophone African States6, of which Rwanda was part, although now it 
practices a hybrid system of both civil law and common law traditions. With regard to Article 
190, the Rwanda Government explains that ‘if an international instrument is ratified and 
published in the official gazette, it automatically becomes a binding legislation’7. The EAC 
Treaty therefore, having been ratified by Rwanda is takes precedence over the organic and 
ordinary laws of Rwanda. Article 190 of the Rwanda Constitution reinforces the provisions of 
EAC Treaty to the effect that the Treaty shall take precedence over national laws on matters 
pertaining to the implementation of the Treaty8. 
 
                                                          
 
5 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended, Objective XXVIII (ii) & (iii). 
6 Magnus Killander & Horace Adjolohoun ‘International law and domestic human rights litigation in Africa: an 
introduction’ in Magnus Killander (ed) International Law and Domestic Human Rights Litigation in Africa 
(2010) 5. According to the monist concept of international law, treaties become part of the domestic law upon 
ratification. This is contrasted with the dualist concept where an international Treaty may only have effect in a 
given State after it has been domesticated.  
7 Republic of Rwanda, The 9th and 10th Periodic Report of the Republic of Rwanda under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights  para. 19, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/47th/state-reports/9th-
10th-2005-2009/staterep9and10_rwanda_2009_eng.pdf, accessed on 15 November 2015. 
8 EAC Treaty Articles 8.4 & 8.5. 
152 
 
The Constitutions of Kenya and Tanzania do not contain analogous provisions, but both have 
ratified and domesticated the EAC Treaty9, as they too, just like Uganda, belong to the dualist 
tradition. It can therefore be said that all the focal EAC Partner States have duly incorporated 
the EAC Treaty into their domestic law. Thus the EAC Treaty, its Protocols and annexes have 
direct effect in all the Partner States that are bound to fulfil all their obligations thereunder. 
 
The EAC Partner States having ratified and domesticated the EAC Treaty, are bound by Article 
8.4 & 8.5 which make the EAC Treaty supreme over national laws with regards to matters 
pertaining to the implementation of the Treaty, a position that has now and again been stressed 
by the EACJ10. National courts in the few cases that involve migration rights issues, to be 
illustrated later on in the chapter, have equally upheld the supremacy of EAC law over contrary 
national law, as well as its direct effect where domestication has occurred.  With regards to 
migration rights, the CMP which elaborates these rights is an integral part of the EAC Treaty. 
The Partner States should, therefore, implement the provisions of the CMP directly since they 
have the force of law in the respective countries and all contrary legal provisions should be 
read in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, its Protocols and annexes. 
 
The Constitutions of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda do not contain provisions that 
reiterate any of the migration rights provided for under both the EAC Treaty and the CMP. It 
is thus arguable that migration rights of EAC citizens are not a subject of national Constitutions 
among the EAC Partner States. Hence it might be the case that migration rights of EAC citizens 
are not recognised as equivalent to analogous rights provided for in the national Bills of Rights. 
The Bills of Rights guarantee an assortment of rights and freedoms to a State’s nationals and 
persons lawfully on the State’s territory. These rights include the right to free movement and 
residence, the right to work and practice one’s profession or trade, which, as discussed in 
chapter two, may be regarded as parallels to migration rights under Community law.  
  
As discussed in the preceding chapters, however, the key issue is not whether migration rights 
are human rights, as they are not, but rather whether they can be approached more from a 
                                                          
 
9 Kenya has domesticated vide the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community Act 2000; while 
Tanzania passed the Treaty for the Establishment of East African Community Act 2001. These laws give the 
EAC Treaty the force of law in the respective countries. 
10 Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & others v The Attorney General of Kenya & others, EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006, 
41-42; Mukira Mohochi case supra note 4 paras. 48, 122-123. 
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human rights perspective than an economic one. This is an issue that is more relevant at the 
point of interpretation than practical application. When it comes to implementation, Partner 
States should really focus on conforming to the Treaty obligations and fulfilling their 
obligations thereunder. 
  
What follows is a discussion on the status of implementation of these rights within the Partner 
States. One thing that will come out clearly is the predominance of the economic rationale for 
migration rights at the point of implementation. At this point, there is a clear divergence of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights that are analogous to migration rights from migration rights 
as guaranteed under Community law. 
6.2 The free movement of persons  
Freedom of movement is guaranteed in each of the Constitutions of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda. Moreover, the right to free movement in virtually all EAC Partner States is 
guaranteed for ‘citizens or nationals’ of that State.  By way of illustration, in Uganda, the right 
to move freely throughout Uganda and to reside and settle in any part of Uganda, as well as the 
right to enter, leave and return to Uganda, is guaranteed to ‘every Ugandan’11. Similarly in 
Tanzania, the right to freedom of movement, and to live in any part of Tanzania; the right to 
enter and leave the country is guaranteed to ‘every citizen’ of the United Republic of 
Tanzania12. The Constitution of Rwanda, too, is explicit in providing that ‘[E]very Rwandan’ 
has the right to move and to circulate freely and settle anywhere in Rwanda, as well as the right 
to leave and to return to Rwanda13. The Constitution of Kenya is slightly different; it provides 
for the right to freedom of movement and the right to leave Kenya to ‘every person’14. But then 
again, the right to enter, remain in and reside anywhere in Kenya is guaranteed to ‘every 
citizen’15. 
 
                                                          
 
11 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended, Article 29(2). 
12 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania cap. 2, Article 17(1). 
13 The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2003 as amended, Article 23. 
14 The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010, Article 39(1). 
15 Ibid Article 39(2). For further discussion on the beneficiaries of the right to free movement ie ‘everyone’ and 
‘every citizen’, see especially Jonathan Klaaren ‘Freedom of movement and residence’ in Stu Woolman, 
Theunis Roux & Michael Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2008). Although he speaks 
specifically about the South African Constitution, there are substantive comparisons with the free movement 
provisions in the Constitution of Kenya. 
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Generally speaking, the guarantee of the freedom of movement and residence in all EAC 
Partner States is still pretty much a preserve for the citizens or nationals of that Partner State to 
the exclusion of all others, considered as aliens or foreigners16. As such this wording seems to 
depart from the international human rights law recommended formulation of ‘everyone 
lawfully within the territory of a State’ as the object of the right. One possible implication of 
this is that the rights of aliens and foreigners to free movement and residence may, in 
accordance with each State’s laws, be subject to restrictions and conditions that may not pertain 
to nationals of the State. In practical terms, however, all persons lawfully within the territory 
of any of the EAC States will enjoy the right to free movement and residence save for where 
lawful restrictions apply. More importantly, though, what needs to be examined closely is how 
the constitutional provisions on free movement may impact on migration rights of EAC 
citizens. 
 
With the domestication of the EAC Treaty and its protocols, all domestic law should be read 
and applied consistent to Community law. Although the various national Constitutions may 
guarantee the right of free movement to nationals, these respective provisions should, 
according to the EACJ’s interpretation in the Mukira Mohochi case, be read so as to conform 
to the requirements of the EAC Treaty17. Thereby, the respective constitutional provisions, 
much as they focus on nationals of the State, should in application be extended to EAC citizens 
to the extent that is required by the EAC Treaty, the CMP and its relevant annexes. As shall be 
illustrated by the domestic jurisprudence to be discussed further on in this chapter, national 
judges have so far been mindful of national laws being conformed to the EAC Treaty, hence 
upholding the supremacy of Community law. Consequently, the national constitutional 
provisions on the right to free movement, despite their specific reference to citizens, would not 
adversely impact on the right of free movement of EAC citizens that is guaranteed under 
Community law. 
                                                          
 
16 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act cap.66, Section 2 defines ‘alien’ as a person who is not 
a citizen of Uganda; The Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act cap. 172, Section 2 defines ‘foreign national’ 
as a person who is not a citizen of Kenya; The Tanzania Immigration Act 1995, Section 3 defines ‘alien 
immigrant’ as a person who is not a citizen of Tanzania; while the Rwanda Law on Immigration and Emigration 
2011, Article 2.12 defines ‘foreigner’ as a person who does not hold Rwandan nationality.  Article 42 of the 
Rwanda Constitution actually specifies that ‘[e]very foreigner legally residing in Rwanda shall enjoy all rights 
save those reserved for nationals as determined under this Constitution and other laws’ (emphasis added). Free 
movement of persons is obviously one of the rights reserved for Rwandan nationals. 
17 See chapter five above, section 5.2, particularly section 5.2.1. 
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Despite the national Constitutional Bill of Rights provisions on the right to free movement, the 
practice among the Partner States has considerably progressed towards conforming to 
Community law. Much in conformity with Article 7.2 of the CMP, all EAC Partner States have 
abolished visa requirements for each other’s nationals. All that is required, is a valid travel 
document, which may be a passport or national ID; and completion of entry and exit forms at 
the border points. In order to ease movement of EAC citizens, separate counters have been 
established for EAC citizens or nationals at the border posts in the various Partner States. Given 
that the use of national IDs is optional, subject to Partner States agreeing to accept them as 
travel documents18, they are only accepted as such in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda19, while 
Burundi and Tanzania still insist on the use of passports only. The regional EAC passport is 
also recognised by all the Partner States and is an acceptable travel document within the EAC20.  
All in all, the formalities of entry and exit of EAC citizens, to a great extent, seem to be 
harmonised in all the EAC Partner States and also to be in conformity with Community law 
requirements. The only exception may be where a Partner State may require additional 
documents from EAC citizens for immigration purposes. One such instance is the requirement 
of a yellow fever certificate from EAC citizens moving into Tanzania which is not a 
requirement in other EAC countries21.  
 
In addition to having valid travel documents, EAC citizens are required to enter and exit a 
Partner State through recognised or gazetted border posts22. Border posts still exist among EAC 
states, unlike for instance within the EU Schengen area. At these border posts, all persons have 
                                                          
 
18 EAC Free Movement of Persons Regulations regulation 5.2. 
19 http://www.commonmarket.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=87&Itemid=137; 
Kenya Legal Notice No. 133 of 2014; Henry Kibet Mutai ‘Assessing the implementation of the East African 
Community common market: a preliminary scoping study’ 2015 Tralac Working Paper S15WP04/2015 21. 
20 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act cap. 172, Section 25(1) para (c); The Tanzania Passports and Travel 
Documents Act 2002, Section 3(2) para (d) & Section 8(3); Law on Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda No. 
4/2011, Article 25; For Uganda, The Passport Regulations Statutory Instrument No. 14 of 2004, regulation 2. 
All EAC citizens are entitled to an EAC Passport, obtainable upon application and payment of ten dollars- for 
further discussion refer to chapter four above section 4.2.1. 
21 See Tanzania Public Health Act 2009. See also http://www.taa.go.tz/index.php/traveller-guides/health-
requirements, accessed on 16 December 2015. With a rise of yellow fever cases in 2016, all EAC countries 
presently require a yellow fever certificate upon exit and entry. 
22 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Regulations No. 16 of 2004 (made under S.82 of the 
Principal Act), regulation 16; Tanzania Immigration Regulations 2002 (made under S. 33 of the Principal Act), 
regulations 19-20; Ministerial Order No. 02/01 of 31/05/2011 Establishing Regulations and Procedure 
Implementing Immigration and Emigration Law of Rwanda, Article 30; The Kenya Citizenship and 
Immigration Regulations 2012 Legal Notice No. 64 of 2012, regulation 15. 
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to complete immigration/emigration forms before they can enter or exit a Partner State23.  Upon 
fulfilment of these administrative procedures, EAC citizens will be granted a six-month pass 
into the host Partner State. According to the Rwanda Immigration law, EAC citizens are issued 
a visitor’s pass valid for six months renewable24. Kenya also issues a six-month visitor’s pass25. 
In Tanzania, a visitor’s pass is issued to any person entering for lawful purposes other than 
work or business and is valid for ninety days26. This provision does not distinguish between 
EAC citizens and other visitors, but the practice is that EAC citizens are given a six-month 
pass in accordance with Community law27. The Ugandan law, too like the Tanzanian law does 
not distinguish visitor’s passes of EAC citizens from other foreign nationals, but states that 
such passes are valid for two months extendable up to six months by the Commissioner’s 
discretion28. In practice, however, EAC citizens visiting Uganda are granted six-month passes. 
6.2.1 Assessing free movement of EAC citizens in real terms 
In all fairness, the EAC Partner States have demonstrated willingness and commitment to their 
CMP obligations on ensuring free movement of EAC citizens. They have to a large extent put 
in place legal and practical administrative measures with the aim of fulfilling the requirements 
of the CMP. However, on the part of the legal measures put in place there is need for 
improvement in terms of harmonisation of laws, particularly within individual Partner States. 
Kenya and Rwanda have attained some harmony in the relevant laws following recent 
amendments that incorporate the requirements of the CMP and its regulations. In Tanzania and 
Uganda, the relevant laws appear to be scattered in various documents; some of the enabling 
laws are not easily available even from the relevant government departments and yet the 
prescribed practices have been implemented.  The failure to harmonise and consolidate the 
laws creates a discord between the practice and the laws. There is therefore a need to update, 
clarify and harmonise the laws relating to free movement of EAC citizens. 
 
In terms of the administrative and practical measures put in place to implement the CMP and 
the regulations on the free movement of persons, the process of entry and exit for EAC citizens 
                                                          
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 8. 
25 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations regulation 31(3). 
26Tanzania Immigration Regulations regulation 13. 
27 Regarding six-months passes for EAC citizens, see http://www.immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=25, 
accessed in June 2015. 
28 Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Regulations, regulation 6. 
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across the Partner States has been greatly eased. Moreover, there are a couple of regulatory 
barriers that may necessarily hamper or hinder the free movement of persons.  
 
The first instance of such barriers is the administrative and border controls that EAC citizens 
are still subject to in the individual EAC States. These procedures are actually sanctioned under 
Community law and Partner States are implementing them in accordance thereto29. EAC 
citizens actually require permits to enter in any Partner State other than their own.  What this 
suggests is that free movement within the EAC is not uninhibited free movement as such, but 
rather regulated movement still subject to bureaucratised and formal immigration procedures. 
This appears to be more the case when comparison is made between the free movement of EAC 
citizens within the EAC and the free movement of nationals that pertains within each individual 
EAC State where movement within a State is not necessarily subjected to formal and regulated 
administrative procedures. In relation therefore, the free movement of EAC citizens within the 
EAC appears to be less ‘free’.  Yet another comparison may be made with free movement of 
EU citizens within the EU Schengen area where inter-state border posts do not exist. The 
rationale for removal of inter-state borders was precisely for the purpose of promoting free 
movement of persons within the Union. From this comparative view the cross-border 
movement of EAC nationals can be said to be still more formal and consequently ‘less free’.  
  
It could, however be that maintaining the border posts and controls is a reflection of the 
nascence of the EAC migration rights regime and probably in future it might evolve to such a 
point where EAC citizens are not generally subject to border controls. It remains to be seen 
whether these prescribed border and administrative procedures and controls will be retained 
for EAC citizens. 
 
The second instance of regulatory barriers goes to the substantive issues that would prompt or 
encourage EAC citizens to exercise their right to free movement. As discussed in chapter two, 
the right to free movement will necessarily be inhibited if States retain measures, regulatory, 
administrative or otherwise, which prevent one from exercising that right. Within the EAC, 
focus seems to be only on the formal immigration procedures and not on related substantive 
matters of migration. The effect is that there are relevant areas other than immigration that 
                                                          
 
29 EAC Free Movement of Persons Regulations regulations 5.2 and 5.3. 
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impact on the right of free movement, but for which no significant measures have been taken 
to give effect to the free movement of persons. As a result, laws and regulations still exist which 
hinder the exercise of the right of free movement of EAC citizens. For instance, students may 
be able to freely and easily enter a Partner State, but gaining admission or even having access 
to admission will be another matter altogether. Admission requirements may be quite disparate 
in each country, just as the fees payable by nationals and non-nationals. For researchers, the 
clearance requirements are country-specific and do not privilege EAC citizens over other 
foreign nationals in any way30. This may inhibit one from conducting research in a given 
country, and so, refrain an EAC citizen from exercising their freedom of movement.  
 
The right to free movement goes beyond formal entry and exit procedures in the various Partner 
States. There is yet more to be done both at the Community level and at the Partner State level 
to ensure that the substantive aspects of the right to free movement are given equal attention 
and duly implemented. One can only expect that the current state of affairs is just the beginning 
and that as the Community evolves and integration advances, EAC citizens will gradually enjoy 
their right to free movement both in formal and substantive matters. 
6.3 Right of residence 
The CMP is quite clear that the right of residence only pertains to those EAC citizens who are 
workers or who wish to establish themselves as self-employed persons in another Partner 
State31. Thus the right of residence as provided for under Community law only applies to a 
restricted range of persons- those who are economically active. This is one of the aspects in 
which there is a divergence between the right of residence under Community law and the right 
of residence under national laws. 
 
In actual terms, what Community law prescribes may be regarded as substantively less than 
what national laws of the individual Partner State prescribe. Under the various national 
Constitutions, the right of residence is corollary to the right to free movement. However, as 
mentioned in the immediately preceding section, the right to freely reside, just like the right to 
                                                          
 
30 Apart from Rwanda which charges the same fee for local and EAC researchers (ranging from USD 20- USD 
100), all other Partner States regard EAC citizens as foreign nationals with regard to payment of research 
clearance fees. The fees range from USD 300 to USD 400 for foreigners applying to do research in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. 
31 CMP Article 14.3; EAC Right of Residence Regulations regulations 5.1, 6.2 & 8. 
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free movement is generally couched in such terms that it is only guaranteed to nationals of 
each State. What this implies is that the right of residence for persons who are not nationals of 
that State, including EAC citizens, may not be guaranteed to the same degree as a State’s 
nationals. Furthermore, the right of residence for nationals of any EAC Partner State is not 
based on one’s economic-activity status as is the case under the CMP provisions.    
 
The analysis on the right of residence as pertains in the various Partner States shall be 
considered in terms of formal requirements before it can be duly exercised by an EAC citizen, 
the attendant rights of spouses and dependants, and conditions regarding permanent residence. 
 
6.3.1 Formal requirements pertaining to the right of residence 
In all EAC countries, it is a requirement that all non-citizens, considered aliens in that country, 
who immigrate for purposes other than short-term visits, obtain a residence permit.  The 
residence permit is generally issued on the basis of an application specifying the purpose for 
which residence is required. The common practice is for the residence permit to be linked to 
the work permit as stipulated in the various national laws.  Most of the residence permits are 
classified in accordance with the purpose for which they are required and as Table 2 (see 
Appendix 1) illustrates this will depend on the work or business one intends to do in the 
respective country.  
 
It is quite clear from Table 2 that permits among the EAC countries are not exactly harmonised; 
each country still uses its own classification or structure of work/residence permits. 
Furthermore, all four countries issue permits that serve as both work and residence permits. 
Specific to Tanzania, though, is the requirement for applicants of Class “A” and Class “B” 
permits to obtain Re-entry passes once their permit applications have been approved. 
 
The fees charged in each country will vary according to the class of permit sought. The fees 
structure too is not harmonised across all EAC States, with each State still setting its own fees. 
Actually, in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, work permit fees have been abolished for each 
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other’s citizens32. For Tanzania, fees are still being charged for citizens from other EAC 
countries who wish to work and reside in Tanzania33. In reciprocation, Tanzanians who seek 
work/residence permits in Kenya, Rwanda or Uganda have to pay the specified work permit 
fees34. 
 
The duration of residence permits, although usually aligned to the work permit, varies from 
country to country. In Tanzania, a residence permit is issued for any period not exceeding three 
years and may be renewed for a period not exceeding two years35. In Kenya, a permit shall not 
be issued or renewed for a period exceeding five years from the date of issue or renewal36, but 
the initial period is usually two years37. The duration for the permit in Rwanda varies according 
to the class of permit: some are two years, others three years, but they are all renewable38. In 
Uganda, the duration of the residence permit may depend on the work permit, the duration of 
which is determined by the Board39, otherwise certificates of residence are categorised in 
durations of five years, ten years, fifteen years, and for life40.  
 
The basis for the right of residence for EAC citizens in each of the Partner states is much in 
accord with the CMP in as far as the right largely accrues to only workers or self-employed 
persons who wish to establish themselves in another Partner State. However, according to 
Table 2, some national laws go beyond Community law in extending the scope of persons to 
                                                          
 
32 Interview with official at Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA), Kampala, Uganda (March 
2015); Interview with official at Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control (DCIC), Kampala, Uganda 
(April 2015). 
33 Depending on the type of permit sought, fees range from USD 1000 to USD 3000 for work permits in 
Tanzania- Immigration (Amendment) Regulations 2012. These may be subjected to change if and when the 
recently enacted The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2014 comes into effect. Therein, the fees have 
been revised to USD 1000 for both Class “A” and Class “B” permits. 
34 In all countries, the fees will depend on the class of permit sought. In Kenya, work permit fees range from 
KES 5000/- to 250,000/- per year, in addition to a processing fee of Kenya Shillings 10,000/- (Ninth Schedule- 
Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations); in Rwanda, the fees range from RwF 20,000/- to 100,000/- 
per year (https://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=79, accessed in June 2015); in Uganda, the permit fees 
range from USD 800 to 5000; while residence certificates range from USD 2000 to 2500, depending on the 
duration of residence applied for - see The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Fees) Regulations 
2013. 
35 Tanzania Immigration Act 1995, Section 18(2). The new law regulating the employment of non-citizens 
stipulates that the validity of the work permit shall be two years, renewable, but the total validity period of the 
1st grant and renewal shall not exceed five years - see The Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2014. 
36 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations regulation 24(2). 
37 http://www.immigration.go.ke/Information.html, accessed in June 2015. 
38 Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Articles 3 & 4. 
39 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act Section 54(3). 
40 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Fees) Regulations 2013. 
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whom residence permits may be issued. For instance in Kenya, Class “K” permits are issued 
to persons, usually thirty five years old and above, who have an assured income from sources 
outside Kenya and undertake not to accept any paid employment of any kind41. Similarly, 
Rwanda issues Class “K” permits to persons with an assured income, including a retired person, 
who does not intend to be employed in Rwanda42. Tanzania issues Class “C” permits to persons 
who do not qualify for Class “A” (business and trade-related) permits, or Class “B” (specific 
employment) permits. The Class “C” permits are granted at the discretion of the Director for 
immigration43, and this enables one to obtain a residence permit not necessarily related to work 
or business, provided one fulfils certain specified conditions. Uganda has no similar permit. 
Persons who wish to reside in Uganda for purposes other than work or business are granted a 
six-month permit if they are EAC citizens. There is admittedly a challenge with persons such 
as pensioners who wish to retire since these are not covered under the Ugandan law. This, 
however, is expected to be addressed in a forthcoming amendment to the law44. 
 
Also worth mentioning is that while in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, the laws do not stipulate 
any restrictions on where one may reside, in Tanzania, one of the conditions for a residence 
permit is that the area of residence  should be stated45. What this implies is that non-Tanzanians 
are restricted to where they may reside and as such they do not enjoy the right of residence as 
Tanzanian nationals. In the other three countries, provided one has a valid residence permit 
(which might be in consideration of the fact that one may not wish to live so far from one’s 
place of business or work), one may reside where one chooses, but may need to update 
immigration authorities of change of address.  
6.3.2 Requirements for spouses and dependants 
Regarding dependant passes, the laws, much as they largely promote family reunion, 
particularly where the principal applicant has obtained a work/residence permit, are still varied 
in some particular aspects in the various Partner States.  
                                                          
 
41Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations Schedule 7. One must have an assured annual income of at 
least USD 24,000 or its equivalent in Kenya Shillings- regulation 20(4). 
42 Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 4.11. The applicant must show proof of an 
annual income of at least USD 5000 per year. 
43 Tanzania Immigration Act Section 20. Actually Tanzania also issues permits for retired persons who want to 
reside in Tanzania- see http://immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=15, accessed in June 2015.  
44 Interview with official at DCIC, Kampala, Uganda (April 2015).  
45 Tanzania Immigration Act Section 19(2). 
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In Tanzania, what is really striking about the law is that language used is not gender-neutral. A 
dependant permit shall be issued upon proof that one is a wife, child or near relative of the 
applicant and is dependent on the applicant for his or her maintenance46. In addition, the 
applicant has to prove that he is able to provide accommodation and has sufficient income to 
continue to maintain each of the dependants adequately while in Tanzania47. Upon satisfaction 
of these and any other required conditions, a dependant pass shall be issued by way of an 
endorsement of the names of the dependant on the applicant’s residence permit48. Asides from 
presupposing that an applicant for a work permit will always be a male, the law specifically 
emphasises as dependants, a wife and dependent children49. The fees payable for a dependant 
pass are USD 50050.  
 
In Kenya, a dependant’s pass will be issued to a person who depends on the applicant for 
maintenance and this could be a spouse, child, or a person by reason of age, disability or other 
incapacity is maintained by the applicant51. The applicant has to prove that the person for whom 
the pass is sought depends on him or her for their maintenance, and that the applicant has 
sufficient income to maintain each of the dependants adequately52. Once all these conditions 
are satisfied, a dependant’s pass shall be issued. Issuance fees of Kshs. 5000 per year are 
payable for a dependant’s pass53. In Rwanda, a dependant’s pass is also issued to a dependant 
of a residence permit holder, whereby dependant means ‘a family member, close relative or 
any other person who may be considered as a family member’54. The dependant applicant has 
to provide proof of relationship, a police clearance certificate and copy of the resident permit 
of the principal applicant55. The law does not seem to require the principal applicant to prove 
sufficient income to maintain each of the dependants, and neither does the specified list of 
                                                          
 
46 Tanzania Immigration Regulations regulation 9. 
47 Ibid.  
48 The Immigration Act Section 25(1). 
49 Ibid. Although the definition of dependant under Section 2 of the Act means ‘a person who is materially 
dependent upon the earnings of another’, the term as used in relevant provisions of the Act specifies ‘a wife and 
dependent children’.  
50 Tanzania Government Notice (G.N.) No.262 of August 03 2012.  
51 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations regulation 27(2).  
52 Ibid regulation 27(3). 
53 Ibid schedule 9. 
54 Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 2.14. 
55 https://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=136, accessed in June 2015. 
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requirements56. Moreover the fees charged are half of what the principal applicant pays57. In 
Uganda, the principal applicant will have to apply for the dependant’s pass and prove that one 
is indeed a dependant and that the applicant can adequately accommodate and maintain the 
dependant58. A dependant is taken to be ‘a person who, by reason of age, disability or other 
incapacity, is unable to maintain himself or herself and depends upon another person for his or 
her maintenance and includes a spouse’59. The fees payable for a dependant’s pass vary 
depending on the nature of the relationship, with a spouse paying USD 200, a child paying 
USD 100 and others paying USD 50060.  
 
Although the regulations pertaining to dependants of workers and self-employed persons in 
each Partner State, are largely in conformity with the procedural standards stipulated in the 
regulations61, in some instances, they go beyond what is stipulated. For example, on the upside, 
the definition of ‘dependant’ in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda is quite expansive going beyond 
the spouse and child of a worker or self-employed person. On the downside, though is the 
requirement to provide accommodation and show sufficiency of income in Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda. This, however could be justified by the Partner States on the ground that the CMP 
gives them leeway to ask for any other document62. This at times may be difficult to prove 
considering that there is no yardstick for what amounts to sufficient income. Consequently, the 
right to family reunion that is the objective of dependant’s passes may be interfered with. A 
more compelling argument could be that the principal applicant will be either a worker or self-
employed person, thus obviously having some means of income, and in any case they will have 
proved sufficient means to reside in the country before a permit is issued. It therefore appears 
absurd to require them to provide, once more, proof of accommodation and sufficiency of 
income for dependants, yet nationals of the country in similar situations are not required to do 
so. This is one of the provisions that may benefit from judicial scrutiny in order to determine 
whether such a requirement is justifiable in the circumstances. 
                                                          
 
56 Ibid. See also Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 4.12.  
57 Ibid. 
58 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Regulations regulation 4.  
59 Ibid regulation 2. 
60 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Fees) Regulations 2013. 
61 EAC Right of Residence Regulations regulation 8; see discussion under Section 4.2.3 in chapter four above.  
62 Ibid regulation 8.3 para (d). 
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6.3.3 Permanent residence 
The CMP does not contain any prescriptions regarding permanent residence, but leaves it 
within the remit of national policies and laws of the Partner States63. In a way this makes sense 
when one considers that the right of residence as guaranteed under Community law does not, 
in substance, extend to EAC citizens seeking permanent residence in another EAC country. It 
applies to EAC citizens who are in a Partner State other than their own for a specified period.  
Therefore, permanent residence is not regulated by Community law, but it is one of those areas 
in which national laws may be seen to offer substantially more than Community law in 
broadening the right of residence of EAC citizens. Consequently, the requirements for 
permanent residence vary from Partner State to Partner State.  
 
In Rwanda, permanent residence is issued to a foreigner who wishes to reside permanently in 
Rwanda for purposes of work or business64. Kenya grants permanent residence to persons who 
were citizens by birth but have since lost their citizenship status and cannot enjoy dual 
citizenship; or persons who have worked in Kenya for at least seven years and have been 
continuously resident in Kenya for three years preceding the application; or children of citizens 
born outside of Kenya and have acquired citizenship of domicile; or a spouse of a Kenyan 
citizen married for at least three years65. In Uganda, in order to be eligible for a certificate of 
permanent residence, one must prove that he or she has contributed to the socio-economic or 
intellectual development of Uganda; has continuously lived in Uganda for ten years; is of good 
character and proven integrity; has no criminal antecedents; has not defaulted in payment of 
taxes; and is neither bankrupt nor destitute66. In Tanzania, the laws on immigration and 
citizenship are not exactly clear on the issue of permanent residence. Presumably this might be 
catered for under the Class “C” permits which are granted at the Director’s discretion. The fees, 
duration and other conditions for the permanent residence, accordingly, vary from one EAC 
state to another. 
                                                          
 
63 CMP Article 14.7. 
64 Regulations for Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 5. 
65 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act Section 37. 
66 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act Section 55. 
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6.3.4 Assessing the right of residence in real terms 
The CMP prescribes the harmonisation of residence permits67, but as demonstrated above, the 
classification and issuance of permits is still in accordance with each Partner State’s 
preferences. The lack of harmonisation with regards to work and residence permits, and the 
failure to provide specially for EAC citizens as distinct from other non-nationals have been 
cited as some of the reasons why the free movement of workers is painstakingly slow68. Among 
the Northern Corridor countries69 (Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda), these issues may be a thing 
of the past as the abolition of work permit fees may partly provide a solution. According to one 
official, harmonisation of work permits ceases to be a significant issue where fees for work 
permits have been abolished70. For purposes, however, of uniformity, certainty and clarity on 
the part of the EAC citizens, it might be worthwhile harmonising residence/work permits 
among EAC countries.  
 
The law and practice with regard to the right of residence within the EAC demonstrates that 
the right does not extend to all EAC citizens, but only those that are economically active. The 
scope of persons targeted is not the only aspect in which the right seems to be restrictive. It is 
also rather clear that EAC citizens that reside in a Partner State other than their own may not 
necessarily enjoy the right of residence in the same way as nationals of that Partner State. 
Consequently, the content of the right of residence in each Partner State does inevitably impact 
on the right of free movement of EAC citizens. When residence requirements tend to be more 
restrictive, free movement is coincidentally inhibited.   
 
The laws and policies notwithstanding, there have been instances where the normative content 
of residence of EAC nationals has been interpreted in a more liberal and broader sense than 
what the laws seem to provide. In the case of Deepak Shah & others v Manurama & others71, 
                                                          
 
67 EAC Right of Residence Regulations regulation 6.5; EAC Right of Establishment Regulations regulation 
6.10. 
68 Mutai op cit note 19 at 22; Andrew Luzze ‘EAC states should harmonise work permits’ Daily Monitor 4 
November 2014. 
69 Reference to the Northern Corridor countries herein is with regard to three EAC Partner States, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda that have signed up for the Northern Corridor Integration Projects Initiative (herein ‘the 
Northern Corridor’). This initiative, which also includes South Sudan, is the transport corridor linking the 
landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan and Burundi to Kenya’s Maritime Port of 
Mombasa.  The transport corridor also serves Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Tanzania’- see 
http://www.nciprojects.org/, accessed in June 2015. 
70 Interview with official at DCIC, Kampala, Uganda (April 2015). 
71 Miscellaneous Application No. 361 of 2001 arising out of H.C.C.S No. 354 of 2001. 
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an application before the High Court of Uganda, the defendants in the underlying suit were 
ordinarily resident in Uganda, while the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The defendants applied to the court for an order that the plaintiffs pay security for costs since 
they were residents abroad, that is, outside the court’s jurisdiction, and additionally, they had 
no property in Uganda. Bearing in mind that at the time, the EAC had been re-established, the 
court considered whether it was necessary for a resident of the Community to pay security for 
costs. Some of the factors that the court took into account included the fact that all three East 
African countries (as they were then) had virtually identical legal provisions with regard to 
security for costs, and foreign judgements enforcement. Furthermore Court considered Article 
104 of the EAC Treaty which provides for migration rights, among others, and stressed the 
obligation of Partner States to ensure enjoyment of these rights by their citizens within the 
Community. In its decision, the court thus observed that in East Africa, ‘there can no longer be 
an automatic and inflexible presumption for court to order payment for security for costs with 
regard to a plaintiff who is resident in the East African Community’. Thus, the Court 
disregarded the plaintiff’s residence as a ground for ordering security for costs and taking also 
other circumstances into consideration, dismissed the defendant’s application. 
 
The court’s ruling in this case is quite remarkable, more so considering that it was made soon 
after the coming into force of the EAC Treaty and long before the CMP came into force. At 
the time, the right of residence was not well-elaborated. Although, the issue in point was not 
exactly about the right of residence, but rather the jurisdictional powers of a national court over 
EAC nationals, the court’s view on residence within the EAC was quite far-reaching. By 
considering the entire EAC as one jurisdictional space, the court broadly interpreted and 
applied what would have been a narrow national legal provision, and thus recognised and gave 
effect to the supremacy of Community law over national law. Hard though it may be to assess 
the impact of the decision on the wider audience, the precedent was set and can always be 
followed should similar matters arise. 
 
The Deepak Shah case demonstrates that national courts can give substance to and apply the 
right of residence of EAC citizens even in matters more far-reaching than what is provided for 
in the CMP and its regulations. In other words, the national Courts can give substance to the 
right of residence far beyond the formalistic provisions of both national and community laws. 
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6.4 Right of establishment 
The right of establishment, as previously explained, applies to those persons who wish to set-
up or manage, economic activities as self-employed persons in a Partner State other than their 
own72.  
6.4.1 Formal requirements pertaining to the right of establishment 
EAC citizens who wish to so establish themselves will have to fulfil the necessary requirements 
and conditions in the host Partner State before they can obtain a work or residence permit. The 
class of permit to be issued varies in each Partner State and, as shown in Table 2, depends on 
the type of economic activity one wants to undertake. The requirements set by each country 
before one can establish oneself vary. For purposes of illustration, we may use the examples of 
persons who intend or wish to engage in trade, business or a profession, i.e. permits: Class “A” 
in Tanzania; Classes “C” and “G” in Kenya and Rwanda; and Classes “D” and “F” in Uganda. 
Table 3 (see Appendix 1) shows the requirements in each country for each of these permits. 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that while some of the requirements for establishment are standard across 
all countries, there are also some distinct variations. With regard to Tanzania, the list of 
requirements appears to be quite lengthy, but this could probably be due to the fact that there 
are many sub-categories of permits merged into one Class (see Table 2). Additionally, 
depending on which permit sub-category one seeks, not all listed requirements may be 
necessary. 
 
The time it takes to process permits varies in each country. Save for Rwanda which claims to 
process a permit in an average of three days73, it is not clear the time it takes in other Partner 
States. In Tanzania, for those who process work permits through the Tanzania Investment 
Centre, it supposedly takes about fifteen days74. For Uganda and Kenya, the timelines are not 
very clear. The process may still be quite cumbersome in almost all the Partner States and in 
some instances, it has been reported to take about six months before a work/residence permit 
is acquired75. 
                                                          
 
72 CMP Article 13.3. 
73https://www.migration.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/PDF_files/FREQUENT_ASKED_QUESTION_VISA_AN
D_PERMIT.pdf, accessed in June 2015. 
74 http://www.tic.co.tz/procedure/285/162?l=en, accessed in June 2015. 
75 Luzze op cit note 68. 
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The amount of fees charged in each Partner State further demonstrates a lack of uniformity. 
Permit fees have been waived selectively for citizens of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda that wish 
to establish themselves in any of those countries, while for Tanzania fees are still charged for 
citizens from the other countries. In reciprocation, the other countries still charge fees for 
Tanzanian nationals who wish to establish themselves in any of those countries. With regard 
to the fee waiver, the EAC Partner States have applied the principle of variable geometry, one 
of the operational principles of the EAC76. In an advisory opinion, the EACJ has explained this 
principle as being intended for or actually allowing ‘those Partner States who cannot implement 
a particular decision simultaneously or immediately to implement it at a suitable certain future 
time or simply at a different speed while at the same time allowing those who are able to 
implement immediately to do so’77. Thus, the Northern Corridor countries, Kenya, Rwanda and 
Uganda, in an effort to fast-track the integration process have made use of the variable 
geometry principle in waiving work permit fees, implementing a single tourist visa, and 
allowing the use of national IDs by each other’s nationals who wish to travel among any of 
these States. Tanzania and Burundi have not yet opted into this initiative, although they too are 
served, perhaps in part, by this corridor78. 
 
The waiver of permit fees makes it more attractive and less costly for EAC citizens who want 
to work or establish themselves in other EAC countries79. There is therefore expected to be an 
increase in the movement of labour, persons, services, goods and capital, as is indeed envisaged 
under Community law, at least among three of the Partner States. Moreover, the less and easier 
the requirements and formalities, the more investors or entrepreneurs that a Partner State 
attracts, and the more equal treatment that may be attained between nationals and non-
nationals80. As explained in chapter two, the gist of the right of establishment is non-
                                                          
 
76 EAC Treaty Article 7.1 para (e). 
77 In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory 
Opinion, EACJ Application No. 1 of 2008. 
78 During the 9th Summit of the Heads of State of the Northern Corridor countries, Burundi announced that it 
would cease being an observer and become a full-fledged member- see, Edmund Kagire ‘Jakaya Kikwete in 
Kigali for Northern Corridor meet as countries pledge speed’ The East African 7 March 2015. 
79 Interview with official at DCIC, Kampala, Uganda (April 2015). See also 
http://www.nciprojects.org/project/immigration-tourism-trade-labour-and-services-ittls, accessed June 2015. 
80 Although there may not be official statistical data to this effect, there has been reported some increase in 
movement of persons and trade volumes among the three countries- 
http://www.sustainabletourismalliance.net/northern-corridor-integration-projects-countries-seek-uniform-
tourism-marketing-approach/, accessed June 2015. 
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discrimination among nationals and non-nationals as they are both exactly in the same 
situation. This however, is not necessarily the case in all EAC Partner States, as partly 
demonstrated with the requirement to pay permit fees by EAC citizens in those Partner States 
where this is the case. 
 
Furthermore, in all EAC Partner States, there is a clear distinction between local investors and 
foreign investors, with EAC citizens largely still being regarded in the latter category. Although 
across all EAC States, the documents that are required of persons who wish to establish 
themselves, are fairly much the same for nationals and non-nationals, there are some 
requirements that may differ in each country, which thus accentuate the difference in treatment 
between nationals and non-nationals. For instance, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda require a 
security bond or payment of a security deposit prior to issuance of permits to persons who 
intend to engage in business, trade, consultancy or prescribed professions. This is not required 
of nationals, and for purposes of comparison, it seems not to be a requirement in Rwanda. 
While a police clearance or certificate of good conduct is one of the emphasised requirements 
in Uganda and Rwanda, it is not mentioned among the permit requirements in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Neither does it seem to be a requirement for nationals in either Uganda or Rwanda. 
All four countries, however, have set minimum thresholds of capital required from an investor 
that seeks to establish himself or herself in the host Partner State. In Uganda, foreign investors 
(including EAC citizens) require a minimum of USD 100,000, while local investors (nationals) 
require USD 50,00081. In Tanzania, the Tanzania Investment Centre handles projects that are 
worth USD 300,000 for foreign investors and USD 100,000 for Tanzanian nationals82. The 
Kenyan law requires applicants for the Class “G” permit to show proof of capital of at least 
USD 100,00083. In Rwanda, a minimum start-up of USD 250,000 is required for overseas 
citizens, and USD 100,000 required for locals and members of the EAC and COMESA States84.  
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is quite evident that only Rwanda has removed the distinction 
between Rwandan nationals and other EAC citizens for purposes of capital requirements for 
                                                          
 
81 See http://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/index.php/faqs; Investment Code Act cap. 92 Laws of Uganda, Section 
10(5), accessed in June 2015. 
82 Tanzania Investment Centre Tanzania Investment Guide 2014-2015 available at http://www.tic.co.tz/ accessed 
in June 2015. 
83Kenya permit requirements as mentioned on http://www.immigration.go.ke/Information.html accessed in June 
2015. 
84 See http://www.rdb.rw/departments/investment/faqs.html accessed in June 2015. 
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establishing a business in Rwanda. The other EAC countries still discriminate between 
nationals and other EAC citizens.  
 
6.4.2 Judicial insights into the right of establishment in the EAC 
Despite the apparently discriminatory provisions on the right of establishment, the issue has 
hardly been the subject of adjudication before the national courts. Nonetheless, there are a 
couple of cases, which provide an insight on the perspective of the national courts on some of 
the relevant national laws.  
 
The first of such cases is the Ugandan case of Pearl Impex (U) Ltd and 2 Others v Attorney-
General and Another85. One of the issues that the High Court had to determine was whether or 
not a foreign investor engaging in trade only could validly be issued with an entry permit by 
the Directorate of Immigration without a certificate of remittance of USD 100,000 from the 
Bank of Uganda, in accordance with specific provisions of the Uganda Investment Code Act. 
In its decision, court noted that the term ‘foreign investor’ used in the Act included any person 
that is not a citizen of Uganda, and thus it extended also to nationals of other EAC Partner 
States. The court then touched on the sub-issue of whether the Investment Code Act was 
consistent with the concept of free movement of capital, labour, goods and services in the East 
African Common Market. In this regard, the court held that the Uganda Investment Authority 
could determine who a foreign investor was. As far as entry permits were concerned, ‘the 
effectiveness of the law and implementation of its objectives depends on enforcement of the 
provision that a foreign investor who wishes to engage in trade only is required to open an [sic] 
bank account with the Bank of Uganda and deposit a minimum of United States Dollars 
100,000 or its equivalent in Uganda Shillings and obtain from the Bank of Uganda a certificate 
of remittance. This provision of law has ramifications on regional common market policies due 
to the citizen based definition of a foreign investor’ 86 (emphasis added). 
 
Although the judge neither went into detail of the possible ramifications nor said outright that 
the Investment Code Act was inconsistent with the EAC law, he definitely intimated as much. 
This is so because further on, he actually observed that ‘it is the duty of the Uganda Investment 
                                                          
 
85 H.C.C.S. No. 3 of 2011. 
86 Ibid. 
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Authority to ensure that the policy and the law is consistent with Uganda’s strides towards 
regional integration and common markets as far as the intended flow of investment capital as 
envisaged under… the Treaty creating the East African Community and its Common 
Market…’.  
 
The case did not concern matters to do with the EAC per se, but was mainly looking at the 
importance of the remittance a foreign investor needs to pay to the Central Bank and its effect 
on other formal requirements. Thus the issue of consistency or inconsistency with community 
law was more or less obiter dicta, a probable explanation for why the learned judge hedged 
around it instead of dealing with it decisively. Had he delved a little deeper into it, he might 
have possibly found that the Ugandan law was discriminatory towards other EAC citizens who 
wished to establish themselves in Uganda, a measure in breach of its obligations under the EAC 
Treaty and the CMP. Such a judgment, would of course have rung true for some of the other 
EAC States as well where measures that distinguish between nationals and non-nationals still 
exist. As it is, the Uganda Investment Code Act has not yet been amended, and neither has the 
Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act that still regards EAC citizens as ‘foreigners’ 
or ‘aliens’ for purposes of investment capital required for establishment87. The failure to amend 
laws among the EAC Partner States has been pointed out as one of the major hold-backs to 
compliance with and hence implementation of the EAC Treaty, the CMP and its annexes88. 
 
The second notable case was a Kenyan case that involved the issue of limiting the right of 
establishment with regard to Advocates in Kenya. As discussed earlier, the right to 
establishment (as well as the right of residence) is not absolute and may be subject to limitations 
on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Whether or not the measures in 
the various EAC Partner States, which apply to EAC citizens, but do not apply to nationals, 
qualify as justifiable limitations on any of the specified grounds, is a matter that would require 
judicial interpretation.  
 
                                                          
 
87 There is an attempt by the Uganda Government to identify all laws that are not in conformity with 
Community law; and the Uganda Investment Code Act as well as the Immigration laws are some of the many 
that have been identified by the Uganda Law Reform Commission. 
88 Interview with official at MEACA, Kampala, Uganda (March 2015).  
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In The Law Society of Kenya v The Attorney-General and 2 Others89, the petitioners challenged 
an amendment to the Advocates Act of Kenya90 which extended admission as an advocate in 
Kenya to citizens of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, provided they are duly qualified. 
Some of the qualifications required are that one should have obtained a law degree, and that he 
or she is an advocate of the High Court of Uganda, the High Court of Rwanda, the High Court 
of Burundi, or the High Court of Tanzania, as the case may be91. The petitioners argued that 
opening up Kenya’s market for trade in legal services in favour of non-Kenyans without 
reciprocal access for Kenyan lawyers and judges in those other countries, inter alia, violated 
the public good expressed in the Kenyan Constitution. Furthermore, this measure could lead to 
unqualified persons being admitted in practice to the detriment of young Kenyan lawyers. To 
put this in terms of Community law, the petitioners were, in effect, arguing that Kenya’s 
opening up to admit lawyers from other EAC countries was not fair in the circumstances, hence 
Kenya should have restricted market access by other EAC citizens for purposes of public 
interest in accordance with Article 13.8 of the CMP.  
 
In its decision, the court agreed with the 1st respondent that the amendment in question had 
only served to include citizens of Burundi and Rwanda since the two countries had then joined 
the EAC92; and that since the amendment was clear that the citizens of the EAC Partner States 
must be duly qualified as advocates in accordance with Section 13 of the Advocates Act of 
Kenya, the issue of different standards and entrenching discrimination against Kenyan 
advocates did not arise93. The court went on to emphasise that the amendments were consistent 
with Kenya’s obligations under Articles 7.1, 76 and 104 of the EAC Treaty and Article 23 of 
the CMP which provide for the free movement of persons, labour and services, and the 
enjoyment of the right of establishment and residence for EAC citizens within the 
Community94. In other words, the court upheld the right of establishment as contained in the 
EAC Treaty and CMP whilst rejecting the argument that it would be in public interest or for 
                                                          
 
89 High Court at Nairobi, Petition 318 of 2012. 
90 The Statute Law Miscellaneous (Amendments) Act 2012 No. 12 of 2012 which amended certain sections of 
the Advocates Act, (chapter 16 of the Laws of Kenya) with some consequential amendments being made to the 
Law Society of Kenya Act (chapter 18 of the Laws of Kenya). 
91 Advocates Act of Kenya as amended Sections 12 & 13. 
92 Before the amendment, the provision recognized citizens of Uganda and Tanzania as being eligible to 
admission as advocates in Kenya. Hence the amendment was a recognition of new parties to the EAC Treaty. 
93 The Law Society of Kenya v The Attorney General & Others, supra note 89 para 32. 
94 Ibid paras 33 & 34. 
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the public good of Kenyan nationals to restrict market access in legal services. In essence, the 
ground of ‘protecting the public good’ was not justifiable in the circumstances to limit or 
restrict the right of establishment of other EAC citizens who wished to practice as advocates in 
Kenya.  
 
This case demonstrates yet another instance of a national court upholding the Community law 
over national laws, even where by so doing it had to reject a constitution-based argument. Thus, 
the Court went beyond the nationalistic confines to advance the demands of Community law, 
thus upholding Kenya’s obligations under the EAC Treaty and CMP.  
 
The Kenyan law and the foregoing judgment notwithstanding, it has been reported that Kenya 
still ‘does not allow foreigners to practice law unless they work with a domestic counterpart, 
and foreigners cannot sign or file pleas in court’95. This is not an issue peculiar to Kenya only, 
all other EAC States have their peculiar requirements regarding legal practice, among other 
professions, that necessarily discriminate between nationals and non-nationals96. 
 
Although related to free movement of labour rather than the right of establishment, it is also 
worth mentioning at this point that most EAC countries will issue work permits to other EAC 
citizens upon assurance that there are no nationals with the required skills available on the local 
market. This is definitely the case in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda97. Actually in Uganda, this 
is one of the common grounds for denial of issuance of a work permit98. Tanzania, taking this 
a little further, has recently enacted a law regulating employment of non-citizens, including 
East Africans99. The Rwandan policy is such that EAC citizens from other Partner States are 
granted the first privilege when competing for the same positions or job with non-EAC 
citizens100. Nevertheless, first option goes to qualified Rwandans, failure to find whom leads to 
                                                          
 
95 The World Bank/EAC East African Common Market Score Card 2014: Tracking EAC Compliance in the 
Movement of Capital, Services and Goods (2014) 21. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations schedule 1, Form 25; The Tanzania Investment Act 1997, 
Section 24; Tanzania Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2014; ‘Proof of failure to employ a Ugandan’ 
is one of the requirements for a Class “G2” Permit- see http://www.immigration.go.ug/content/permits; Uganda 
Immigration Guidelines 2012, accessed in June 2015. 
98 Interview with official at DCIC, Kampala, Uganda (April 2015). 
99  Tanzania Non-Citizens (Employment Regulation) Act 2014. 
100 Report on the Social Sector Programme in the Ministry of East African Community Affairs available at 
http://www.mineac.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/Documents/Social/The_Social_Sector__2_.pdf, accessed in 
June 2015.  
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employment of a foreign national101. These nationalistic tendencies, however, also at times 
extend to the right of establishment as clearly illustrated in the Law Society of Kenya case.  
 
Although individual Partner States are right to be concerned about high youth unemployment 
levels, it was thought that the common market could in a way provide more employment 
opportunities beyond national boundaries102. The current laws and policies restricting 
employment of foreign nationals, including EAC citizens, however, demonstrate scepticism on 
the part of the Partner States103. Suffice to say that where such measures exist, they inevitably 
hamper free movement as the reason for moving would be obviated. Hence the freedom of 
movement of persons could cease to have substance.  
 
From the foregoing discussion one can surmise a variance in community law and national laws; 
and also a variance in the law and practice. Partner States can be seen to be moving at a much 
slower pace in implementing their obligations on the right of establishment, than they 
comparably are with regard to their obligations on the free movement of persons.   
 
The removal of restrictions under the right of establishment is supposed to be gradual and 
progressive104. Mindful of this leeway that Partner States have got, as well as their specific 
commitments to the liberalisation of services, a careful assessment would be required to 
determine whether or not a Partner State is meeting its obligations. It would be interesting if 
the various laws and policies pertaining in the respective Partner States, which apply separately 
to nationals and other EAC citizens, were to be subjected to judicial scrutiny in the national 
courts. The court, taking each State’s peculiar circumstances into consideration, would then 
determine whether or not such ostensibly discriminatory measures are justifiable or not; 
                                                          
 
101https://www.migration.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/PDF_files/FREQUENT_ASKED_QUESTION_VISA_A
ND_PERMIT.pdf, accessed in June 2015.  
102 EAC Secretariat Report of The Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation (2004) para 218. 
103 See Edwin Mutai ‘Kenyatta, Kagame call for EAC member states to open borders’ The East African 16 
October 2014. 
104 CMP Article 11, para (b); EAC Right of Establishment Regulations regulation 10.1 reiterates that the 
restrictions under the right of establishment shall be in accordance  with the Schedule on the Progressive 
Liberalization of Services annexed to the CMP. CMP Article 23.1 recognises that the implementation of this 
Schedule is to be gradual. This is also in accordance with the Partner States’ obligations under the GATS-  see 
WTO ‘Factual Presentation: Economic Integration Agreement East African Community Common Market 
(Services)’ Report by the EAC Secretariat to the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements available at 
rtais.wto.org, accessed on 24 April 2017. 
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whether the various measures, laws and policies in the individual Partner States are legitimate, 
objective, and proportionate105. 
 
Another issue that would yet benefit from judicial scrutiny is the very requirement for work 
permits for EAC citizens establishing themselves or working in Partner States other than their 
own. The main issue here would be whether or not the requirement for work permits by EAC 
nationals who wish to work or establish themselves in another Partner State amounts to 
discrimination.  
 
Some stakeholders have reportedly singled out the failure to waive work permit requirements 
for citizens of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi as hampering regional 
movement of labour106. When compared with the practice in the EU, for instance, citizens of 
the Union, generally107 do not need work permits to work anywhere in the EU whether as 
workers or self-employed persons. Within the EAC, however, the CMP and its annexes, much 
as they emphasise the principle of non-discrimination, actually do stipulate for the requirement 
for work permits for EAC citizens moving to other EAC countries for purposes of work or 
business, which might seem as a contradiction. This is yet an indication of the emphasis of the 
focus of the framers of the CMP on the formalities, in this case formalities pertaining to the 
work activity, rather than on the substance of the right guaranteed.  
 
Looking at the grounds of limitations to the right of establishment as provided for in the CMP, 
the requirement for a work permit for EAC citizens who wish to establish themselves in a 
Partner State would have to be justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health. This would be an issue best determined by the courts, and particularly the EACJ. 
In the meantime, one can argue that the only justification so far is that the CMP itself prescribes 
that EAC citizens who wish to work or establish themselves in a Partner State other than their 
own require a work permit108.  
                                                          
 
105 See especially Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano [1995] ECR I-4165 para 37. 
106  Gahiji ‘EAC legal team urged to harmonise regional work, residence permit rule’ News of Rwanda 4 
November 2014. 
107 There are some exceptions regarding Croatian citizens or some citizens of the Union working in Croatia- 
http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/work-abroad/work-permits/index_en.htm, accessed in June 2015.   
108 See discussion in chapter four sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2; EAC Right of Establishment Regulations; and EAC 
Free Movement of Workers Regulations. 
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On a more practical level, during the 10th Northern Corridor Integration Projects Summit109, 
the Heads of State signed the Agreement on Total Liberalization of the Free Movement of 
Labour, and the Agreement on Total Liberalization of Free Movement of Services. Although 
the terms of the agreement are not yet fully available to the public, it appears like they provide 
for, inter alia,  the abolition of work permits for nationals of Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda who 
wish to practice their professions in any of the three countries110.  In yet another development, 
there was a meeting of multi-sectoral experts on the Harmonisation of the 
Entry/Work/Residence Permits Fees, Forms and Procedures within the EAC Common Market 
Protocol Framework111. The purpose of the meeting included reviewing forms, fees and 
procedures of obtaining entry/work/residence permits with a view to harmonising them. So it 
seems like there are parallel developments or views with regard to the issue of work permits 
within the EAC, which creates some confusion on the way forward- is it abolition of work 
permits or their harmonisation? What is apparent is that there are different levels of progress 
being made within the EAC with some countries moving faster in some aspects than others. 
The ideal situation would of course be abolition of work permits in all aspects for EAC 
nationals in all the Partner States. 
6.5 Role of national courts in upholding and protecting migration rights 
Article 54.2 of the CMP provides that Partner States shall, in accordance with their 
Constitutions, national laws and administrative procedures, guarantee that any person whose 
rights and liberties as guaranteed under the Protocol have been infringed shall have a right of 
redress before competent judicial, administrative, legislative or other authority. Accordingly, 
national courts and other established administrative bodies may provide avenues for redress 
with regard to migration rights of EAC citizens.  
 
                                                          
 
109 Joint Communiqué of 10th Northern Corridor Integration Projects Summit held at Kampala, Uganda, 6th June 
2015. 
110  Dicta Asiimwe ‘Uganda joins Kenya, Rwanda in abolishing work permits for professionals’ The East 
African 13 June 2015. 
111 The meeting was held in Nairobi, Kenya on 8-10th June 2015. The meeting brought  together 
experts  drawn  from immigration,  labour,  investment  authorities,  workers, and employers  organisations 
to  address  issues  of  work/residence permit harmonisation- see http://www.eatuc.org/news, accessed in June 
2015.   
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All the EAC countries have a redress or appeal mechanism within the Ministry or Government 
Department responsible for immigration. In Uganda, the National Citizenship and Immigration 
Board has as one of its functions the grant and cancellation of immigration permits112. Any 
person aggrieved by a decision of the Board may appeal to the Minister for Internal Affairs113. 
Where a person still feels aggrieved after the Minister’s decision, he or she may appeal to the 
High Court and the decision of the High Court shall be final114. However, with regard to a 
deportation order, which is made by the Minister, an aggrieved person may appeal to the High 
Court, the decision of which may be appealed to the Court of Appeal115. In Kenya, any person 
aggrieved by a decision of a public officer made under the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration 
Act may apply to the High Court for a review116. Elsewhere the law provides that any person 
aggrieved by decisions of the Cabinet Secretary or of the Kenya Citizens and Foreign Nationals 
Management Service may appeal to the High Court117. Likewise, a person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Permit Determination Committee, established under the Kenya Citizens and 
Foreign Nationals Management Service Act, may appeal to the High Court118. Although there 
may appear to be many decision points in Kenya, what’s of importance is that the decision of 
any of these bodies can be challenged in a Court of law. Under the Tanzania law, deportations 
are recommended by the Director of Immigration Services and an order is made by the Minister 
responsible for immigration119. Moreover, where an application for a permit is denied or the 
conditions of or validity period of a permit are varied, the aggrieved person may appeal to the 
Minister and the Minister’s decision shall be final and ‘not be subject to any inquiry by any 
Court of law’120. In Rwanda, the law stipulates that appeals against a deportation order shall be 
made to the Head of the National Intelligence and Security Service121. The power, though, to 
cancel visas or residence permits lies with the Director-General of Immigration and 
Emigration122.  
 
                                                          
 
112 The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act Section 7(1). 
113 Ibid Section 10(1). 
114 Ibid Section 10(5). 
115 Ibid Section 60(7). 
116 Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act Section 57(1).  
117 Ibid Section 57(2). 
118 Ibid Section 40(10). 
119 Tanzania Immigration Act Section 14. 
120 Ibid Section 23. 
121 Law on Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Article 16. 
122 Ibid Article 11. 
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It would appear like only the immigration laws of Kenya and Uganda expressly allow for 
appeals to courts of law, or some sort of judicial scrutiny of decisions emanating from the 
respective immigration bodies. For Rwanda, the law does not make any mention of the role of 
national courts in immigration matters. Upon responding to an inquiry on whether immigration 
cases can be handled by the Rwandan courts, an official of the Rwandan judiciary clarified that 
‘Rwandan Courts are competent for this cases but I don’t know if there are cases taken before 
Courts up to know [sic]. Generally the immigration office handles these cases properly’123. 
Thus one can assume that any person aggrieved by an immigration decision of the Directorate 
of Immigration may appeal to the relevant courts of Rwanda. In Tanzania, the position is rather 
categorically stated, the courts have no jurisdiction over decisions made by immigration 
authorities. 
 
In addition to these appeal mechanisms, each country has its complaints process with regards 
to rights guaranteed in the CMP. In Uganda, for instance, there is a complaints desk hosted by 
the Ministry of Trade. It usually handles trade-related complaints, and matters of immigration 
may not necessarily fall in its purview, but then again goods do not move on their own. Failure 
to move goods necessarily impacts on the free movement of persons and other related rights124, 
such as the right of establishment for those who wish to deal in trade.  
 
It is not surprising therefore that with the administrative procedures in place, some playing a 
quasi-judicial role, some having the final say, that there is a dearth of cases determined by the 
national courts on matters of migration rights of EAC citizens. Most of the cases that are usually 
adjudicated upon, at least from the jurisprudence of Kenyan and Ugandan courts, concern 
matters of the Customs Union and its protocol125. One possible explanation for this could be 
that it is mainly persons dealing in trade and business that are bringing matters to court, and 
they are mostly affected by the Customs Union Protocol which has been in force much longer 
than the CMP.  
 
                                                          
 
123 Email correspondence 8 May 2015. 
124 Interview with official at MEACA, Kampala, Uganda (March 2015).  
125 This is evident from an online search on relevant cases available on http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/ and 
http://www.ulii.org/ and http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.net/#, as at end of June 2015. 
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The rights contained in the CMP and its annexes have not really been brought for adjudication 
before national courts. Although this might be an indicator that all is well, this is definitely not 
the case within the EAC as presented in the foregoing discussion. An explanation that was 
proffered to the question on why appeals to the High Court of Uganda on immigration matters 
were virtually non-existent, was that ‘the cases are straight-forward’126. Hence, there is no cause 
to appeal. This in a way echoes the response, quoted earlier, in the case of Rwanda. 
 
There does not appear to be any contestation concerning the decision-making powers of these 
administrative bodies. Research efforts did not reveal any cases in which the national laws 
restricting judicial review or decisions of the administrative bodies were contested. Hence, it 
is hard to discern the position of the national courts on such issues. 
 
The EACJ, much as it views the national judicial, administrative and other authorities referred 
to in Article 54.2 of the CMP as alternative dispute mechanisms, it has categorically stated that 
their power to ‘rule on disputes of persons seeking redress does not and should not include final 
determination over questions of interpretation of the Protocol’127. The obvious implication of 
this is that inasmuch as the national law may seem to provide a final point of determination of 
a matter involving migration rights of EAC citizens, issues that involve interpreting the CMP 
or even the EAC Treaty, should always be referred to the EACJ for final determination. 
Accordingly all national organs and institutions referred to in Article 54.2 of the CMP should 
make use of the preliminary referencing procedure provided for under Article 34 of the EAC 
Treaty. From the point of view of the EACJ, national laws that have the effect of ousting 
judicial review, might be of no consequence when the EACJ becomes apprised of the matter. 
 
By way of summary, therefore, one can infer that matters concerning migration rights for EAC 
citizens are not being much adjudicated upon because: one, the national laws may exclude the 
courts from handling them, as is the case, say, in Tanzania. Two, there may be alternative, 
faster, less-costly and less cumbersome non-judicial procedures available such as the 
complaints mechanisms, and the various administrative procedures in the various immigration 
departments, hence these are more preferable. Three, it could be that the concerned citizens, 
                                                          
 
126 Interview with official at DCIC, Kampala, Uganda (April 2015). 
127 The East African Law Society v The Secretary General of the EAC, EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2011. 
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for various reasons, are either unwilling or not able to take such matters before national courts. 
The third reason could be more plausible considering that most persons who benefit most from 
the EAC migration rights regime, especially when considering the provisions of the CMP, are 
the business persons, the workers in the private sector, and students. They may have faster or 
more efficient means and mechanisms to resolve their problems128. As it is, the rate of litigation 
under the CMP is currently still low, not only at the national level, but also in the EACJ. There 
is therefore a need for more intervention by civil society organisations undertaking more public 
interest litigation as well as advocacy for the promotion and protection of migration rights of 
EAC citizens within the Community. 
6.6 Chapter conclusion 
The migration rights regime of the EAC is, fairly speaking, quite nascent and so, much may 
not be expected to happen too soon. The CMP has only been in force since 2009 (less than ten 
years) and the EAC Partner States, some much faster than others, are still trying to make the 
relevant adaptations and modifications to conform to its provisions.  
 
With regard to the free movement of persons, although there are  a number of notable 
progressive steps these are more to do with formalities of immigration and emigration leading 
to more eased cross-border movement for nationals of EAC Partner States within the 
Community.  The right of residence is currently only available for workers and business 
persons and members of their family, which is a very small percentage of East Africans. 
Additionally, each State still determines its own procedures for issuing work/residence permits, 
thus emphasising the lack of harmony and certainty in the migration process. Save for the 
waiver of work permit fees among the Northern Corridor countries, EAC citizens will not, in 
many aspects in each of the Partner States, be treated different from other foreign nationals. 
This is underscored by the fact that most laws in virtually all Partner States still contain 
provisions that discriminate between their nationals and nationals of other EAC States. The 
discrimination between nationals and other EAC citizens is even more manifest when it comes 
to the right of establishment. EAC citizens who wish to establish themselves in a Partner State 
                                                          
 
128 James Gathii ‘Variation in the use of sub-regional integration courts between business and human rights 
actors: the case of the East African Court of Justice’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 45-49. Some 
of the reasons he gives for business actors eschewing the EACJ may perhaps explain a similar occurrence at the 
national level. These reasons include: administrative mechanisms are deemed more effective than judicial 
review or litigation; and low levels of legalisation of EAC integration, which may result in less litigation.  
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other than their own still face many frustrating and discouraging legal and administrative 
hurdles, which essentially mark the distinction between them and nationals. Hopefully, with 
the new agreements recently signed by the Northern Corridor countries, discriminatory 
measures among the Partner States will soon be done away with. As it is, the requirement of 
non-discrimination under Community law is yet to be met.  
 
The amendment of national laws that are not in conformity with Community law is yet to be 
completed. In Uganda, for instance, such laws have been identified, but the process of 
amending them is taking quite a while129. Currently the issue of amending and harmonising 
laws in order to bring them into conformity with the CMP seems to be high on the agenda, 
particularly among the Northern Corridor countries. 
 
As has been demonstrated, some of the discriminatory practices or practices that seem to hinder 
full enjoyment of migration rights, such as the requirements for residence/work permits, are 
actually entrenched in the Community law itself. This appears to be a self-contradiction since 
the same laws provide for non-discrimination. This as has been explained by some 
researchers130 was a result of compromises that had to be made before the CMP could come 
into force, an event that occurred at least a couple of years later than was originally 
envisaged131. This is an area that would benefit greatly from judicial insight. 
 
Apparently, national courts as well as the EACJ, as yet, are underutilised. This is particularly 
so with regards to migration rights of EAC citizens. There is so much that the courts could do 
in order to give substance and effect to these rights, but presently most of the related issues 
seem to be handled more by administrative authorities. This may not be too surprising when 
one considers that the nature of the rights as elaborated in the CMP, particularly in the annexes 
to the CMP, is still largely to do with administrative and bureaucratic processes that are best 
handled by the administrative authorities and bureaucrats of each Partner State. Besides, 
immigration matters among EAC Partner States are usually considered as security matters and 
                                                          
 
129 By the end of February 2015, the Uganda Law Reform Commission had identified about twenty two sets of 
laws that needed to be brought in conformity with the CMP, but by end of June 2015, the report on the same 
was yet to be finalised and approved.  
130 Mutai op cit note 19 at 1; James T Gathii African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (2011) 50-
51. 
131 EAC Secretariat Report op cit note 102 paras 83, 130. 
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so it is almost impossible to get access to cases handled by these administrative or quasi-judicial 
bodies. Consequently, with the courts still exercising a minimal role, it is difficult to get a 
complete picture of how the substance of migration rights is perceived in each Partner State, 
and whether or not these rights are being adequately protected at the national level. The few 
cases discussed herein have demonstrated that national courts can indeed be drivers for 
promoting and protecting migration rights, but their potential is yet to be fully exploited or 
maximally utilised. 
 
When migration rights within the EAC are compared to the various concepts elucidated in 
chapter two, there is still more that needs to be addressed, in terms of laws, policies and 
practices, both at the national and Community level in order for EAC citizens to fully enjoy 
migration rights in a region that intends to become a political federation. Migration rights, go 
beyond mere immigration procedures. All laws, policies and measures that inhibit or hamper 
free movement need to be removed in all Partner States. As the situation currently stands, 
migration rights of EAC citizens are still largely formalistic and not really substantive. 
Evidence of this may be seen in the extant border posts among EAC countries;  the continued 
subjection of EAC citizens to immigration controls which have thus far only been eased 
through abolition of visas, use of national IDs (in only three EAC countries), establishment of 
separate border counters, and faster or eased progress through the border immigration points; 
the lack of harmonised laws; and the continued handling of CMP matters by administrative 
institutions without much judicial review or oversight. Hence, migration rights within the EAC 
may be seen to be still in early or preliminary phases of taking full effect. There is thus need to 
move from the formal to the more substantive aspects of migration rights if EAC citizens are 
to fully enjoy them.  
 
Furthermore, the status of implementation of migration rights, as presented in this chapter, 
leaves no doubt that the rationale or justification behind their implementation in each of the 
Partner States is decidedly economic.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION- WHICH WAY FOR MIGRATION RIGHTS IN THE EAC? 
7.0  The EAC and the role of migration rights  
The integration of the EAC is one of a kind since it is not purely an economic integration 
project, as is usually the case with other regional integration schemes in Africa and elsewhere. 
Going beyond the principally economic objectives of the archetypal REC, the EAC integration 
incorporates political, social and cultural, defence and security, research and technology, legal 
and judicial affairs objectives as well.  
The ultimate objective of the EAC is the establishment of a political federation, which means 
that all community undertakings, economic or otherwise, should be guided by that objective in 
mind. Hence, and following the recommendations of the Wako committee report on fast-
tracking the political federation1, EAC integration has not necessarily abided by the linear and 
sequential evolution from a free trade area to a customs union, to a common market, and onto 
an economic union. Rather, the attainment of these phases of integration is happening more or 
less simultaneously, in a parallel and overlapping manner. For instance, it was not necessary 
for a full customs union to have been attained before the CMP came into force. Neither was it 
after the objectives of the CMP been satisfactorily met before the EAC Protocol establishing 
the Monetary Union came into force.  
Migration rights, that is, the free movement of persons, including workers; the right of 
residence; and the right of establishment, have really developed and become defined in the 
course of regional economic integration. This was illustrated in chapter one with the example 
of how these rights developed in the EU, the prototype REC upon which most of the other 
RECs including the EAC have been modelled. The position of migration rights within the 
economic integration process has therefore justified rationalising them as economic freedoms 
ineluctably linked to economic development processes. 
Moreover, as argued in chapter one, the course of regional integration has tended to occur 
outside or parallel to the human rights discourse, with the former being considered to belong 
more to the realm of economics and trade-related matters.  In recent years, however, with the 
growing and wide recognition of human rights, they have gradually been incorporated into 
                                                          
 
1 Refer to chapter three section 3.4.2. 
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economic integration discourses and processes. Consequently, a number of REC Treaties 
including the EU Treaty, the EAC Treaty, and the ECOWAS Treaty contain provisions on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, at least recognised as fundamental principles of the 
Treaty and the integration process as a whole. 
The EAC entrenches human rights as one of its fundamental and operational principles. In light 
of the human rights influence, migration rights within the EAC framework might perhaps be 
seen or perceived of as analogous to human rights espoused in international and regional human 
rights instruments. Consequently, migration rights have been referred to as a ‘hybrid’ right2 
owing to their conceptual duality. Chapter two provided an analytical framework of this 
conceptual duality. The issue that thus arises is whether migration rights should be conceived 
of as ‘economic or market freedoms’ or as ‘human rights’. 
This has been one of the key objectives of this research: to ascertain the overriding conceptual 
basis of migration rights within the EAC, and to ascertain whether or not this would fit in with 
its overall objectives. The issue has been addressed by examining the substance of migration 
rights generally; looking at the legal provisions on migration rights under EAC law and 
examining how the EACJ, the Community Court, has interpreted and applied them. Finally it 
has analysed how they are being applied within the various Partner States- whether this 
domestic application is in consonance with Community law and in which direction it leans 
towards, that is, economic or human rights. 
One of the main arguments in this research has been that migration rights can and should be 
interpreted with a human rights-oriented approach, particularly where doing so is 
commensurate with the overall objectives of the regional community, and actually boosts their 
attainment. Even where, human rights may not be fully recognised in a regional community, 
migration rights, initially conceived of as economic freedoms, could be the indispensable link 
to gradually and eventually incorporating human rights within a REC’s integration trajectory. 
7.1 Summary of key findings 
Chapter two involved a discussion on the correlated concepts of migration rights and 
community citizenship. While migration rights have contributed to the development of the 
                                                          
 
2 See Laurence Helfer ‘Sub-regional courts in Africa: litigating the hybrid right to free movement’ iCourts 
Working Paper Series, No. 32, 2015. 
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concept of community citizenship within RECs, the latter concept would be hollow without the 
former. The chapter analysed the hybridity of migration rights, looking at both their economic 
and human rights underpinnings. The distinction was made between migration rights as 
enunciated within regional economic treaties, and analogous rights of free movement and 
residence; and the right to work and exercise one’s profession or trade as provided under human 
rights law. It emerged that migration rights as expressed and applied within regional integration 
may not be exercised to the same extent as analogous human rights. Migration rights are limited 
in terms of the persons that may benefit from them, and they are subject to conditions, 
regulations and restrictions that may not necessarily apply from a human rights perspective. 
These inherent limitations can be attributed to the economic underpinnings of migration rights. 
They are availed only to the extent that they are necessary to fulfil the objectives of the REC, 
which objectives are usually, economic. Moreover, regional courts, specifically the ECJ, have 
incrementally applied a human rights approach to migration rights in the course of their 
interpretation and application under community law. Be that as it may, the interpretation and 
rationalisation of migration rights may vary from REC to REC, hence the need to look at the 
EAC in detail as focal REC examined in this research.  
Chapter three provided an overview of the EAC, juxtaposing the original EAC that existed 
between 1967 and 1977, with the current EAC which was established in 1999 in attempt to 
revive the integration project. Unlike the old EAC, the new EAC is marked by broader 
objectives which go beyond economic objectives, and is guided by the principles of good 
governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, among others. The current dispensation 
sets the tone for a more liberal and progressive interpretation of the rights guaranteed under 
Community law.  
Within the EAC, although there had been prior integration efforts and some free movement by 
citizens, albeit informal, the current EAC Treaty and CMP contain elaborate and well-
articulated provisions on migration rights of EAC citizens. An in-depth look at these provisions 
in chapter four revealed the inherent duality in the nature of these rights. On the one hand, the 
fact that they are contained in the CMP, which establishes the common market; and most of 
them relate to economically active citizens migrating within the common market, strongly 
suggests that they should be regarded as economic or market freedoms. On the other hand, 
looking closely at the content of these rights, one cannot miss the distinct human rights 
overtones, for example as relates to non-discrimination and equality in treatment; free 
movement as a right pertaining to all community citizens; the rights of family members and 
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dependants; and restrictions or limitations of these rights, among others. In this regard, the 
language of the Treaty and the CMP echoes more that of human rights instruments than that of 
economic treaties. Coupled with the overarching objectives of the Treaty that aim at 
establishing a political federation, and human rights being some of the guiding principles of 
the EAC, it is thus a reasonable expectation that migration rights within the EAC are interpreted 
and applied with a human rights approach as opposed to an exclusively economic approach. It 
was, however, concluded that migration rights as provided for under the CMP and its 
regulations seem more focussed on formal procedures as pertain to free movement of persons, 
rights of establishment and residence and not the substance of the rights as such. Additionally 
they tend to benefit more the economically active EAC citizens, particularly the rights of 
residence and establishment. 
Chapter five considered the interpretation and application of migration rights in the EAC by 
the EACJ. It involved a detailed discussion of the Mukira Mohochi case, the only case 
involving a migration right that the court has decided on its merits. In this case, while the Court 
upheld the free movement of persons under the CMP, it did not consider whether or not there 
was an overriding economic or human rights rationale. Although it entertained the alleged 
human rights violations, including that on free movement, and made a finding to that effect, 
the Court avoided deeply analysing these allegations within the ambit of human rights 
instruments. As such it did not exactly endorse the human rights interpretation, but rather came 
up with a neutral term of ‘Treaty-guaranteed rights’, which in effect espouses the duality of 
migration rights.  
The main challenge in this chapter was forming a definitive opinion on the Court’s approach 
to migration rights on the basis of a single case. However, when considered in the totality of 
other significant decisions of the EACJ, a common trend was the EACJ’s proclivity to a textual-
formalist interpretational approach. It was contended that, overall, the EACJ tends to be 
cautious and restrained, hence it may not be seen as pushing the boundaries of the express 
Treaty provisions, even where doing so would mean adopting a human rights approach or more 
expansive interpretation to migration rights. This restraint could partly be as a result of the 
Court’s express lack of jurisdiction over human rights matters, in which case it tries to steer 
away from directly adjudicating upon them. Understandably, interpreting and adjudicating 
upon migration rights as human rights might mean exercising jurisdiction not yet bestowed 
upon it, thus setting it on a possible collision course with the other organs of the EAC. This is 
a turn of events that the Court seems ready and willing to avoid especially after the backlash 
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experience it suffered after the Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o decision. Therefore, as far as the EACJ 
is concerned, migration rights are interpreted as expressly provided for in the Treaty, no more 
or less- a non-committal neutral position.  
Chapter six examined the status of implementation of migration rights in various EAC Partner 
States. The main findings herein were as follows:  the Partner States are not really moving at 
the same pace in ensuring Treaty compliance, some appear to be moving faster, while others 
appear hesitant. Secondly, relevant laws and regulations are yet to be amended or even 
harmonised throughout the Community. Thirdly, discrimination on grounds of nationality, 
especially with regards to work and establishment, is still largely prevalent; nationals of Partner 
States still receive favourable treatment than other community citizens. Community citizenship 
in some cases does not seem to count, even where it should. Moreover, the application of 
migration rights, save for the general free movement of persons, to a large extent applies to 
economically active persons. However, members of their families and dependants may also 
benefit, their rights deriving from those of the economically active member. Fourthly, despite 
the existence of many national laws, policies and State practices that should be challenged in 
Courts of law, there are hardly any cases on migration rights being taken for adjudication before 
either the national courts or the EACJ. The possible explanations for this may vary: there are 
other parallel administrative forums and mechanisms through which matters pertaining to 
migration rights can be resolved3. In a community that may not be so litigious, such 
mechanisms have been much preferred especially by the business community4. With regard to 
immigration matters, the immigration departments seem to be dealing with such matters 
conclusively leaving no room for judicial recourse. Nevertheless, the couple or so cases before 
national courts that have been examined in this thesis show a tendency by these courts to uphold 
supremacy of Community law, thus interpreting national laws in accordance thereof.  
The fact that there is no significant adjudication on migration rights suggests that within the 
EAC, migration rights are being shaped or defined by administrative bureaucrats more than the 
courts. One possible explanation for this state of affairs could be that the Community law itself 
stipulates more on formal procedures and requirements and places little emphasis on the 
                                                          
 
3 The Complaints mechanisms under the Trade Ministries; the review procedures under the national 
Immigration Departments, and the good-offices role played by the East African Business Council. 
4 James Gathii ‘Variation in the use of sub-regional integration courts between business and human rights 
actors: the case of the East African Court of Justice’ (2016) 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 45-49. 
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substance of the rights. Yet another possible explanation could be due to the nascence of the 
migration rights regime within the EAC whereby formalities or formal procedures are 
indicative of the preliminary phases of implementation.  
Emphasis on administrative mechanisms could result in lack of harmonisation and uniform 
application of Community law. Each State may still want to assert its sovereignty over matters 
which should be governed by Community law leading to divergences. This state of affairs could 
only derail the integration process. 
Community law, and the CMP in particular is meant to have direct effect, but the reality is that 
the Partner States are still struggling with implementation and meeting their obligations. 
Admittedly, there may be better compliance with regard to some rights such as the free 
movement of persons, particularly with regard to formal procedures, than with the other 
migration rights.  
At the moment, EAC Partner States seem to be focussing more on immigration procedures, but 
in actual sense and as explained in chapter two, migration rights are much more than mere 
immigration procedures. It may therefore be concluded that migration rights within the EAC 
are still being approached in mere formalistic terms and not quite in their substance. 
Formalities, although necessary, should facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of migration 
rights in accord with the Community objectives.  
Turning to the theoretical issue raised in this research on how migration rights are rationalised 
in the EAC, the answer is not so straight-forward. The Community law provisions on migration 
rights contain both economic and human rights nuances. The EACJ has stuck to this approach 
by adjudicating upon them as ‘Treaty-guaranteed rights’; while when it comes to 
implementation and practical execution, Partner States seem to approach migration rights as 
economic freedoms. Hence within the EAC, the duality of migration rights is preserved, both 
economic and human rights rationales may be adopted depending on the circumstances. The 
courts have a significant role to play in ensuring that the rights guaranteed under Community 
law are given substance depending on how they interpret and apply them. Moreover, a 
comparison with other regional courts, particularly the ECJ, has revealed that a textual 
approach may not always give substance to migration rights, but rather a teleological approach. 
With the teleological approach, regional courts have adopted a more human rights-oriented 
approach towards migration rights thus giving them full effect for the benefit of all community 
citizens.  
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The role of the Courts, both national and the EACJ, but especially the EACJ being the 
Community Court, in shaping and defining migration rights is therefore vital and critical. With 
regard to the EACJ, whose role is to interpret and apply the Treaty and its Protocols, its limited 
remedial powers coupled with its textual-formalism might partly account for its lack of 
popularity as a recourse mechanism on migration rights matters5. Interestingly and quite 
ironically, the Court is adjudicating more on matters which allege human rights violations, for 
which it does not have express jurisdiction, than matters such as migration rights over which it 
has express jurisdiction. The former cases are considered to fall under the general provisions 
on principles of the EAC which include rule of law and human rights protection (Articles 6 
para (d) and 7.2 of the EAC Treaty). But quite paradoxically, on matters of migration rights, 
the Court tends to deal with those aspects of the case for which there are express provisions in 
the Treaty or Protocol, while there is hardly any deductive reasoning or analysis on the aspect 
pertaining to human rights. Therein seems to lie the Court’s dilemma – how to deal with the 
conceptual duality of migration rights within the ambit of Community law and its jurisdiction.  
What follows is a suggestion on the approach that the EACJ and national courts should adopt 
in their interpretation and application of migration rights so as to give them more substance 
and make them more meaningful for EAC citizens. 
7.2 A synchronised approach or a paradigm-shift towards a human rights approach 
to migration rights within the EAC?6 
7.2.1  Arguments for a synchronised approach 
The synchronised approach is currently what seems to pertain within the EAC, at least from 
the perspective of the EACJ. Herein, the Court apparently embraces the duality of migration 
rights and deals with them as such. It cannot be seen to uphold one conceptual approach to 
migration rights over another- there is neither a strong emphasis on them being economic 
freedoms nor human rights or fundamental freedoms. Although it has emphasised that the EAC 
Treaty is not a human rights Treaty, the Court has not exactly treated migration rights in a strict 
economic sense whereby persons are viewed as mere factors of production serving the 
                                                          
 
5 See chapter five section 5.2.3. 
6 A modified version of this section has been incorporated in an article which has been accepted for publication 
in Journal of African Law published by Cambridge University Press- Caroline Nalule ‘Defining the scope of 
free movement of citizens in the East African Community: The East African Court of Justice and its interpretive 
approach’ accepted for publication in Journal of African Law.  
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economic objectives of the Community, mainly increased market access and improved 
economic welfare. Rather it has considered them as persons moving in exercise of their Treaty-
guaranteed rights and freedoms. One might speculate that the reason for not considering 
migration rights in the EAC solely as economic freedoms, is because doing so would not be in 
keeping with the objectives of the EAC in their entirety. It would only meet one and not the 
other objectives. On the other hand, neither has the court exactly gone overboard with the 
human rights interpretation as well, but has taken the neutral stance.  
This stance fits in with the Court’s textual-formalism approach which may be justified in 
consideration of the institutional or structural and external challenges it may face. For instance, 
the Treaty amendments that effectually undermined the supremacy of the Court, and restricted 
access by natural and legal persons; the lack of jurisdiction over human rights matters; the ad 
hoc nature of the Court, limited remedial powers, and the executive influence over the Court, 
particularly with regard to the appointment and removal of judges. Over all, the executive 
organs exercise some control over the EACJ, and in turn, the EACJ will tread with much 
restraint where its decision might appear confrontational7. External factors include the geo-
political environment; most of the countries in the EAC are strongly under the control of the 
Executive, and other arms of government are relatively weak, which is mirrored at the regional 
level. The civil society, though influential is still relatively weak; and the human rights culture 
is not yet particularly strong within the region.  
In addition, organs and institutions of the EAC are operating more at a level of cooperation and 
not as supranational bodies. This is particularly the case with the EAC Secretariat, which thus 
far, despite having the mandate to do so, has not brought any matter before the Court against 
any Partner State for failing to fulfil its obligations or even infringing the Treaty. Actually, in 
most cases, the Secretariat will side with Partner States and not those alleging violation or 
infringement of the Treaty by Partner States8. The EACJ, thus lacks the strong co-operation 
                                                          
 
7 See, for example: Hon. Sitenda Sebalu v The Secretary General of the East African Community; the Attorney 
General of the Republic of Uganda & 2 others, EACJ Reference No.1 of 2010; and Hon. Sitenda Sebalu v The 
Secretary General of the EAC, EACJ Reference No. 8 of 2012. 
8 The EAC Secretariat has been criticized for viewing ‘its mandate through the prism of Member States’ 
interests’ and not engaging sufficiently with civil society actors, especially during the course of the events that 
culminated in the backlash against the EACJ- See Karen J Alter, James T Gathii & Laurence Helfer ‘Backlash 
against international courts in West, East and Southern Africa: causes and consequences’ (2016) 27 European 
Journal of International Law 320. 
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from an organ that would boost its function and unique mandate, as, for instance, the European 
Commission did for the ECJ. 
Despite having political objectives as the ultimate phase of integration, the EAC is still very 
much at a stage where economic objectives and drivers are still largely predominant. The 
present reality is that of an economic community rather than a potential political federation. 
This could explain why migration rights are set out in the CMP, including the free movement 
of persons that are not economically active. It could also explain why the EAC Treaty and its 
Protocols hedge at the concept of community citizenship.  
The synchronised approach is thus reflective of the status of integration and the institutional 
and geo-political dynamics within the EAC. In the circumstances, it might be more effective 
and prudent for the court to interpret migration rights as Treaty-freedoms in the time-being, or 
to handle them in their hybridity as currently seems to be the approach of the EACJ. As the 
citizens of the Community become more aware of their rights and as the Community develops 
further towards the envisaged political federation, it would perhaps be more appropriate if a 
more expansive and human rights-oriented interpretation of migration rights were to be 
adopted.   
7.2.2  Seeds for a paradigm-shift 
The key argument for a paradigm-shift in the interpretation and application of migration rights 
in the EAC hinges primarily on the broad nature of its objectives, with the ultimate aim of 
establishing a political federation. Migration rights should not only be advanced for purposes 
of the economic objectives, but for the overall objectives of the community, hence the need for 
a more holistic interpretation and rationalisation. This calls for a shift from the predominantly 
economic paradigm among the Partner States, or the neutral ‘Treaty-guaranteed rights’ position 
of the EACJ, to a human rights-oriented approach to migration rights. The EACJ, being the 
Community organ responsible for the interpretation and application of Treaty would be a major 
driving force for this shift. Even if it were to adhere to its textual approach, all that would be 
required is to read some Treaty provisions more expansively, or specifically to read such 
provisions from a human rights viewpoint.  
As explained earlier, migration rights in the Treaty have human rights overtones, rendering it 
more a question of whether or not to interpret them from a human rights perspective. In this 
case, the Court would adopt a higher standard of construing migration rights broadly, while 
narrowly construing the restrictions upon them. Secondly, the Court already adjudicates on 
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matters alleging human rights violations under the rule of law and human rights principles 
embodied in the Treaty. Therefore, interpreting migration rights with a human rights bias could 
fall squarely within the fundamental and operational principles of the EAC. The Court has so 
far avoided analysing the alleged migration rights violations as human rights. The Appellate 
Division’s decision that the EACJ has the mandate to interpret the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights9 should actually embolden the Court to adopt a human rights interpretation 
over the economic-based interpretation of migration rights. This is so because the economic 
rationale can easily be subsumed within the human rights interpretation. 
Furthermore the underlying principle in migration rights is non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality or equality of treatment. As explained in chapter two, the substance and standards 
of non-discrimination are universal. ‘Non-discrimination’ or ‘equality of treatment’ as 
understood under human rights law applies equally to migration rights within the economic 
integration context. Non-discrimination may thus be seen as the point of intersection between 
the economic and human rights rationales for migration rights. This makes it easier to 
incorporate a human rights rationale for migration rights. The principle of non-discrimination 
is inherent in the EAC Treaty, particularly the provisions on migration rights. The 
jurisprudence of the ECJ reveals that it is these very principles that the ECJ teleologically 
interpreted, thereby broadening and shaping the scope of migration rights within the EC. 
Moving in tandem, the EACJ in its decisions on migration rights could also place more 
emphasis on non-discrimination and adopt the higher and more objective human rights 
standards, particularly when construing the application of limitations on the rights. Even if it 
does not adopt the teleological approach like the ECJ, which might not be the best course in 
light of the EACJ’s operational context, if it took advantage of the non-discrimination 
provisions, the EACJ would surely be seen as being more progressive. In this case it would not 
only be championing the rights of EAC citizens but also advancing the higher objectives of 
integration. 
This research has revealed that despite a number of infractions in the various Partner States, 
there is hardly any judicial challenge of the same. Recourse to administrative mechanisms or 
procedures appears to be the preferred mode of dispute resolution. Although the research has 
not empirically tested or proven why this may be the case, asides from where the laws 
                                                          
 
9 Democratic Party v The Secretary General of the EAC & others, EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2014. 
193 
 
specifically exclude judicial review, some reasons may not be hard to surmise. For instance, 
the administrative mechanisms may be faster and more efficient than judicial recourse10. Since 
migration rights are being exercised mostly by the economically active, they may need faster 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including diplomacy and good offices, than the usually long 
drawn-out judicial processes. Moreover, and specific to the EACJ, it is not in an advantageous 
or even competitive position over administrative bodies with regard to available remedies. The 
EACJ only makes declarations and awards as to costs, which remedies do not make economic 
sense for business persons. Hence it will be shunned in favour of avenues that offer more 
effective remedies. Moreover, as earlier mentioned, the danger in this current state of affairs is 
dissonance in interpretation and application of migration rights within the Community.  
The remedial powers of the EACJ are more congruent to those of a human rights court than a 
purely economic court or tribunal. By adopting the human rights approach, the EACJ would 
have an edge over the national administrative bodies11 in so far as it could offer more, in essence 
and substance. The human rights interpretation, since it easily subsumes the economic rationale 
for migration rights, offers a higher standard that will conduce to a harmonised and uniform 
interpretation of migration rights. Such interpretation should trickle down to the national courts 
and the administrative bodies who would have to apply EACJ’s interpretation and guidance, 
for the advancement of the Community objectives.  
The human rights interpretation advances the political federation objective of the EAC more 
than the economic interpretation could. This argument also draws on the notion of community 
citizenship discussed in chapter two. Migration rights, even where their rationale is purely 
economic, lie at the heart of community citizenship. Moreover, in most RECs such rights will 
apply only to those who are economically active and mobile. The EAC is in a unique position 
in that the economic objective is only a transitional phase towards a political federation. Within 
the envisaged political federation, community citizenship should be a better defined and more 
prominent status since the Community would be more of a politically defined entity. In such a 
political entity, migration rights ought to take on more the human rights rationale, as has been 
                                                          
 
10 Gathii op cit note 4. 
11 The EACJ’s edge in matters of human rights is well illustrated by the fact that majority of the cases it has 
decided concern the fundamental and operational principles on the rule of law and human rights protection. 
There is only a negligible number of cases that raise matters concerning the economic objectives of the EAC. 
Roughly about one tenth of the cases heard and decided by the EACJ raise matters on the CMP, of which only 
about three of these touch on free movement. See also Gathii op cit note 4.  
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possibly envisaged in the EAC Draft Bill of Rights. The key point here is that interpreting 
migration rights from a human rights viewpoint not only reinforces community citizenship, but 
also paves way for consolidation of these rights under the EAC political federation when it is 
established. 
Yet as discussed in chapter four, migration rights as enunciated in the CMP do not address 
some of the specific concerns of some peoples who are for all intents and purposes EAC 
citizens. These include nomadic pastoralists, cross-border communities as well as EAC citizens 
that may be rendered stateless due to the generally ethno-centric citizenship definitions. Much 
as this might need an amendment or revision of the EAC Treaty and CMP, if the EACJ were 
to adopt a human rights approach in interpreting the Treaty, it might provide some guidance 
on how the law could be shaped in this respect so as to make migration rights meaningful to 
all EAC citizens. 
In the final analysis, the process of bringing to fruition migration rights within the various EAC 
Partner States, is happening gradually and at varying degrees. The level of implementation of 
the Treaty obligations is still much focussed on the formal procedures of migration. The 
citizens in the Northern Corridor states are able to exercise their migration rights to a greater 
extent than those of the EAC states that do not belong to the Northern Corridor project. 
Moreover, even among the fast-moving Northern corridor countries, hurdles still pertain for 
those wishing to work, establish and reside in those countries. All over the EAC, discrimination 
on grounds of nationality with regard to migration rights still persists. But then again, the 
migration rights regime is relatively nascent and as yet evolving.  
The rationale for migration rights within the EAC is not so clear-cut, leaving room for much 
ambiguity in their interpretation and application. While at the Partner State level, the economic 
rationale seems to be predominant, the EACJ has adopted a more neutral rationale of ‘Treaty-
guaranteed rights’. The objectives of the EAC, moreover, seem to support a human rights 
rationale. 
The EACJ, whose uncontested mandate is to interpret and apply the EAC Treaty, therefore has 
a crucial role to play in defining the rationale for migration rights and putting to rest any 
inherent ambiguities. Moreover, the textual-formalism approach favoured by the EACJ, much 
as it may serve its purposes in the time-being, may not have any significant impact in advancing 
the citizens’ migration rights for purposes of achieving the higher objectives of the community.  
195 
 
Even though it may as yet shy away from the teleological or purposive approach, the Court can 
still read the migration rights provisions more expansively in consonance with and to give 
effect to the human rights principles of the EAC Treaty. What is needed is a paradigm-shift 
from the diminutive economic rationalisation of migration rights to the more holistic human 
rights-oriented interpretation. In the meantime, while the EAC is still at the stage where 
economic objectives are largely predominant and the key drivers for integration, it may be wise 
if this paradigm-shift would occur gradually in tandem with the advancement of the EAC’s 
integration. 
7.3 Recommendations for further research and looking forward 
Considering that there is sparse research on the subject of migration rights in the EAC, this 
research serves as a basis for further investigation in this area. The thesis has exposed a number 
of issues that merit further research that may be undertaken in various disciplines.  Some 
specific issues were pointed out in various sections in chapter six, and hence may not be 
repeated. The suggestions provided here are not exhaustive, but might just as well be a starting 
point. First and foremost is the need for an in-depth and empirical research, done at the national 
level, on the status of implementation of each of the migration rights in each of the EAC Partner 
States, which might be utilised for assessing levels of compliance with the EAC Common 
Market Protocol and its regulations. The right to establishment seems to be quite multi-faceted 
compared to the other migration rights, hence it might need more detailed attention. The free 
movement of workers within the EAC also requires specific attention as it is also quite broad 
and elaborate. 
Secondly, it would be interesting to explore whether migration rights, if fully and freely 
exercised by community citizens, would foster integration and co-existence among the 
ethnically-polarised African communities. Chapter four only highlighted some of the problems 
with the migration rights and community citizenships concepts in the EAC. Further 
investigations and research are needed to test the applicability of these concepts in the various 
RECs in Africa, and whether they can be adapted to provide comprehensive solutions to 
Africa’s citizenship and nationality-related problems. 
Thirdly, and specific to the EAC, is the need to study the form that the envisaged political 
federation would take and the status of migration rights and community citizenship in that 
establishment. Although some work is being done at the level of the secretariat following the 
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Wako committee report, a comprehensive scholarly study would contribute to recommending 
best available options for the EAC. 
With regard to the EACJ, it would be interesting to study the profile of the judges and get an 
insight into how they perceive of their roles and their vision for EAC integration. It would also 
be worth investigating how the Court expects to overcome some of the challenges it faces, 
especially challenges to its authority. Does the Court see itself as being a ‘motor for 
integration’12 in the EAC, and how does it see itself playing this role?  
These are just some of the general recommended areas of study. However there is still more to 
unpack and unravel in the area of EAC integration generally and particularly migration rights 
of EAC citizens.   
Among the RECs in Africa, the EAC undoubtedly has the most developed normative 
framework for migration rights. As one of the building blocks for the continental integration 
project, that is the AEC and the AU, the way the EAC advances its migration rights regime 
will probably have implications for or impact upon the bigger project. As mentioned in chapter 
three, the EAC is part of the TFTA together with COMESA and SADC. This TFTA is one of 
the projected phases leading towards the establishment of a continental free trade area, one of 
the stages envisioned prior to the establishment of the AEC13. Although both SADC and 
COMESA allow for free movement of persons, albeit to varying degrees, there are a number 
of lessons they can draw from the EAC. The starting point would have to be its normative 
framework, but also the interpretation and application of the norms would set a valuable 
precedent. Therefore the human rights approach to migration rights suggested in this thesis 
would not only serve the interests of the EAC, but would most probably influence the 
continental approach towards migration rights as provided for under the AEC Treaty14. In other 
words, the EAC’s rationalisation and approach to migration rights can serve as a benchmark 
for other African RECs with similar objectives.
                                                          
 
12 A phrase used by August Reinisch in reference to the ECJ. See August Reinisch Essential Questions in EU 
Law (2012) 68. 
13 AEC Treaty Articles 4.2 & 6.2 (c) para (d). 
14 AEC Treaty Article 43. 
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APPENDIX 1   TABLE 2 Entry/Work/Residence Permit Requirements among EAC Partner States 
Permit 
Class 
Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
A Issued to a person who intends 
to engage in prospecting and 
mining. 
Issued to a person who intends to engage in 
prospecting and mining.  
A1- for investors. 
A2 - for entrepreneurs. 
Issued to a person who intends to engage in: 
prospecting and mining (A1); trade and business 
(A2); prescribed profession (A3); manufacturing and 
processing (A4); agriculture and animal husbandry 
(A5); artisans (A6); small scale farming, trade, 
business and fishing (A7); peasants (A8). 
Issued to a person 
contracted in service for 
the Government of 
Uganda; or to an 
accredited diplomat. 
B Issued to a person who intends 
to engage in agriculture or 
animal husbandry. 
Issued to a person who intends to engage in 
agricultural production, animal husbandry or 
related activities. B1 for investors. 
B2 for entrepreneurs. 
Issued to a person offered specified employment. Issued to persons who 
intend to invest in 
agriculture or animal 
husbandry. 
C Issued to a member of a 
prescribed profession who 
wishes to practice it in Kenya. 
Issued to a member of a prescribed profession 
including professional players and artists.  
C1 for a person with a prescribed profession. 
C2 for a professional player or artist. 
Issued to a person not granted Class ‘A’ or ‘B’ 
permit, if the Director thinks it fit to be granted such 
permit. 
Issued to persons who 
intend to engage in 
prospecting and mining. 
D Issued to a person who has been 
offered specific employment. 
Issued to diplomats. 
D1 for persons accredited as diplomats to 
Rwanda. 
D2 for a person working with an international 
organisation and has diplomatic status. 
 Issued to a person who 
intends to engage in 
business and trade. 
E  Issued to a person employed on a Rwandan 
Government contract. 
E1 for a person employed on a government 
contract. 
E2 for a person providing technical assistance 
to Rwanda under a bilateral agreement. 
 Issued to a person who 
intends to engage in 
manufacturing. 
F Issued to a person who intend 
to engage in specific 
manufacturing. 
Issued to a person who intends to engage in 
specific manufacturing or processing. 
F1 for investors. 
F2 for entrepreneurs. 
 Issued to a member of a 
prescribed profession who 
intends to practice that 
profession in Uganda. 
G Issued to a person who intends 
to engage in a specific trade, 
business, consultancy or 
profession (other than a 
prescribed profession).  
Issued to a person who intends to engage in a 
specific trade, business and services. 
G1 for persons within the region. 
G2 for persons outside the region in which 
Rwanda is situated. 
 G1 – issued to volunteers, 
NGO workers and 
missionaries. 
G2- issued to persons who 
intend to work as 
employees in specific 
employment. 
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H  Issued to a person who has been offered 
specific employment.  
H1 for a skilled worker on an occupation on 
the demand list. 
H2 for a skilled worker sponsored by his or 
her employer. 
H3 for a journalist or foreign media 
representative with Rwandan accreditation. 
H4 for a semi-skilled worker or artisan from a 
country within the region. 
H5 for a foreign staff working in an 
international or regional organisation. 
  
I Issued to a member of an 
approved religious or charitable 
organisation or activity. 
Issued to a person engaged in approved 
religious activities. 
  
J  Issued to a person who invests in the 
hospitality sector and other related activities. 
J1 for investors. 
J2 for entrepreneurs. 
  
K Issued to persons not less than 
35 years of age and who have a 
prescribed assured income from 
sources outside Kenya. 
Issued to a person with an assured income 
including a retired person. 
  
M Issued to a person who has been 
granted refugee status. 
Issued to a close relative or any person that 
may be considered a family member of a 
permit holder or national. 
  
N  Issued to a person who is in Rwanda for study 
purposes or as an occupational trainee. 
  
P  Issued to a person who undertakes voluntary 
work with an organisation that has a 
prescribed agreement with Rwanda, and to a 
student of a higher institution of learning 
working during his or her holidays or ne who 
has completed studies. 
  
R  Issued to a foreigner who secures employment 
for not more than 90 days. Also issued to a 
worker or self-employed person who has not 
yet acquired a resident permit. 
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*Sources: Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations No.64/2012; Ministerial Order No. 02/01 of 31/05/2011 establishing Regulations and Procedures Implementing 
the Immigration and Emigration Law of Rwanda; The Immigration Act No. 7 of 1995 (Tanzania); The Immigration Regulations, G.N. No. 657 of 1997 (Tanzania); The 
Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Regulations No. 16 of 2004. Websites: http://www.immigration.go.ke/Information.html; 
https://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=79; http://immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=15; http://www.immigration.go.ug/content/permits as at 18 June 2015. 
  
S  Issued to a person who resides along the 
border area of Rwanda who regularly crosses 
for reasons of work or business. 
  
W  Issued to a person who intends to invest in 
information and technology and other related 
activities. 
W1 for investors. 
W2 for entrepreneurs. 
  
X  Issued to a person who wishes to invest in 
transport and logistics and related activities. 
X1 for investors. 
X2 for entrepreneurs. 
  
Z  Issued to a person who wishes to invest in any 
sector other than one already mentioned. 
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TABLE 3 Permit requirements for persons who wish to engage in a profession, business or trade in various EAC Partner States 
Class of 
Permit 
Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
“A”    Trade, business and prescribed profession: 
Application forms; 
Security Bond; 
Cover letter; 
Curriculum vitae; 
A copy of national passport; 
Certified copies of academic certificates (if any); 
Evidence of capital of the company e.g. bank 
statement(s); balance sheet; a list of the company's 
assets with their value; proof of ownership of 
assets;  
Proof of importation of company goods (if any); 
Evidence of the premises of the company e.g. lease 
agreement or title deed; 
Memorandum and Articles of Association (for a 
limited company); 
Certificate of Incorporation, Compliance or 
Registration of the Company/Business; 
Extract from Register for business not incorporated 
as a Limited Company 
Business Licenses;  
Registration Certificates from relevant Regulatory 
Authorities; 
Value Added Tax (VAT) Certificate (for 
Businesses entitled to pay this type of tax); 
Tax Payer's Identity Number (T.I.N.) Certificate; 
Business License Tax Clearance Certificate; 
Certificate of Incentive); 
Share Certificate (where the applicant is a 
shareholder in a registered company); 
Transfer of Share(s)/Stock Deed (in case the 
applicant is a shareholder by virtue of some shares 
being transferred to him); 
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Board Resolution appointing the applicant as a 
Director (where the applicant is not among the first 
Directors); 
Return of Allotment of Shares from the Registrar 
of Companies in case the applicant has been 
allotted some shares; 
Six passport photos. 
Fees- USD 3000. 
“C”  Travel document; 
Permit fees (100,000Rwf) 
not payable by citizens of 
Kenya and Uganda; 
Police clearance; 
1 coloured passport photo; 
Application form; 
Cover Letter to the Director 
of Immigration; 
Company Registration 
Certificate; 
Trading License; 
Curriculum Vitae; 
Certificate of Registration 
with Rwandan Professional 
body. 
 
  
“D”    Business and trade 
Work permit form; 
Covering letter from 
company; 
2 passport size photos; 
Photocopies of the 
passport; 
Company's bank 
statement; 
Uganda Investment 
Authority license ( where 
applicable ); 
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Articles and 
memorandum of 
association; 
Certificate of 
incorporation; 
Income tax clearance; 
Trading license; 
Banking of Uganda 
Certificate of remittance 
of US $ 100,000; 
Police clearance from 
country of origin; 
Security bond. 
Fees waived for citizens 
of Kenya and Rwanda. 
“F”    Prescribed professionals 
Work permit form; 
2 passport size photos; 
Photocopies of passport; 
Covering letter; 
Qualifications; 
Registration with the 
relevant professional 
agency; 
Company documents; 
Police clearance from 
home country; 
Security bond. 
Fees waived for citizens 
of Kenya and Rwanda. 
“G” Specific  trade, business and services 
Application form; 
Cover letter; 
Copies of passport; 
2 passport photos; 
Documentary proof of capital to be 
invested/already invested minimum of 
100,000 US dollars or equivalent in any 
other currency; 
Specific trade, business and 
services 
Passport photo; 
Application form; 
Cover letter; 
Business registration 
certificate; 
Curriculum vitae; 
Police clearance; 
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Registration certificate of the company OR 
certificate of incorporation; 
Copies of personal and company PIN 
(Personal Identification Number) if 
business is running; 
Processing Fee Kshs.10,000 non-
refundable; 
Fee is Kshs. 100,000/= per year or part 
thereof 
Fees waived for citizens of Rwanda and 
Uganda. 
Trading licence; 
Memorandum of 
Understanding between 
businessmen (if in 
partnership); 
Report from field inspection 
and law enforcement 
department; 
Fees (20,000 Rwf) waived 
for citizens of Kenya and 
Uganda.  
*Sources: Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Regulations No.64/2012; Ministerial Order No. 02/01 of 31/05/2011 establishing Regulations and Procedures Implementing the Immigration and 
Emigration Law of Rwanda; The Immigration Act No. 7 of 1995 (Tanzania); The Immigration Regulations, G.N. No. 657 of 1997 (Tanzania); Immigration (Amendment) Regulations, 2012 
(Tanzania); The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Regulations No. 16 of 2004; The Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control (Fees) Regulations, 2013. Websites: 
http://www.immigration.go.ke/Information.html; https://www.migration.gov.rw/index.php?id=79; http://immigration.go.tz/module1.php?id=15; http://www.immigration.go.ug/content/permits; 
http://www.rdb.rw/departments/investment/starting-a-business.html; http://www.tic.co.tz/menu/179?l=en as at 18 June 2015. 
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